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Preface 
This report presents findings from research into the impact of selected projects on water supply and 
sanitation (WSS) services in urban areas of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with particular emphasis on the 
way in which poor areas and households are included in those investments.   
 
The research has focused on projects carried out by utilities and funded by the International Development 
Association (IDA). The IDA is an important source of funding for investments in WSS in low-income 
countries  through concessional loans and grants. The research covered utility-implemented, IDA-funded 
projects in three countries, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Tanzania, focusing on the following cities: Accra 
(and one other urban centre in Ghana), Ouagadougou and Dar es Salaam.  
 
The study aims to assess how the inclusion of low-income areas and households is conceptualised in 
urban WSS (UWSS) policies and strategies, designed in the specific projects under consideration - 
including the approaches of the water utilities/operators as observed in relation to those projects - and 
implemented on the ground.  
 
Demographic changes are presenting major challenges for water delivery systems. Rapid growth in each 
city has more than doubled populations over the last two decades, with urban expansion into new areas 
and large numbers of residents living in slums and informal settlements. The aim of this study has been to 
draw lessons from both the achievements and weaknesses of the selected projects, in order to contribute 
evidence and analysis to policy debates regarding the improvement of water services for previously un-
served or poorly served users in SSA cities, with particular attention to low-income households. 
 
This research was commissioned by WaterAid, as an input to an on-going dialogue process which aims to 
strengthen understanding between the World Bank and civil society organisations (CSOs). The research 
has been conducted over a period of three years. In February 2009, a team comprising WaterAid and ODI 
took the project outline to the World Bank „Water Week‟ for initial discussions, including consultation as 
to which IDA-supported utility projects would be studied. In Spring 2009, reconnaissance missions were 
made to Ghana, Burkina and Tanzania and in-country research partners in each case were identified. In 
the second half of 2009, the research was undertaken by ODI/SOAS and the local partners.  
 
In July 2010, a preliminary report, in draft, was submitted to WaterAid by ODI/SOAS, on behalf of the 
research team. WaterAid transmitted this to the World Bank for review and comment. The World Bank 
subsequently responded in December 2010 with detailed written comments on the preliminary report in a 
reply document, with comments on the Burkina chapter sent in January 2011. In response to ODI/SOAS‟ 
request (forwarded by WaterAid to the World Bank in March 2011) for documents and reports which had 
not been available to the study teams in 2009, the Bank supplied, in May 2011, some additional 
documentation. Some gaps still remained in the information available to the researchers, for example 
documentation of social analysis in Tanzania which was reportedly undertaken during project design. 
 
In May 2011 also, a meeting was held by video-conference between the World Bank, ODI/SOAS and 
WaterAid to  consider issues raised by the ODI/SOAS research in relation to the challenges of achieving 
„inclusion‟ faced by urban water supply and sanitation projects in Africa (on an informal basis - the 
discussions during the video-conference are not cited in this report).   
 
The research findings presented in this report are, mostly, based on the work of the researchers 
undertaken in 2009. The report has, however, been reviewed and revised by ODI/SOAS to respond to the 
World Bank‟s written comments on the preliminary July 2010 draft, taking account of the points 
presented by the World Bank and views expressed in those written comments.  
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Further, the researchers in each of the three countries were requested, in Autumn 2011, to conduct a rapid 
check for any major project or sector developments. The three country studies in Sections 2 - 4 include, 
therefore, some information updates as at November 2011.    
 
At the time of the research in 2009, the sample projects were at different stages. In Ghana, the Urban 
Water Project had been approved in 2004 and originally scheduled for completion by the end of 2010. 
Implementation had, however, been delayed; at the time of the main research in 2009, disbursement was 
reported to be only in the region of 40% of total funds. The closing date of the Ghana project has 
subsequently been re-scheduled for 31
st
 December, 2012. In Burkina Faso, the Ouagadougou Water 
Supply Project (commonly called the „ZIGA‟ project) was concluded in 2007 and a further initiative, the 
Urban Water Sector Project, was approved in 2009, with a sanitation component. In Tanzania, the Dar es 
Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project-DWSSP began in 2003 and concluded in November 2010, 
following several time extensions from the originally programmed end-date of December 2008. 
  
As per the research brief, a key focus has been the „pro-poor‟ strand in UWSS: how far inclusion of low-
income areas and households, established in national policy in the three countries, was maintained in a 
chain of activities from policy principles to project design and project implementation in order to achieve 
results in terms of pro-poor service. The research team accordingly looked for the translation of the policy 
statements on inclusion and „equity‟ in the three countries into utility plans/operator contracts, project 
designs, and realisation of the projects on the ground. 
 
At the outset of this research, the intention was to include more study of sanitation aspects, but the 
selection of Ghana, Burkina and Tanzania - as the outcome of the dialogue between WaterAid, the World 
Bank and ODI/SOAS - meant that a majority of the chosen project elements targeted to poor populations 
were for water supply rather than sanitation provision. In relation to sanitation, only the new project in 
Burkina includes a substantial sanitation component. The project in Ghana focused exclusively on water 
supply, while in Tanzania the majority of project funds (and virtually all of the specific pro-poor 
elements) were dedicated to water. Consequently, water supply is given more focus in the present study.   
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Executive Summary   
 
The background to this research project, including an overview of the objectives and processes involved, 
is provided in the Preface above. This Summary presents a synopsis of the main research findings as well 
as recommendations arising from those. A key observation is the diversity of approaches adopted in the 
countries and projects studied when it comes to providing services for low-income households. 
 
 „Inclusion‟ in water policies 
In each of the three countries studied (Ghana, Burkina Faso and 
Tanzania), laws and/or policies applying to water supply include a 
commitment to universal access to potable water supply and recognition 
of the need for „equity‟ (Burkina and Tanzania) in making water available 
to the poor (Ghana and Tanzania) at affordable cost (all countries).  
How far these stated policy goals were translated into practice is discussed below.  
 
 Project Investment in Water Infrastructure 
The projects have established substantial new water infrastructure and 
rehabilitated existing facilities. The achievements in engineering and 
technology in each of the countries as are follows. 
 
In Ouagadougou, the Ouagadougou Water Supply Project - or „ZIGA‟ 
project - saw: construction of an earth dam/reservoir at the ZIGA river site; 50 kilometres of primary 
water main bringing bulk supply to the city; a storage facility and a pumping station at the city boundary; 
water towers and ground-level tanks within the city; plus 171 kilometres of secondary and 1,437 
kilometres of tertiary distribution networks in the city. Water production and delivery has been tripled, 
from 40,800 cm3/day in 2001 to 122,000 cm3/day in 2007, with a transformation from an intermittent to 
continuous supply (including in the dry season), sufficient to meet current demand.  
 
In Tanzania, the Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project (DWSSP) has made a substantial 
investment in rehabilitation of water production facilities and the distribution network, to go some way to 
address a severe shortfall in bulk water in the system. 110,000 connections (new, reinstated and 
rehabilitated) and 184 water kiosks have been installed, and stand-alone water supply schemes have been 
constructed in 41 peri-urban communities. Infrastructure improvements have, however, been delayed, 
with the result that water losses have not yet been significantly reduced. The development of new water 
sources is still urgently required. Continuing lack of water in the network, as well as a failure to address 
some management issues, mean that a reliable service is not provided by most kiosks; in 2009 only 12 out 
of 184 (7%) were functioning reliably. 
 
In Ghana, the Urban Water Project (UWP) was intended to finance infrastructure in urban areas in all ten 
regions of the country to cover individual water supply systems, extension of water production, 
transmission and distribution networks. However, progress in implementation was extensively delayed, 
which meant that, at the time of the research in 2009, the project had yet to realize the full extent of the 
proposed  - and much-needed - investment in infrastructure. 
 
 Utility capacity and commercial/financial performance 
Strengthening of utility/operator capacity and financial 
performance is also a central objective of each project, as clearly 
set out in the project appraisal documents (PADs). Indeed, the 
combined utility capacity and infrastructure components are 
allocated by far the largest share of project budgets. In each of 
Progress in strengthening utility 
capacity and commercial/financial 
performance 
         
   
Conceptualisation of 
‘inclusion’ in policy 
         
   
Engineering and technical 
achievements 
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the three countries, there has been support for strengthening aspects of utility/operator capacity, with 
considerable progress (at least, against project targets as stated in the PADs) in Burkina and recent 
improvements in Tanzania at utility level, though the performance of the operator has been less strong. 
Some improvements have also occurred in Ghana, although performance remains below target.  
 
In Burkina, the strong leadership by the Managing Director of ONEA and his team generated a 
substantial turn-around in financial/operational management: bill collection, reduction of unaccounted-
for-water, staff productivity, and financial reporting.  
 
In Tanzania and Ghana, institutional reform was oriented towards the introduction of private operators: 
Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (AVRL) in Ghana and initially City Water in Tanzania, until the management 
contract was terminated in 2005 and water and sewerage operations were leased to the publicly-owned 
Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sewerage Corporation (DAWASCO). The failed privatisation in Dar 
was damaging because it delayed improvements in operations and infrastructure, and led to an 
unsatisfactory institutional arrangement where the operator lacks accountability. 
 
In each of the countries studied, there was a contract between the State and the utility/operator. In the 
cases of Ghana and Tanzania, the operators were managers of the water system, with a parallel state body 
being the owner of the infrastructure. In Burkina, the infrastructure was owned and managed by the 
publicly-owned utility, ONEA.  
 
The contracts between supervising government ministries 
and the utilities, and the independent operators in Ghana 
and Tanzania, focus on improving utility performance and 
achieving financial stability, measured by technical and 
financial indicators. The contracts provide very little 
incentive for the utilities/operator to serve low-income 
households.  
 
In Burkina, ONEA‟s performance contract did not include any performance targets relating to „pro-poor‟ 
objectives. In Tanzania, the performance contract for DAWASA (the public sector utility which owns the 
water infrastructure) includes implementation of the pro-poor components of the DWSSP, and these 
terms mirror targets expressed in the project design as set out in the PAD  (to implement a lifeline tariff, 
first-time connection fund, kiosk installation and community water supply and sanitation projects). 
However, when it comes to the contract with the operator of the water infrastructure (DAWASCO), these 
are missing from the contractual performance indicators, which focus solely on general technical/service 
standards and efficiency measures, leaving an accountability gap around the services for low-income 
households for which DAWASCO was responsible (first time connection fund and kiosk construction).  
 
In Ghana, the contract between the government water company (GWCL) and the private management 
company (AVRL) was reported to contain no specific incentives to increase services to low-income 
households. While the management contract included key performance indicators which were aimed at 
improving service delivery (reducing non-revenue water, improving water quality, improved standards 
for customer response), none related to improvements in service delivery for low-income households. 
There was only a very loose proviso that AVRL was obliged to perform its services in accordance with 
social policy of the regulator (PURC). In addition, the relationship between GWCL and AVRL was 
strained, with the two parties failing to agree on the interpretation of some clauses in the management 
contract. That eventually culminated in the signing of two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) in 2007 
and 2008 respectively.  
 
Performance contracts and projects  
are ‘skewed’ to utility/financial and 
engineering matters…         
   
  
 
 
 
This contributes to a key finding of the research that, 
while the project documents contain substantial pro-poor 
rhetoric, when it comes to the details of design and 
implementation the projects assessed by this research 
study are skewed towards commercial/financial and 
technical objectives, to the relative detriment of social 
aspects.  
 
In the design of each project, as set out in the PAD, pro-poor goals referred to in descriptive parts of the 
text are not reflected in the key performance indicators (KPIs). While project performance indicators 
prioritise financial and technical aspects, social indicators - where they exist - refer to numbers of 
connections or standpipes/kiosks installed with no measure of where these are located or who is to 
benefit.  
 
So, output/outcome indicators refer to objectives in terms of installation of standpipes/kiosks 
(Ouagadougou and Dar es Salaam), creation of community schemes (Dar), and operation of life-line or 
„social‟ tariffs (Ouagadougou and Dar), as well as „social‟ connections (Ouagadougou) and the First Time 
Connection Fund (Dar), but they do not make explicit who these water facilities are to serve and whether 
they will provide a good and affordable service.   
 
In Burkina, a “primary goal” of the 2009-2015 Urban Water Sector Project (page 20 of the PAD) is “to 
contribute to sustainable improvement of hygiene and environmental health by improving access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation in poor fringe areas of Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso and other urban 
areas … including reducing “…the access bias between formal and informal settlements…”. But, among 
a number of infrastructure/financial objectives in the KPIs of the project, this social goal is not reflected. 
In the KPIs, there is no reference to the location of either infrastructure type and no specification of which 
categories of „population‟ and „individuals‟ are to benefit from the new connections and standpipes. The 
same omission occurred in the design of the prior „ZIGA‟ project in Burkina (2001-07).   
 
In the PADs of the studied projects, statements of „pro-poor‟ goals are not translated into quantifiable 
measures of impact for low-income households. There is, therefore, no requirement to assess the 
effectiveness of pro-poor measures as part of project evaluation. This means that pro-poor goals are likely 
to be de-prioritised, and that opportunities to learn from the efforts which have been made to reach low-
income populations may be missed. 
 
Addressing underlying constraints, such as a lack of bulk 
water in the system (a problem in all three cities/countries 
at the start of the projects and one which persists in Accra 
and Dar es Salaam) or strengthening utility management, is 
necessary to underpin any improvement in service 
provision, including for low-income populations. However, 
to ensure that low-income groups are not the last to benefit, overall system improvements alone are not 
sufficient; specific measures are needed.   
 
 Water services - „inclusion‟ in projects 
On the subject of „inclusion‟ of poor areas and households, the research finds that in all three countries, 
the national policies (referred to above) express the principle of affordable services to low-income 
communities. However, when it comes to the translation of policy statements into utility plans/contracts, 
project design and ultimately project implementation, social aspects, in particular inclusion of low-
income areas and households, have been lost or disregarded (in Dar, they are taken account of in part, but 
… to the detriment of social aspects 
         
   
Ensuring low-income groups are not 
the last to benefit 
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in many cases downgraded in priority) - as shown in the Figure attached to this Executive Summary 
(reproduced from section 5.5).  
 
In Ghana, the infrastructure investment has been allocated across the country according to specific 
criteria.  The regional allocation is based on the urban population, GDP per capita, the proportion of the 
population covered by existing services and the extent of parallel investments. Within each region, funds 
are allocated according to water availability, population service coverage and existing investment per 
capita. Thus, the allocation mechanism is intended to reach those on lowest incomes in areas with least 
coverage and least investment. While this indicates a pro-poor targeting strategy, the research study found 
that this did not necessarily reach those most in need where there were additional water sources such as 
private wells and customers faced substantial obstacles in obtaining a household connection in the form 
of cost and bureaucratic processes.  
 
In Burkina, the ZIGA project provided (according to the 2008 World Bank evaluation reported in the 
ICR) 56,000 new household connections and 400 standpipes. Based on ONEA‟s estimates of the number 
of persons per connection and standpipe, this means that over 600,000 persons were served with new 
facilities, i.e: more than a doubling of persons with access to network in six years. That was a substantial 
achievement, except that ONEA is unable to say who has benefitted - which sorts of household make up 
the 600,000. During the 2009 interviews conducted by the present project‟s research team in 
Ouagadougou, an ONEA official had commented that the city was composed of mixed wealth 
communities so that it is: “impossible to distinguish between rich and poor areas”. Since, the researchers 
in Burkina have carried out a mapping exercise, based on the 2006 census, showing levels of poverty of 
peri-urban zones, as compared with comparatively wealthier central sectors of the city. This exercise has 
shown that the water infrastructure installed by ONEA reached, broadly, poor peri-urban districts, but that 
there were targeting errors which meant that some poor districts were excluded, and some non-poor areas 
were included.      
 
The most tangible effort of inclusion was made in Tanzania under the DWSSP, which included several 
pro-poor components in its design. Of these, a community water supply and sanitation programme has 
provided water services to between 165,000 and 400,000 people (estimates vary) in peri-urban areas. This 
initiative has been broadly successful and DAWASA has shown commitment to the programme, 
including extending the approach, through a dedicated Community Liaison Unit - a very positive 
achievement. However, the other pro-poor components have not been effectively applied. A fund to 
subsidise new connections for those categories of households was collected with the intention of ensuring 
that at least 80% of new connections were for low- and middle-income households, but it was never 
applied. An insufficient number of households in networked areas met the criteria of eligibility for the 
fund, and instead a universal connection subsidy was provided under the project, meaning that there was 
no way to ensure that a majority of lower- or middle- income consumers were connected. Meanwhile the 
kiosks installed under the project are not generally providing a good service, as described above, and 
seem to have been de-prioritised.  
 
As noted above, the projects have delivered some improvements in 
water services in all countries, albeit with varying degrees of 
success. From an equity perspective, however, the question arises 
as to who benefitted from these improved water services. 
Currently, none of the projects demonstrate a clearly defined and 
adequately developed targeting strategy, which is consistently 
applied by the utility/operator.  
 
In Ghana, the implicit assumption seems to have been that, by improving bulk water supply and financial 
performance of the utility, improvements in delivery to low-income households would emerge as a by-
Targeting to low-income areas 
or households is either non-
existent or undeveloped and 
unsystematic         
   
  
 
 
 
product, without special measures. The regulator, PURC, is leading social policy highlighting pro-poor 
issues, and a small element of the UWP was allocated to an innovative pilot study aiming to reach poor 
households in three deprived areas of Accra. This pilot project incorporated detailed baseline analysis and 
community sensitisation before implementation. A Water User Committee was established in each project 
area. These pilot projects led by PURC are positive attempts to tackle the challenges of pro-poor target, 
although they constituted a small proportion of the budget for the UWP.  
 
In Burkina, where the June 2008 ICR of the ZIGA project says that standpipes are “mostly” located in 
poorer districts of Ouagadougou, this is correct, but not analytically useful. ONEA‟s stated intention of 
implementing a „social‟ policy was not realised by the ZIGA project, or at least not demonstrably 
realised.  
 
In Tanzania, various targeting approaches were developed under the DWSSP which represented an effort 
to reach low-income households in design. The CWSSP schemes were clearly targeted to areas in need of 
new services and with high rates of water-related disease, while kiosks were mostly targeted to areas 
identified as priorities for infrastructure upgrading (under a parallel project) and some attempt was made 
to assess demand for kiosks versus household connections. The first time connection fund was also to be 
targeted against a set of criteria aimed at identifying low- and middle-income households. However, the 
process for targeting kiosks used under this project has not been integrated into the routine practice of the 
operator, while the targeting criteria for the connection fund were found to be ineffective and have not 
been applied. As a result of the abandonment of targeted connection subsidies, the project‟s design target 
for 80% of new connections to reach low- and middle-income households fell by the wayside. There is no 
measure of whether the new household connections installed under the project have reached low-income 
households.  
 
The lack of clear commitment by the utilities/operator to pro-poor services in each of the three countries 
threatens the sustainability of the social components of the projects, as does the weakness in 
accountability. Problems of functionality of standpipes are affecting access in areas where focus groups 
were convened as part of this research study (e.g. Tabtenga in Ouagadougou; Dar es Salaam).  
 
 Tariffs and subsidies  
The utilities in the three countries operate a system of subsidy to 
household connection cost and consumption tariff, each with its 
particularities. However, connection subsidies have been geared 
to increasing the number of household connections irrespective 
of for whom - not specifically for low-income households - 
while consumption subsidies benefit only those with an 
individual household connection. Water from standpipes/kiosks is subsidised in all three countries, but in 
Burkina and Tanzania it remains more expensive for consumers than water from a household connection, 
as the cost of paying an operator/caretaker is passed on to kiosk/standpost users.  
 
In Ghana, there exists a lifeline tariff for the first 20 m3 of water supplied to households, although this 
has been shown to be regressive, because it penalises those in high-density housing (usually on lower 
incomes) where a large number of individuals access water from a single connection. The tariff at 
standpipes is the same as the social tariff, but - as in the other cases studied - the actual price paid is often 
higher due to the mark up of the standpipe operator.  Unlike in Burkina and Tanzania, connections are not 
subsidised in Ghana. The view of the regulator (PURC) is that the main barrier to access for poor 
households is not the cost of connection, but inadequate infrastructure, and that customers are able to 
meet the full cost of connections once the service is expanded to them.  
 
Subsidies are not directed to low-
income households         
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In Burkina, together with a reduced tariff for the first tranche of residential water consumption, a key 
element of ONEA‟s policy was noted to be (still was in 2011), a subsidy to stimulate demand for 
household connections, called „social connections‟. This subsidy is made available to all households in 
the areas of the Ouagadougou beyond the centre that express the desire to connect - i.e. the subsidy is not 
targeted to any peri-urban districts or customer income categories living outside the centre in particular. 
The subsidy continues to be applied universally. As such, in the Ouagadougou context, it is too blunt an 
instrument to achieve the goal of equity set out in national water policy. Treating all customers‟ requests 
for connection to the network equally will not achieve equity. By not filtering out relatively wealthy 
households from their current eligibility to benefit from the social connection subsidy, low-income 
households in poor peri-urban areas of the city are being made to wait for improved access. Meanwhile, 
by not charging the full unsubsidised connection cost to more wealthy households, ONEA is missing out 
on revenue, which does not help it in its objective of maintaining financial equilibrium. As to the 
reduction in the price of household connection in Ouagadougou (from FCFA 300,000 to FCFA 30,000), 
the responses from the focus groups conducted by the research team in surrounding areas (far from the 
Ouagadougou city centre) suggest that the reduced price of FCFA 30,000 needs reviewing - on the basis 
that it is still not affordable by very poor households (in both formal and informal areas).  
 
In Tanzania, whilst a targeted connection subsidy was designed under the DWSSP and was supposed to 
ensure that at least 80% of new connections were for low- and middle-income households, in practice free 
connections were provided to all new customers under the project in order to increase the number of 
connections on DAWASCO‟s books and help achieve financial stability, with no differentiation as to 
household wealth. All those with a private connection also benefit from a consumption subsidy to the first 
„lifeline‟ tranche of water consumed each month, although many consumers access water from 
neighbours‟ connections and would therefore be unable to benefit from this (section 1.2). Meanwhile, 
water purchased from kiosks or the CWSSP schemes remains more expensive than water purchased 
through private networked connections, although these consumers are expected to be poorer.  
 
 Socio-economic analysis 
The PADs in all cases cite very limited social analysis as 
compared with the depth of information and discussion of 
financial and technical aspects and, to the extent the projects 
assessed, as a starting point, the needs of poor households, the 
socio-economic information on which that assessment was based 
was either not cited in the relevant PAD or was not utilised in the project design.  
 
In Ghana, the pro-poor national targeting strategy of the project was to be supported by more detailed 
socio-economic analysis. When it came to implementation, the analysis appears not to have been 
conducted in the manner anticipated in the PAD. Instead of a substantial review at the start of the project, 
use was made of already-existing research which was dated and oriented towards privatisation rather than 
the needs of the poorest households. Subsequent to the 2009 research, a socio-economic study was 
commissioned in 2011, but, coming so late in the project, this is unlikely to have the impact on targeting 
that was envisaged in the PAD.  
 
In Burkina, a survey conducted for ONEA in 2007 by international consultants collected data on the 
„socio-economic profile‟ of households in Ouagadougou and other urban centres in Burkina, based on a 
questionnaire which was delivered to a sample of 760 households in the seven cities surveyed. In the 
consultants‟ 2008 report1 to ONEA, the description of Ouagadougou (and the other urban centres) which 
is presented clearly drew on responses to the questionnaire and confirmed Ouagadougou as a city with 
identifiably different levels of wealth/poverty. Nevertheless, in designing the 2009-2015 Urban Water 
                                                 
1 ICEA/SOGREAH 2008, made available by ONEA to the researchers in 2011.   
Socio-economic analysis either 
lacking or not utilised         
   
  
 
 
 
Sector Project, this socio-economic data was not utilised as an input to a strategy for targeting low-
income areas and households.  
 
In Tanzania, the PAD contains a very brief assessment of affordability which identifies, but does not 
address, the fact that water from kiosks will remain more expensive than that from household 
connections. Although World Bank staff indicated that other social analysis was conducted to inform 
project design, evidence of this was not made available to researchers. The project the Implementation 
Completion Reports (ICR) indicates that a rigorous beneficiary impact assessment was „foreseen‟ later in 
the project but never undertaken. DAWASA did commission a survey to assess project impacts, but 
although income data was collected, the survey did not provide any disaggregated data by income level 
which could have guided pro-poor strategies, for example on service levels, affordability or needs. 
DAWASA‟s Community Liaison Unit has, however, shown a commitment to learning from the CWSSP 
experience and has commissioned a number of studies to assess both impacts for beneficiaries and the 
effectiveness of its approaches. 
 
 Management for results and, particularly pro-
poor impacts 
In all three countries, there is a lack of data disaggregated 
by household income level. Increasing water access is 
documented in terms of numbers which bear no reference 
to income groups. The water utilities in each country do 
not currently organise customer data by income category. This goes hand in hand with the lack of targeted 
subsidies for connections (or consumption) - directed at low-income consumers. The utilities currently 
have no systems to identify these households, and are also not making use of census data or other 
available information to do so.  
 
In Burkina, the absence of disaggregated information available and utilized by ONEA means that it lacks 
information with which to analyse how far the new water infrastructure which it has installed brought 
improved services to low-income households. Poor households in Ouagadougou have benefitted, but 
ONEA is not able to say how many. And, from the perspective of inclusion of poor households, its 
„targeting‟ of peri-urban areas is patchy. Further, in some areas/sectors of Ouagadougou, it seems (subject 
to ONEA‟s explanations in each case) that equity was not done, e.g. the sectors of the city which are seen 
in the bar chart supplied by ONEA and reproduced in Annex 6 of the present report to have received less 
than 10 standpipes in 2003-2009
2
.  
 
Until this pro-poor and equity gap is addressed by the utilities and regulating/supervising state 
bodies, it risks undermining progress in tackling the challenge of extending improved water 
services to peri-urban areas of cities, both formal and informal.   
 
The lack of monitoring arrangements for pro-poor 
services in all three countries/cities raises concerns about 
accountability, given that, as noted above, there is no 
overall strategy or plan for inclusion in any of the cities 
studied and a lack of indicators relating to social issues in 
either the project documents or utility contracts. For 
services provided to the poor, there is no clear basis on which to hold utilities accountable.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Namely sector 15 (poor), 20 (poor), 26 (poor), 28 (very poor) and 29 (very poor).     
... and weak measuring and monitoring 
of impacts in terms of poverty reduction 
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 Significance of IDA Support  
For each of the projects studied, the World Bank is the largest single financial contributor. IDA support 
contributed much-needed investment which was important in enabling the progress in infrastructure and 
strengthening utility capacity noted above.   
 
The research team studied how the projects are applying IDA and other project funds, and - as far as 
possible based on available information sources - the nature of inputs of World Bank staff to project 
design and implementation, including attention to pro-poor targeting during project design and 
implementation, 
 
Those sources - those which provide evidence on World Bank-Government discussions and interactions - 
were limited. Official documentation accessed by the researchers comprised the PADs of each project and 
the ICR‟s of two projects (in Burkina and Tanzania). The PADs are key project documents written by 
World Bank staff, recording the project designs which emerged out of the discussions between the Bank 
and the partner Governments. The researchers were not, of course, privy to those discussions during the 
writing of the PADs, so the tenor of those exchanges, including on inclusion issues, was not visible to this 
study, including any differing views which may have been expressed by government officials and Bank 
team members.  
 
The researchers have additionally taken into account the written comments of the World Bank on the 
preliminary July 2010 draft of the present report.  
 
Further, in Ghana, the researchers attended the Mid Term Review of the UWP at which the Government, 
World Bank and other actors were present
3
.  
 
Save for the evidence of the Government-World Bank interaction offered by the above sources - a few 
insights only - the lack of transparency of Government-
World Bank interactions, and the lack of an accompanying 
process of open public debate, has made it very difficult for 
the research team to assess fully the role of IDA in project 
design and implementation, including determining whether 
strengths and weaknesses observed are the result of 
government or donor practices. The World Bank 
acknowledged in the written comments of December 2010 that “… the process and ability for non-
government stakeholders to access World Bank key project documents is not straight forward”4.  
 
What is, however, clear from the available sources is that both the official country strategies and 
the IDA project documents are characterised by a disconnect between policy and practice. In each 
country, universal coverage is a clear government goal and yet this fails to be adequately reflected in 
practical implementation. Similarly, in project design: the PADs state that the aim is to improve services 
for low-income households, but the details of how this is to be achieved are underdeveloped or missing 
and, when it comes to the indicators by which the project will be assessed, that pro-poor objective is 
poorly reflected in those key performance indicators (KPIs).  
 
                                                 
3 InTanzania, meetings held at the beginning of the DWSSP and mid-way through the project were attended by sector 
stakeholders, but not by the World Bank, although Bank staff had been invited.   
4 NB: the written comments went on to note that the World Bank‟s new „Access to Information Policy‟ came into effect on 
July 1st, 2010. The researchers understand that, as from that date, „aide memoires‟ written by Bank staff, reporting on missions 
to country, are made publicly available, with, it  is hoped, an increase in the degree of transparency of projects - as discussed in 
this report. 
Interpreting such evidence as was 
available on the significance of IDA 
support to the projects 
         
   
  
 
 
 
In relation to the ZIGA project in Burkina, from the written comments of the World Bank in January 
2011, it is clear that Bank staff accepted, without challenge, the sweeping characterisation by ONEA that 
the population of the „service territory‟ of the project was uniformly poor, since that view is reiterated in 
those written comments. This suggestion that poverty exists in the seventeen districts (sectors 14-30) of 
the service territory of the project in a homogeneous form is surprising - and misleading, as the mapping 
exercise carried out by this research project, referred to above, clearly shows (echoed by 
ICEA/SOGREAH in its 2008 report). A substantial part of east Ouagadougou, for example, is very poor; 
at the same time, not all districts beyond the central area are poor: two surrounding districts (sectors 18 
and 24) are relatively well-off, and two other outlying areas (sectors 21 and 14) are in the intermediate 
category, while the remaining thirteen districts which received standpipes are poor or very poor - as 
shown in the different colours on the map in Annex 5. 
 
As for observations on Government-World Bank interactions made in key informant interviews with 
other actors - actors who were not privy to the Government-Bank discussions, but who expressed views 
as to the role of Bank staff which, they said, they had witnessed - it was, for example, reported in Ghana 
and Tanzania that that pro-poor service provision had at least become the subject of policy discussion as a 
result of these IDA projects, so that some donor influence seems to have come into play. According to 
these reports from key informants, individual World Bank staff members were seen to have supported 
incorporation of pro-poor components: in Tanzania, pushing for more attention to pro-poor aspects of 
design, and, in Ghana, making efforts to overcome delays in procurement. 
 
Such support in principle does not, however, seem (based on the available evidence) to have been 
followed up with adequate guidance on how to target low-income areas and households. Overall, the 
impression of the research team is that World Bank staff did not provide the necessary strategic guidance, 
and support mobilisation of sufficient resources, to work out how to deliver pro-poor services in the 
circumstances of each city - or, to the extent the World Bank staff did provide guidance, this was not such 
as to influence the utilities/operators to strengthen inclusion aspects. This may be because, for the Bank, 
equitable outcomes were a lower priority than improvements in the financial position of the utilities. 
 
So, given the extent of donor dependence of these low-income countries - the reality underlying the 
relationship between major external sources of funding and partner governments - the World Bank is in a 
position to push more forcefully than it has to-date for greater emphasis on increasing access for low-
income households. As noted in a 2008 World Bank publication on the political-economy of policy 
reform, the role of development partners is “to persuade rather than prescribe” (World Bank, 2008b, page 
7), but persuade they can, if/when they so choose, and, in the present case, that is the appropriate role for 
World Bank - in order to work more pro-actively for inclusion in UWSS projects. That includes (as 
discussed below) World Bank staff actively taking the lead in supporting governments and utilities to 
devise innovative approaches for increasing access and upgrading the priority attached to equity in project 
outcomes.  
 
World Bank thinking on support to UWSS had evolved from key focuses in the 1990s (post-1992) on 
quality regulation, economic regulation and private sector participation, to a shift of emphasis, post-2000, 
to improved performance of utilities, whether public or private - as expressed in the 2004 Water 
Resources Strategy (p.19): “building of commercially oriented and customer-focused utilities, able to 
mobilise financing for rehabilitation, upgrading and expansion of infrastructure”. The Bank‟s 2004 
Operational Guidance
5
 notes that this “requires specific attention and targeted interventions”. The 
statement in the section of that Operational Guidance on „Extending Services to the Poor6‟, that 
“diagnosis should form the starting point for formulating policies to address access and equity issues in 
                                                 
5 World Bank 2004b. 
6 Ibid p.11-12.  
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the sector”, with also, referred to in the Guidance, application of a range of options, including poverty 
mapping and incentives to operators, could have usefully been applied by World Bank staff in each city.   
 
 On-lending and on-granting 
In all four projects studied, once the World Bank had 
made available the IDA funds to the governments (via 
ministries of finance), the governments transmitted the 
funds to the water companies/utilities in the form of both 
loan and (non-reimbursable) grant. The rationale is that 
finance for components which are expected to generate 
revenue is on-lent, while funds for activities not expected to generate income are on-granted, e.g. the 
sanitation component of the new project in Burkina which is to receive a grant of US$ 24.44 million grant 
(PAD, World Bank 2009b, p.17). Credits/loans are seen as instruments of financial rigour, and the 
utilities‟ financial models, as described in PADs, specify ambitious cost recovery targets. The question 
arises whether this will place excessive pressure on utilities and undermine outreach to poor areas.  
 
The answer to this question will lie in the detailed financial workings, over time, of the utilities. First 
indications of a response, however, are that, in Burkina, despite the progress made by ONEA in 
strengthening its finances, the 2009 PAD and a recent independent report (commissioned by the Water 
and Sanitation Programme of the World Bank-WSP) highlighted ONEA‟s debt service obligations as a 
concern (WSP, 2008). Repayment of the IDA loan for the ZIGA project is scheduled to start soon. And, 
in Tanzania, comparison of DAWASA‟s actual financial position with PAD projections shows much 
slower progress, so that utility and Bank staff have now recognised that financial targets were far too 
optimistic and were based on flawed assumptions (as confirmed by weaknesses in the DWSSP noted in 
the ICR). The PADs look like they displayed, in each case, excessive optimism as to what the 
utilities/operators could achieve. 
 
The 2009 PAD in Burkina could have added that certain water elements (e.g. standpipes) generate lower 
commercial revenues (than full cost recovery). The PADs of the four projects, in sections relating to on-
lending and on-granting, make no reference to different levels of revenue generation from water 
components, yet the grant elements of the IDA funding packages provide opportunities to direct subsidies 
to „social‟ water components, without imposing an extra burden on the Government‟s treasury or the 
utility‟s/operator‟s finances. One option would be to deliver a subsidy to low-income urban households, 
by retrospectively compensating the utility for all (or proportion) of water sold through lower revenue-
earning project components, e.g. standpipes. This would be a means of remedying current disincentive to 
utilities to work with the lower-revenue „water economy‟.  
 
 
Recommendations 
Based on the studied projects, the following are key recommendations:- 
 
 Mainstreaming of inclusion 
Reaching low-income households needs to move up the policy agenda of governments, the World Bank 
and other donors in the three countries. Ministries responsible for UWSS need to commit to a 
concerted process of sector review of social and „inclusion‟ aspects alongside those of utility 
performance and engineering without the current disconnects - with the review process involving the 
utility, other service providers and water user associations, as well as Government and NGOs.  
 
Sector institutions need to articulate time-bound strategies for serving low-income areas and households, 
beyond the design of specific project components, so that these are not „add-ons‟, but components which 
Are over-ambitious cost-recovery goals 
undermining outreach to the poor?         
   
  
 
 
 
are conceptually and methodologically developed, so as to be integrated into the project design. Such 
adjustments also need to be incorporated into wider government strategies with appropriate fiscal support.  
 
The World Bank needs to actively encourage and support this sector review process in each country, so 
that sector investments prioritise low-income households and this is incorporated into all aspects of 
project design and implementation, including the key performance indicators (KPIs) .  
 
The World Bank, other donors and governments need to work with the utility, other service providers and 
water user associations and CSOs, including those (both within and beyond the water sector) who have 
conducted analysis of socio-economic conditions and poverty in each city. Greater attention is needed to 
wider aspects of water access, with promotion of innovative, case-specific approaches.  
 
 Development of city-wide strategies for inclusion 
Measures to be determined during the above sector review process include city-wide strategies for 
inclusion. The targeting approaches selected will need to be informed by analysis and collection of 
existing and new data. Existing data may be drawn from census and surveys already commissioned by 
utilities and regulators. The first step should be to draw together and review existing sources, and also to 
review any targeting methods used in other sectors (such as healthcare). This data should provide insights 
which help service providers determine how to identify low-income households (i.e. what are their visible 
or easily determined characteristics?), and which measures will be most effective in improving their 
access to services (i.e. what are their current constraints to access?). The World Bank could provide 
insights here from its experience in other countries and sectors, although „one size fits all‟ approaches 
should be avoided as pro-poor strategies must be matched to local conditions. 
 
Section 3 (Box 3.4) gives examples of the type of household characteristics which could be used as 
possible proxy indicators for identifying wealthy households. Different targeting methods will be 
appropriate in different urban contexts, given that the extent to which geographic location and household 
characteristics (such as size of dwelling per inhabitant) correlate with poverty will vary, and the 
availability of data may also differ between cities. Social development specialists in each city should be 
involved in the targeting process to help identify the most suitable methods in each case.  
 
The most sophisticated targeting methods, such as income-based means testing, are expensive. In these 
cities, the key will be to find indicators of poverty which are as meaningful as possible, but not 
prohibitively costly to apply, e.g. the poverty mapping approach suggested in the Burkina case study 
which may, for example, be combined in Ouagadougou with targeting by household characteristics. 
Greater levels of sophistication can then be developed in future, as appropriate.  
 
Better understanding of the precise constraints to access of low-income households is vital, including 
inter alia more attention to levels of affordability of services. This analysis should inform a discussion of 
how best to provide subsidies, appropriate service options and other types of support (e.g. flexible 
payment mechanisms) to low-income consumers. 
 
Analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of urban districts and households needs to actively inform 
the provision of water services for different water users as part of a city-wide strategy for pro-poor 
services. The targeting strategy used to identify low-income households, and the suitability of the 
provisions afforded to them (such as subsidies for specific purposes or priority infrastructure 
development), should be the subject of regular reflection, analysis and refinement. This could be the main 
function of pro-poor units in utilities/operators where these exist (currently in Tanzania only).  
 
Finally, means of shaping the priorities of utilities so that serving low-income areas is at least as 
important as cost-recovery are required and will need to be determined as a key component of a city-wide 
strategy for pro-poor services.  
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 Modes of service provision 
Standpipes and kiosks should remain components of pro-poor services in the studied cities. For many 
households in poor areas, public standpipes/kiosks, are, and will continue to be in the short and medium 
term, a key source of water. While many may access water from neighbours and other alternative sources, 
this relies on social networks that may not be available to the most marginalised, particularly in transient 
urban communities. Kiosks may not be commercially viable, but where they provide an important means 
of access for low-income communities, subsidies need to be considered. 
 
The decision in Burkina to focus a larger proportion of investment of the water component under the new 
project (2009-2015) (compared with the ZIGA project) on new household connections, instead of 
standpipes, is, from an inclusion perspective, a move in the wrong direction. Where, as in Dar, 
standpipes/kiosks are not currently working well, they should not be de-prioritised, but rather a concerted 
effort should be made to bring as many standpipes/kiosks as possible into operation, particularly where 
the underlying constraint is not one of bulk water supply and can therefore be resolved more rapidly. 
Funding mechanisms should be developed to ensure that water from kiosks/standpipes is no more 
expensive - and preferably cheaper - than water from a private connection.  
 
 Utility performance 
Projections of utility performance need to be based on more realistic assessments of potential for 
progress, including detailed analysis of institutional constraints, especially where these are linked to the 
approval of on-lending arrangements, and are in danger of having a perverse effect in terms of diverting 
attention from the achievement of social objectives.  
 
Government-utility contracts should be re-negotiated, to incorporate appropriate social targets and 
indicators. 
 
 On-lending of concessional loan elements  
Study of the projects, the subject of this research, raises an important issue in relation to the application of 
the concessions incorporated in these IDA financings: namely, whether the manner in which governments 
are on-lending to responsible water entities the loan component of IDA finance - itself, made available to 
those governments at concessionary rates - is influencing incentives against targeting of low-income 
areas and households. It is recommended that the World Bank review whether the „IDA plus‟ interest 
rates charged by the ministries of finance in their on-lending to the water utilities is having the effect of  
pressuring those utilities into focusing more on securing revenues from relatively wealthy 
areas/households than targeting low-income ones. If it is, the World Bank should consider how its 
influence may be brought to bear to persuade governments to modify this practice to avoid in future such  
negative effects as it has from an inclusion perspective.  
 
 Destination of grant elements 
Meanwhile, future PADs should specify in more detail how grant elements are to be applied to project 
activities - to direct subsidies as close as possible to those who need them.  
 
As referred to above, one option would be to deliver a subsidy to low-income urban households, by 
retrospectively compensating the utility for all (or proportion) of water sold through lower revenue-
earning project components, e.g. standpipes. This would be a means of remedying current disincentive to 
utilities to work with the lower-revenue „water economy‟.  
 
 Management for Results 
In line with the Accra Agenda (paragraphs 22 and 23 - cited in Section 5 of the present report), the World 
Bank should work with the Governments in the three countries to strengthen (employing the Accra 
  
 
 
 
Agenda terminology) „management for results‟ under the projects, through socio-economically 
disaggregated data on water users and service levels - to ensure, in other words, pro-poor impacts.  
 
The World Bank is in a position to draw on its wide experience in many countries, its convening power, 
and its access to expertise, to support governments and utilities in the development of approaches to 
monitoring and evaluating (M&E) of project results, including pro-poor impacts.  
 
 Information and transparency 
As noted above, non-governmental actors are very largely excluded from project discussions and the 
impression is of a lack of transparency and accountability. As well as the post-July 2010 availability of 
the „aide-memoires‟ written by Bank staff, there seems, additionally, to be a need for more questions and 
answers sessions between Government, World Bank staff, CSOs and other sector actors during project 
design, and implementation, on the basis of open exchange of information, including on pro-poor aspects. 
 
 
 
Concluding remarks - of this summary 
This research study of selected utility-executed, World Bank-funded projects has highlighted some 
achievements in improving water services in the project countries. The stated objectives, however, of 
reaching low-income households were - consistently in each case - not translated into project activities or 
outcomes that could be monitored by clearly specified indicators.  A shift in priorities is required so that 
greater emphasis is accorded to the needs of marginalised households.  Such an adjustment will require 
innovative and diverse approaches to recognise different existing conditions. In addition, careful baseline 
and evaluation assessments are needed to determine the equity impact of IDA investments.  
Without such a shift in policy direction within water utilities and operators, supported by the Bank, this 
research indicates that there is a high risk that benefits from IDA-funded investments in the water sector 
will benefit relatively wealthy households in recipient countries and will fail to alleviate conditions of 
water deprivation for those most in need.   
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Policy principles to project implementation: how „inclusion‟ is being lost or disregarded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance targets 
in utility contracts 
focus on financial 
and infrastructure, in 
the three countries 
Key performance indicators of the projects in 
the three countries focus on infrastructure, and 
in B and G major focus also on utility capacity, 
including financial aspects. 
There is a lack of incentives for the three 
utilities to serve poor. 
National policies and 
sectoral strategies 
Utility plans and 
contracts 
Project design Project implementation 
Strengthen UWSS sector and 
build capacity of utility (B). 
“Financial stability, viability and 
sustainability” (G). Achieve cost 
recovery and build capacity of 
utilities (Tz). 
Substantial progress towards “financial 
equilibrium” achieved by ONEA (B). 
Financial auditor of project in Ghana unable to 
report on progress by AVRL against financial 
targets (baseline data not agreed with GWCL). 
Considerable improvement in utility capacity 
and performance (B); improvements in 
financial situation emerging but slower than 
expected (Tz). 
 
Utility capacity and 
performance, including 
financial aspects 
No performance 
targets on inclusion: 
it is left to the utility 
to determine how to 
reach the poor with 
affordable prices. 
„Social‟ schemes 
proposed in each 
country (e.g. PURC 
in G.)  
Installation of household connections and 
standpipes or kiosks (in 2 or 3 countries) 
without geographical criteria or disaggregation 
of whom they will serve - in all three countries, 
inclusion objectives are not expressed in KPIs.  
The exception is Tz: a clearly defined targeting 
method was used for  the CWSSP, kiosks were 
targeted to CIUP priority areas, and eligibility 
criteria were developed for the first time 
connection fund (though this was not applied).  
Social analysis informing the projects, and 
impact assessment, is weak in all three 
countries. 
Surveys during projects do not provide data 
disaggregated by household income level or 
other socio-economic criterion, and/or the 
utility did not utilise the data collected. 
Subsidies geared to increasing total numbers of 
connections, irrespective of for whom (B and 
Tz). Such subsidies not provided at all in 
Ghana. 
Community-managed CWSSP schemes provide 
improved, affordable services. (Tz) 
Expansion of water distribution 
networks, sewerage and onsite 
sanitation in urban areas (B). 
 
Rehabilitation followed by 
extension of water supply 
infrastructure (Tz). 
 
 
The ZIGA project completed its roll-out of 
water infrastructure (B).  
The UWP has experienced major delays (G).                   
Infrastructure components of the DWSSP are 
now largely complete, but faced severe delays. 
(Tz). Considerable non-functionality of kiosks 
in Dar (Tz); also in Tabtenga (B). 
 
Water infrastructure - 
engineering and technology 
aspects 
 Principle of equity and/or goal 
of extending affordable services 
to poor populations stated in 
sector policies of the 3 countries. 
Water Services - social 
aspects, in particular 
„inclusion‟ 
Performance targets 
in utility contracts 
focus on financial 
and infrastructure 
aspects, in the three 
countries 
Key performance indicators of the projects in 
the three countries focus on infrastructure, and 
in B and G major focus also on utility capacity, 
including financial aspects (latter also in Tz). 
There is a lack of incentives for the three 
utilities to serve poor. 
KEY: 
G = Ghana    B = Burkina Faso   Tz = Tanzania  
  
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This report presents findings from a research study on the equity impact of four urban water supply 
and sanitation projects in sub-Saharan Africa carried out by utilities and funded by the International 
Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank as part of its financing of development. This 
Section 1 provides some details of the aims and objectives of the research which is followed by 
background information on the context, and a review of the literature on methods to provide services 
to low-income households. The final section considers the significance of IDA support. 
1.1 Research Overview 
This report describes the aims, scope and results of a research study on inclusion of poor populations 
in investments in urban water supply and sanitation (UWSS) in selected countries and cities in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and the role of the International Development Association (IDA). 
 
The research has assessed UWSS projects in three SSA countries: Ghana, Burkina Faso and Tanzania 
- with a focus on the following cities, respectively: Accra (and one other urban centre in Ghana), 
Ouagadougou and Dar es Salaam.  
 
The studies have been designed to contribute evidence and analysis to inform discussion on the 
challenges facing utilities of making services available and accessible to poor areas and households in 
urban and peri-urban contexts in SSA, including measures for targeting. 
 
The research was carried out between July and December 2009. This report has been updated in 
November 2011 to reflect availability of new information, but primarily reflects the situation at the 
end of 2009 (as described in the above Preface).  
 
 
1.1.1 Aims of study 
This research examines the extent to which poor areas and households are included in the example 
utility-executed, IDA-funded projects in the three SSA countries. The aim of the research is to draw 
lessons from both the achievements, and any weaknesses, of the selected projects in reaching poor 
populations, and make recommendations:-  
- to inform dialogue between governments, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the World Bank; 
- to contribute to lesson-learning by the World Bank and by CSOs, as well as other actors; 
- to understand better the role of the World Bank in relation to IDA‟s investments in UWSS in the 
selected countries.  
 
The main question asked by this research project is:- 
„To what extent, and how, are poor urban populations served under the selected utility, 
IDA-supported projects, and what lessons can be learned?‟ 
 
To answer this question, each country study has examined how inclusion of the poor in water 
supply, or sanitation, is:-  
 - conceptualised in policies and strategies;  
- designed in the approach taken by the chosen utility project(s); and 
- implemented on the ground; 
 
- see the red arrow in Figure 1.1, the Research Framework, reflecting the three limbs to this 
question. 
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Figure 1.1 Research  Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Inclusion‟ means the inclusion of low income households in the design and delivery of WSS 
services:-  
 targeting and design of services for poor areas and households (e.g. network expansion, 
subsidies, low-cost approaches); 
 the extent and appropriateness of services received on the ground by poor households. 
 
To meet the needs of poor households, services need to be accessible and affordable, and service 
providers have to be accountable to government/regulators and users. The sustainability of services 
(or prospects for sustainability) is an indicator of the (likely) long term impact of the projects on poor 
users.  
  
In looking at investments in UWSS through the lens of „inclusion‟, equity between different groups 
of users has been a key consideration. 
 
In their different ways, the selected projects throw light on these issues, and provide lessons for 
debate. The country studies investigated the particular circumstances and characteristics of each 
project. In the three countries, the researchers reviewed sector policies and strategies relating to urban 
water supply and sanitation to see how far „inclusion‟ is taken into account.  
 
1.1.2 Projects studied 
The IDA-supported projects which were the subject of this research are shown in Table 1.1.  
 
 
 
To what extent, and how, 
are poor urban 
populations served under 
the selected project?  
 
What lessons can be  
  learned? 
 How is inclusion.. conceptualised? designed? implemented? 
POLICIES FOR 
INCLUSION IN 
WSS  
(SECTOR,  
CITY & IDA) 
PROJECT 
APPROACH 
TO 
INCLUSION INCLUSION OF 
THE POOR IN 
WSS 
SERVICES 
What is the significance of 
IDA support in relation to how 
inclusion is conceptualised, 
designed and implemented? 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1     Projects studied by this research 
 
 
Country 
 
Project name 
Project 
number  
(as per IDA) 
 
Dates7 
 
Project value and IDA 
contribution 
US$ million   
 
Ghana 
 
Urban Water Project (UWP) 
 
 P056256 
 
2004-
2010 
 
120 
IDA 103 
 
Burkina 
Faso 
 
 
Ouagadougou Water Supply Project  
(also known as the „ZIGA‟ project) 
 
Urban Water Sector Project  
(includes a sanitation component) 
 
 
 P000306 
 
 
 P106969 
 
 2001-
2007 
 
2009-
2015 
 
205.88 
IDA: 70 
 
92.92 
IDA: 80 
 
Tanzania 
 
 
Dar es Salaam Water Supply and 
Sanitation Project (DWSSP) 
 
 
 P059073 
 
2003-
2010 
 
164.6 
IDA: 61.5 
 
As indicated by the dates in Table 1.1, the four projects were, at the time of the research in 2009, at 
different stages:- 
- the Urban Water Supply Project in Burkina (referred to in this report as the „new project‟) was 
just beginning (approved for IDA funding in May 2009);  
- due to delays, the Urban Water Project (UWP) in Ghana was ongoing with many activities still 
to be completed (the closing date of the project is now scheduled for 31
st
 December, 2012) ;  
- the Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project (DWSSP) in Tanzania was originally 
programmed to be completed  by December 2008,  but was extended to November, 2010; and 
- the Ouagadougou Water Supply Project, also known as the „ZIGA‟ project, in Burkina had been 
concluded in 2007, with a World Bank evaluation carried out in June 2008.   
 
Each of these projects is described in detail in succeeding sections of this report: Section 2 on 
Ghana (Accra, and one other urban centre, Obuasi), Section 3 on Burkina (Ouagadougou), and 
Section 4 on Tanzania (Dar es Salaam).  
 
As regards the institutional framework of the projects, Sections 2-4 also describe the agencies 
responsible for implementing the projects and their roles among UWSS-related institutions in each 
country. By way of overview, this selection of countries and UWSS projects comprised:-  
- a public utility in each country holding assets, with separate operators in two countries (Ghana 
private, Tanzania public); the above utilities/operators are mandated by government to operate 
on commercial principles; 
- regulation is by the relevant ministry in one country (Burkina) and by independent regulators in 
two countries (Ghana and Tanzania); 
- of the three utilities, two are responsible for water and sanitation (Burkina, Tanzania) while the 
Ghanaian utility provides water only.  
 
                                                 
7 The dates of the four selected projects are not the same as the dates of  IDA 15 (2008-2011), but as an approximate 
guide, the above percentage UK contribution to IDA 15, of 16.28%,  applied to the total IDA contribution to the four 
selected projects would be £33 million (at exchange rates at the time of writing).   
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At the outset of this research, the intention had been to include more study of sanitation aspects, but 
the selection of Ghana, Burkina and Tanzania - as the outcome of the dialogue between WaterAid, the 
World Bank and ODI/SOAS - was that a majority of the chosen project elements targeted to poor 
populations were for water supply rather than sanitation provision. In relation to sanitation, only the 
new project in Burkina includes a substantial sanitation component (US$ 24.44 million of IDA funds 
and US$ 11.12 million of government funds
8
), while the other projects focused on water supply 
(exclusively so, in the case of the project in Ghana). Consequently, water supply is given more focus 
in the present study.  As to the prospect of increased attention to sanitation in the future, a recent 
report of the World Bank (World Bank, 2010) has recommended that the Bank work with clients to 
shift more attention to sanitation
9
.  
 
 
1.1.3 Methodology and information 
The principal methodologies employed by the research teams were:- 
(i) semi-structured interviews with key informants in relevant institutions (government ministries, 
utilities (the operator in Ghana) and, in both Ghana and Tanzania, the regulatory bodies), World 
Bank country offices, and other actors in each country;  
(ii) focus group discussions (FGDs) with water users; and 
(iii) desk study - of documents supplied by those interviewed, and such other information as was 
available relating to the projects studied, as well as plans of utilities, and UWSS policies/strategies 
already in the public domain.  
 
The key source of information available on project design is the Project Appraisal Document 
(PAD). Each PAD sets out the elements of the project which emerge from the negotiation between 
Government and World Bank. This research project was not privy to discussions between the 
governments and the World Bank10 on the design of the selected projects. The comments in this report 
are based on the researchers‟ reading of the PADs, and other official documents (e.g. the 
Implementation Completion Report of the completed project in Burkina), as well as such observations 
on Government-World Bank interactions as were made by key informants11 in interviews. The 
researchers have additionally taken into account the written comments of the World Bank on the 
preliminary July 2010 draft of the present report. Without published information, the tenor of 
discussions during the writing of the PAD, on inter alia inclusion issues, is not visible, including 
differing views which may have been expressed by government officials and Bank team members. 
The PAD records the position arrived at the conclusion of any such debate - the resulting project 
design. As one key informant commented, if an element of design is missing from the PAD, that is 
because either the government representatives or Bank team members “did not think of  it, or “tried to 
negotiate its incorporation but failed, or tried and succeeded”. 
                                                 
8 Alongside US$ 51.74 million and US$ 1.04 million of IDA and Government funds respectively for the water supply 
component.         
9
 The 2010 evaluation by the World Bank‟s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) examined all the “water-related” 
projects financed by the Bank between 1997 and 2007. Bank-supported projects (dedicated and non-dedicated) listed in 
Table 2.2 on page (vi) as relating to „urban water supply‟ were 299 in that period, as compared with 190 to „urban 
sanitation and sewerage‟ (not including wastewater treatment). The evaluation recommended that the Bank work with 
clients to shift more attention to sanitation in order to broaden sanitation access, as one of a number of “tough but vital 
issues”. 
10 The researchers in Ghana attended the Mid Term Review of the Urban Water Project in Ghana at which the 
Government of Ghana (GoG), World Bank and other actors were present.          
11 A few comments only - civil servants and World Bank staff supplied information to the researchers, without generally 
talking about the conduct of meetings and other exchanges between the Bank and partner governments relating to the 
four projects. 
  
 
 
 
In its written comments on the preliminary July 2010 version of this report, the World Bank 
acknowledged, in relation to the process of drawing up the PADs:- 
 
“We realize that the process and ability for non-government stakeholders to access World Bank 
key project documents is not straight forward”. 
 
The above comment adds that the World Bank‟s new „Access to Information Policy‟ came into effect 
on July 1
st
, 2010. The researchers understand that the intention is that, as from that date, „aide 
memoires‟ written by Bank staff, reporting on missions to country, will be made publicly available - 
with, it is hoped, an increase in the degree of transparency of projects (as further discussed in section 
1.5.2 on the „roles of countries and development partners‟ and section 5.6 on „accountability‟).    
 
1.2 Context 
Efforts in developing countries to expand water and sanitation services are struggling to keep up with 
high levels of urban population growth. According to the 2010 WHO/UNICEF report „Progress on 
Sanitation and Drinking Water, from 1990 to 2008, globally, the number of urban dwellers without 
access to improved drinking water increased by 37 million. SSA is the fastest urbanising region in the 
world, including an increase in urban slums. Slum prevalence at 62% is the highest in SSA (UN-
Habitat 2008). Countries have not been able to keep up with investment and maintenance in UWSS. 
Investments in informal areas have not been prioritised for a number of reasons including physical 
challenges as well as the unclear legal status of residents. In addition, in some cases “Incentives to 
perform according to financial targets have discouraged utilities from prioritizing expansion in these 
areas” (Keener, Luengo and Banerjee 2009, p.1.)  
 
Keener et al (2009) present findings from a literature review and available data from national surveys 
and the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic-AICD - on water provision for low-income 
households in SSA. They find that large proportions of the urban population are not connected to 
piped water supplies, although there is variation in the proportion of households that are outside the 
reach of the network ranging from above 80% in some cities (in Uganda, Mozambique, Rwanda and 
Nigeria) to as low as 21% in Namibia and 12% in South Africa. Central and Eastern Africa rely to a 
greater extent on standpipes, while Western Africa has a higher reliance on wells and boreholes (ibid). 
 
Generally the AICD research (see Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010 for Flagship Report and 
www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd for website with database and supporting papers) found that 
standpipes were the main source of water for unconnected households in most cities. However, 
utilities overestimate coverage from public standpipes. The research found a discrepancy in the 
proportion estimated by the utility to be functioning (81%) and the proportion estimated to be in 
working order on the basis of independent studies (42%). The research also found that standpipes 
were a low revenue generating service which was poorly monitored and regulated by utilities. In 
addition, there has been a shift over the past three decades from standpipes owned and managed free 
of charge to those run by private individuals or communities. 
 
Household resellers were found to be important in countries with medium to low water coverage 
levels. Evidence indicates that these can provide up to 80% of water resources for the urban poor but 
such access methods do not necessarily emerge in official data as this is not consistently listed in the 
categories of water sources in household surveys. Instead they fall into the category of piped water or 
„other‟. In addition, low income households obtain water from small scale independent providers 
which have established secondary networks and mobile vendors (Keener et al 2009). 
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In relation to sanitation, the dimension of the challenge calls for particular attention. According to the 
above-mentioned 2010 WHO/UNICEF report, the number of urban dwellers who accessed improved 
sanitation in the period 1990-2008 fell substantially short of population growth: 813 million compared 
with 1,089 million, i.e. a short-fall of 276 million. Overall, for urban (and rural) sanitation, SSA is not 
„on track‟ to meet the sanitation target under Goal 7 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
1.3 Reaching low-income households 
1.3.1 Subsidies 
Poor urban populations face four main challenges in accessing water and sanitation services: the 
cost of accessing services; the bureaucratic process involved in securing access; the locality of their 
settlement (many poor communities are situated far from the existing piped network); and the legal 
position of land tenure, which can bar them from services. Underlying these is the weak political 
position of poor populations. Low-income groups and households generally lack a strong voice to 
demand services and their needs are seldom prioritised by decision-makers.  
Providing services to those on low-incomes requires an understanding of the complexities of the 
constraints which households face and these will differ across locations and communities and may 
not simply be a question of affordability (which itself presents substantial challenges and 
complexities).  These may be physical, for example, where a settlement is far from the piped water 
network so that a connection is not possible, e.g. without substantial expenditure. Often slum areas 
are congested and lack other infrastructure, so it is difficult to simply extend the network. 
Alternatively, where low income households live in rented accommodation, both landlord and 
tenant may lack incentives to pay for a household connection, so residents rely on external sources. 
Where no utility facility is available (standpipe/kiosk), residents will use alternative sources. 
Households may be deterred from securing a connection on account of an intermittent billing 
system which allows high debts to accrue, or by difficulties in paying monthly bills compared with 
payment “by the bucket”. Onerous bureaucratic processes can prevent households going to the 
effort to obtain a private connection. Finally, securing a connection to the piped network, either 
inside a house or a yard or via a standpipe or kiosk, will only provide effective access if there is 
water on a regular basis which is of reliable quality.  
Much of the literature on delivering water and sanitation to the urban poor focuses on practical 
solutions to these challenges. However, beyond these proximate problems/solutions lie a wider set 
of questions about policy priorities and management approaches which will constrain or support the 
adoption of pro-poor measures.  
Utilities face financial pressure and extending services to such users can be a low priority. There is, 
in much of SSA, a history of serious underinvestment in infrastructure, so that many utilities 
struggle to provide adequate services to existing customers or maintain existing infrastructure, let 
alone expand. The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), referred to above, estimates 
the overall expenditure required to achieve the MDGs in water and sanitation to be about 
US$21.9bn a year, including investment and maintenance with water accounting for abut two thirds 
of this.  Existing spending is around US$7.6bn so there is a large a financing gap.  
Policies which aim to provide services to low-income poor households, then, need to understand the 
constraints faced. Generally, the approach to extending services to low-income households centres 
on subsidising costs. The rest of this section considers the equity impact of different subsidy 
mechanisms and methods used to target low income households.  
Subsidies occur where any user obtains a service for less than the cost of its provision.  They can be 
implicit or explicit. Implicit subsidies are not always visible, occurring, for example, where inputs 
  
 
 
 
(such as electricity in the case of bulk water production) are underpriced, or they may take the form 
of a financial loss which is absorbed by the utility, which in turn may constrain a utility‟s ability to 
invest in maintaining and extending infrastructure (UNDP, 2006). Such subsidies are common in 
SSA where, although tariffs are high by developing country standards, they are not sufficient to 
cover all costs. Average water tariffs in Africa are around 64% of full cost recovery, a subsidy 
which is highly skewed towards better-off households which tend to have connections (Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia 2010, p.92).  
Other forms of implicit „subsidy‟ include non-collection of revenue or a tolerance of illegal 
connections. It may be that illegal connections are well targeted as they are more common in 
informal settlements and less so in wealthy areas, but this is difficult to evaluate (Komives et al 
2005, p.11).  Implicit subsidies also occur where governments (and/or donors) cover the cost of 
capital works. The choice of such capital works directs the incidence of the subsidy. Projects that 
lead to service expansion will benefit unconnected customers, but projects which improve the 
reliability of service will benefit only existing customers (ibid, p.16).  
Subsidies can be financed from the public purse through general taxation, from donor funds or from 
other types of user through cross-subsidy, for example from industrial to residential consumer. 
Another form of cross-subsidy would be a surcharge on services to existing consumers to finance 
expansion of services to new consumers. But, this can fail where prices on industrial consumers are 
so high that they exit from the piped network.  
Explicit subsidies may subsidise consumption or connection to the water network and they may or 
may not be targeted. There is a trade off between the accuracy of targeting tools and the complexity 
and, hence, cost of methods used. Targeting has benefits over universal provision in that the costs 
are lower and a limited budget can have a greater impact, but targeting also can be administratively 
costly and may have a stigma attached if associated with being poor. 
A universal, non-targeted method of subsidy delivery would be a national tariff for consumption or 
connection as the costs incurred will vary across the country. General universal under-pricing, 
where the tariff is below cost for all consumers, is also an un-targeted subsidy. Similarly a flat rate 
fee in the absence of meters may be universal.  
Targeted subsidies benefit a subgroup of customers. Explicit targeting aims to reduce the cost of 
service to customers with a particular characteristic (such as low income, in informal settlements 
etc). Targeting of subsidies takes the form of self-targeting - where an individual opts for a 
particular form of service - or administrative targeting - where households are selected to receive a 
subsidy by an external body such as the utility, the state or the community. Such targeting may be 
categorical (e.g. pensioners), geographic or based on some characteristic such as income.  
Looking in more detail at consumption subsidies, some are described as self-targeted where they are 
linked to a particular standard of service level. For example, lower tariffs at stand posts are self 
targeted as individuals choose whether or not to use this form of service delivery. Quantity based 
subsidies, such as increasing block tariffs (IBTs) where higher consumption levels are charged at a 
higher rate, are also categorised as self-targeted in that households technically can choose their 
consumption level. This form of targeting tends to penalise those living in high density housing 
where a large number of individuals access water from a single connection. This is typically the 
case in low income areas of urban SSA.  Furthermore, the subsidised volumes are available to all 
consumers, regardless of wealth, so there is considerable leakage of subsidy to better-off 
households (a form of targeting error).  
Any consumption subsidy that is targeted via household connections (rather than standpipes), may 
be regarded as regressive to the extent that those with household connections are generally more 
wealthy. However, the situation in SSA is more complex in that a high proportion of non-connected 
households access water from their neighbours (see above) and therefore might benefit indirectly 
from consumption subsidies.  
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The provision of connection subsidies is considered to be a more effective targeting method than 
subsidising consumption, as it reaches those outside the piped network and provides access to water 
from the utility which is typically cheaper than alternative sources. Such a subsidy can be 
progressive if these are low income households. The biggest cost hurdle for low income households 
in accessing a piped water network is not usually the cost of water, but the cost of connection 
(LeBlanc 2007; Trémolet & Halpern 2006). The average cost of connection is over $100 in SSA, an 
amount far beyond the reach of many poor households (UNDP 2006). Furthermore, connection 
subsidies benefit those not already connected, who are more likely to be poor, and as one-off 
subsidies are much easier to target and administer. 
 
Table 1.2 summarises the above discussion, showing the different ways in which consumption and 
connection subsidies may be targeted and delivered. 
 
 
Table 1.2. Targeting subsidies for water 
 
 
Universal (no 
targeting) 
Self-targeting Administrative targeting  
(e.g. geographic, means testing, 
community-based) 
 
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 s
u
b
si
d
ie
s 
 Under pricing 
(e.g. not 
covering 
capital costs) 
 
 Flat fee for 
households 
 
 
 National tariff 
 
 
 
 
 Lower tariff at standpipe - 
likely to be progressive as 
wealthy households will not 
use such service. 
 
 Quantity targeting such as 
increasing block tariff so that 
self selection is based on 
consumption (BUT 
consumption is difficult for 
individual households to 
monitor and this penalises 
high density housing typical 
of low income areas) 
  Lower consumption tariff for target 
households. Trade off exists between 
precision of targeting and complexity of 
methods. Simple forms target 
geographical areas or household type. 
More complex tools are based on 
income levels determined by means-
testing which require high levels of data 
availability.  
 
  Alternatively, community members may 
identify target beneficiaries and select 
poor households. They may have greater 
knowledge, but may be subject to 
political pressures. 
 C
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
 
su
b
si
d
ie
s 
  Flat fee for all 
new 
connections 
  Lower cost for particular 
form of service level or for 
households which provide 
their own labour 
   Social connection tariff for households 
with particular characteristics (discussed 
above) or in a specific geographical 
location. 
 
             Source: Adapted from Komives et al 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3.2 Targeting methods 
There is often a trade-off between simplicity and accuracy of targeting methods. The geographic 
distribution of poor and non-poor households, the information available to planners, and the desired 
trade-off between accuracy and cost, all influence the targeting method selected. Table 1.3 sets out 
  
 
 
 
major targeting methods and their advantages and risks, including both administrative 
methods and self-targeting. 
 
Table 1.3 Targeting Methods 
Targeting Method Advantages Risks Suitable contexts 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e 
T
a
rg
et
in
g
 M
et
h
o
d
s 
Geographic Targeting 
Areas identified as poor are 
prioritised and households in 
those areas are selected 
Cheap  
Simple to 
administer 
Reduces bias 
towards vocal 
communities 
Misses poor households 
in better-off areas 
Subsidises the better-off 
living in poor areas 
i.e. two possible types of 
targeting error.  
Low-income households known to 
be concentrated in specific areas (e.g. 
poverty map in place) 
Low inequality within geographic 
zones 
Useful for identifying broad areas to 
target, e.g. for infrastructure 
expansion. 
Targeting by household 
characteristics  
Households are selected by 
characteristics believed to 
correlate with poverty, e.g. 
housing type. 
Discriminating: 
targets individual 
households in any 
location  
Cheaper than full 
means testing (see 
below) 
Misses “non-typical” 
households (in terms of 
the selected 
characteristics) 
Clear differences between 
households of different income 
groups (based on good information)  
Significant inequality within 
geographic areas. 
Income-based means testing 
Households are selected based 
on household income. 
The most accurate 
targeting approach, 
if done well 
Expensive to administer 
Income data is difficult 
and expensive to collect  
Will miss poor 
households which move 
location, fall into 
poverty or migrate to the 
city, unless information 
base is continually 
updated 
Possible stigma attached 
to being classified as 
„poor‟ 
Sophisticated social targeting 
mechanisms including means testing 
already exist, of which 
water/sanitation can make use 
High capacity and adequate financial 
resources.  
Community-based   
Community leaders, 
community organisations or 
civil society organisations 
select poor households in their 
community. 
Potential to be 
highly accurate as 
draws on in-depth 
knowledge of 
communities 
Subjective and possibly 
non-transparent 
Risk of bias (and it may 
be difficult to recognise 
or control this) 
Trusted community-level 
organisations with good 
understanding of communities. 
  
Self-targeting 
Households select from a range 
of service levels at different 
prices (e.g. household 
connection or standpipe) 
OR the first volumes of water 
used are subsidised and 
households (in theory) self-
target by consumption level.  
 
Households set 
their own 
cost/service 
priorities 
 
Households may be 
missed if the range of 
options does not meet 
their needs, or the range 
is too narrow (e.g. if no 
options are affordable 
for the poorest) 
 
Utility has the capacity to respond to 
household requests and provide 
different service levels (which may 
be simple e.g. shared versus single 
connections). 
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Socio economic analysis to support pro-poor targeting requires analysis of:- 
Affordability - Incomes vary within urban areas. Allocation criteria based on incomes may omit 
the most marginalised where an average figure is used. An alternative approach would be to target 
areas identified as having high incidence of poverty where this information is available. The fact 
that high prices are paid to water vendors does not necessarily mean that water at that tariff is 
affordable. Households have to adopt coping strategies in such circumstances because they have to 
obtain water somehow.  
Alternatives  - Where households have easy access to wells and boreholes they may prefer this to 
the effort and cost of securing a connection.  
Attitudes to utility water – generally utility water is likely to be safer and there are environmental 
hazards from the random sinking of boreholes especially in urban areas. In some cases, the taste of 
utility water is considered inferior to well or river water and this may be particularly so in situations 
where the utility lacks credibility. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to carry out some 
kind of sensitisation in the community to encourage use of utility water. 
Distribution of water access – allocation based on assumptions of coverage which are derived 
from population and water production estimates may be misleading. There is a need to determine 
the way in which water consumption in an area is distributed. This need not be 100% precise but 
there may be some areas where there is no access even though coverage estimates indicate that 
water is sufficient. 
Constraints to access – to target infrastructure effectively it is important to understand why 
households are not connecting to the water network. Different constraints will lead to alternative 
policy responses. Possible barriers to access include: cost of connection, inadequate bulk water, 
bureaucracy of securing a connection,  
Disconnections – to determine the social impact of tariffs, utilities need to monitor what happens to 
those that are disconnected for non-payment to determine if they subsequently reconnect or remain 
disconnected. A system where a high proportion of connections is inactive for non-payment is not 
effective.  
Quality and regularity of supply – weaknesses in these may mean that households use alternative 
sources. 
 
 
1.3.3 Regulation 
In many developing countries, WSS sectors were restructured during the 1990s, often with a view 
to privatisation. Sector reforms included the separation of infrastructure ownership from sector 
management (as in Tanzania) and establishment of an independent regulator (Tanzania; Ghana). 
The regulatory framework was based on that of industrialised countries. Several years later, 
privatisation has not happened as intended. In SSA, there are few private sector companies 
operating on a long term basis and private sector participation has typically been in the form of 
management contracts where performance targets are set for the operator (e.g. Ghana). 
 
In the two countries, the role of the regulator is not entirely clear. Regulatory functions cannot be 
fulfilled in the same way as in developed countries. There are constraints in terms of access to 
  
 
 
 
information and in suitability of sanctions. Where the utility is a public sector company in a weak 
financial position, the imposition of fines for non-compliance has little impact.  
 
Independent regulation can play a key role in ensuring that utilities deliver services of an acceptable 
price and quality, although the impact of regulation is now in some doubt. Evidence from a review 
of 24 African countries suggests that, in the water sector, performance in countries with an 
independent regulator is no better than in those without (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). 
Elsewhere, however, there are some positive examples, for example in Jamaica, Brazil and Peru, 
where regulators have made considerable efforts to work with poor users, to increase understanding 
of their needs and to better assess the services they receive (World Bank 2004d). A regulator 
cannot, however, set the overall policy and institutional framework of the sector, and it cannot 
substitute for broader sector reform where sector policy and political incentives do not favour pro-
poor approaches (ibid).  
 
1.3.4   Incentivising utilities to serve the poor 
In an attempt to improve the performance of water utilities, a number of countries have introduced 
performance contracts between the utility and the government which set time-bound goals for 
performance. In SSA, these include inter alia Uganda, Senegal and some cities such as Nairobi and 
Durban (WSP/PPIAF 2009). Such an approach stems from an awareness of the need to shape the 
incentive framework of the service provider.  
 
Where targets are in terms of financial performance, there is an incentive to prioritise service 
delivery to water users who consume high volumes and are secure payers, as these will be lowest 
cost consumption units due to economies of scale. There will be a disincentive to serve poor 
households which may consume low volumes and may find it difficult to pay according to 
traditional methods (where billing and payment is not designed appropriately).  
 
For targets for service expansion to poor populations to carry weight, and for utilities to be held 
accountable for meeting the targets, they must be clearly specified and detailed in contracts. A 
broadly stated goal of expanding services to the poor is usually inadequate (Trémolet & Halpern 
2006). Further, targets must be matched with the resources necessary to achieve them. 
 
The attitude of utility staff to the poor, including in some cases unwillingness to work in poor areas, 
may often be barriers to expanding services to poor communities (Grant & Hulme 2008; Connors 
2005). This barrier can be overcome through training, performance management and motivational 
tools (e.g. goal-setting and rewarding staff who work in poor areas), good supervision and even 
financial compensation for staff working in slums12.   
 
 
1.4 The IDA and urban water in SSA 
The IDA provides funding to low-income countries, through loans on concessional terms and grants 
- see Box 1.1. The IDA is “the single largest source of donor funds for basic social services in the 
poorest countries” (source: World Bank website13).  
                                                 
12 An example is Bangalore where significant progress has been made in extending services to slums through such 
approaches even without wholesale institutional reform (Connors 2005; WSP, 2006a).  
13 The webpage on the IDA entitled: “What is IDA”? 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21206704~menuPK:83991~pa
gePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html 
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Box 1.1  IDA funds: concessional loans and grants 
As well as a zero interest rate, IDA loans (or „credits‟) allow borrowers more time to repay than if they 
borrowed from other sources (including commercial banks). „Maturity‟ periods for IDA loans are 
between 20 and 40 years, including a 10-year period of grace before the borrower has to begin to pay 
back the capital (or „principal‟). In the case of loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), another lending arm of the World Bank, maturity and grace periods are 
typically shorter, between 15 and 20 years and 3-5 years respectively.  
 
The IDA also provides grants which are non-reimbursable, or non-reimbursable parts of capital 
amounts made available in IDA credits. 
Source: World Bank website 
 
 
The IDA is one of the largest donors supporting WSS. In 2009, 6% of total IDA commitments, 
globally, amounting to US$ 14.00 billion, were made to „Water, Sanitation and Flood Protection‟ 
(DFID 2009, page 27). In SSA, the IDA supports water projects in over 20 countries. In the World 
Bank‟s review of the 32 IDA projects which finished in 2008/09, “water and sanitation projects 
benefitted over 2 million people by constructing 4,000 new water connections and 93,000 sanitation 
facilities” (ibid, page11).  
 
IDA funds are provided by donor countries contributing in rounds of IDA „replenishment‟, in a 
three year cycle. Since the initial subscriptions to IDA in 1960, there have been 14 past 
replenishments with the „IDA 15‟ round of contribution relating to the period from July 1st, 2008 to 
June 30
th
, 2011.  
 
In its 2009 report on „The UK and the World Bank‟ (DFID, 2009), the Department for International 
Development (DFID) recorded that the UK was pledged to make its largest contribution ever to the 
IDA in IDA 15 (2008-2011), of GBP 2.1 billion, a 49% increase on the UK‟s contribution to the 
previous IDA round (ibid, page 11). Based on all donor pledges of £12.9 billion for IDA 15 (ibid, 
p.11), the UK pledge represents 16.28% of the total.   
 
1.5 Significance of IDA support  
As shown in the Research Framework, the fourth question posed by this study relates to the 
significance of IDA support to the selected projects.    
 
1.5.1  „Operational Guidance‟ on WSS 
First, the significance of IDA support is, as noted above, that the IDA is a major supporter of WSS 
in low-income countries in SSA, and, to the projects studied, the IDA is the largest single financial 
contributor. 
In the Operational Guidance for World Bank Group Staff (World Bank 2004b)14, it is stated that a 
focus of Bank policy is efficient and financially viable water utilities and service providers, public 
or private (page 4). Reforms “required to place the water supply and sanitation sector on a 
                                                 
14
 One of several „key publications‟ linked to the Bank‟s WSS webpage, at the time of carrying out this research in 
2009. This World Bank document (as its title indicates): “provides guidance to World Bank staff” (Foreword, p.iii): a 
“framework within which staff can design assistance programs and individual operations in a manner that ensures the 
quality of our interventions” (ibid). The focus is on urban contexts. 
  
 
 
 
commercial footing”, says the Foreword (page iii), are a necessary step in tackling the challenge of 
reaching the poor. In the section in the Operational Guidance on “Extending Services to the Poor” 
(p. 11-12), it states:-  
 
“Reforms that place the sector on a sound financial footing will generate increased resources 
for investment in systems expansion. But this alone will not guarantee that the poor are 
reached. Extending services to the poor requires specific attention and targeted 
interventions. The nature of the problem - involving a lack of the access by the poor to 
credit and unaffordable connection fees and consumption charges - should first be well 
analyzed, and this diagnosis should form the starting point for formulating policies to 
address access and equity issues in the sector” (emphasis added).  
 
 
1.5.2 Roles of country and development partners 
As to the nature of the World Bank‟s development partnership with the countries which the IDA 
supports, the World Bank is party to the commitments made in the Paris Declaration (Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005) and reaffirmed in the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008. 
Extracts from the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda are set out in Box 1.2 including 
paragraphs on „ownership‟ and „alignment‟.    
Under paragraph 16 of the Paris Declaration, donors “commit to base their overall support - country 
strategies, policy dialogues and development co-operation programmes - on partners‟ national 
development strategies…”, including “poverty reduction and similar overarching strategies as well 
as sector and thematic strategies” (emphasis added).   
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Box 1.2.  Extracts from the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda (emphasis added) 
Paris Declaration    
Statement of Resolve - paragraph  2.  “…core principles… because we believe they will increase the 
impact aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating 
achievement of the MDGs”. 
 
Ownership – Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and 
strategies and co-ordinate development actions.  
- para 14: Partner countries commit to: exercise leadership in developing and implementing their 
national development strategies through broad consultative processes. Translate these national 
development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as expressed in medium-
term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets…       
- para 15: Donors commit to: respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to 
exercise it.  
 
Alignment - Donors base their overall support on partner countries‟ national development strategies, 
institutions and procedures.  
 
Note: the term „national development strategies‟ includes poverty reduction and similar over arching 
strategies as well as sector and thematic strategies. 
 
Donors align with partners‟ strategies – para 16 – Donors commit to base their overall support – country 
strategies, policy dialogues and development co-operation programmes – on partners‟ national 
development strategies and periodic reviews of  progress in implementing these strategies…”.  
 
Accra Agenda    
This is a moment of opportunity – para 1 – We are committed to eradicating poverty and promoting 
peace and prosperity by building stronger, more effective partnerships that enable developing countries 
to achieve their development goals. Para 3: Democracy, economic growth, social progress, and care for 
the environment are the prime engines of development in all countries.  
 
Para 8. Country ownership is key. Developing country governments will take stronger leadership of their 
own development policies, and will engage with their parliaments and citizens in shaping those policies. 
Donors will support them by respecting countries‟ priorities, investing in their human resources and 
institutions, making greater use of their systems to deliver aid, and increasing the predictability of aid 
flows. 
 
The Paris Declaration refers throughout to donors and „partner‟ countries and in the Accra Agenda 
(paragraph 1) the expressed aim is the building of stronger, more effective „partnerships‟. Within 
partnerships generally, more or less active/passive roles can be assumed by partners15. Although the 
Paris principles put much emphasis on the partner country‟s leadership role as an important feature 
of development cooperation, that does not preclude a role for the donor in shaping policy. The 
practice of development cooperation since 2005 suggests that donors do not consider their 
commitment to “respect partner country leadership” (paragraph 15) as a bar to efforts on their part 
to influence country policies. The same applies to influencing of the content of projects16  supported 
                                                 
15 The expression „sleeping‟ partner is, for example, sometimes employed by lawyers to describe an extreme type of 
situation where a party enters into a partnership arrangement, but then does not contribute to, or participate in, the 
partnership in any way. 
16 As noted, the Paris Declaration was entered into in 2005, prior to the design of all but one of the projects studied by 
this research (the new project in Burkina was approved in 2009). The Paris Principles (and Accra Agenda of 2008) are, 
  
 
 
 
by development assistance. As noted in a 2008 World Bank publication on the political-economy of 
policy reform, the role of development partners is “to persuade rather than prescribe” (World Bank, 
2008b, page 7), but persuade they can, if/when they so choose. 
 
The lack of transparency of government-World Bank discussions, noted in section 1.1.3 in 
relation to project design, presents a difficulty for researchers. In this pluri-party context, attribution 
of a decision on a given issue to a particular actor (whether during project design or 
implementation) is not straight forward. 
 
 
1.5.3 Role of World Bank in project design and implementation 
What, then, is the role of the World Bank in project design and what is the nature of inputs of Bank 
personnel to project implementation?  
 
Notes on the role of the Bank‟s „task team leaders‟ and their teams are set out in Box 1.3, based on 
insights provided to the researchers during key informant interviews in 2009.  
 
This portrayal of the team task leader‟s role, as communicated to the researchers, is one of 
considerable discretion in presentation and negotiation of the project design. 
 
 
Box 1.3   Role of World Bank ‘task team leaders’  
In relation to project design, the role of the Bank task team leader is to call on and gather the Bank staff 
and external consultants who will write the project appraisal document. The PADs are “documents of the 
World Bank” (as noted on their front pages) and their purpose is to present the proposed financing to the 
Board of the Bank, appraising the economic rate of return on the Bank‟s investment and the viability of 
the project on which that will depend. The PAD, in practice, sets the programme for implementation of 
the project and becomes an important point of reference for the task team leader during the project - the 
document to which the Bank team attending the six-monthly missions to country regularly refers.  
 
During the writing of the PAD, elements of the proposed project which the leader and his/her team 
consider should be included in the design are discussed and negotiated. The task team leader leads this 
negotiation with the government.  
 
The composition of the Bank team, in terms of disciplines and skills, is a function of whom the task team 
leader gathers in his/her group of internal specialists and external experts. Once the project has started, the 
Bank team monitors project implementation through the bi-annual missions. The team which the task 
team leader summons for the monitoring missions will again be a combination of Bank staff and external 
consultants, including commonly some members who participated in the design mission(s). The missions 
are a means by which the task team leader can bring technical assistance to the project, including guidance 
to government and implementing agency on particular aspects of the project. 
 
/cont… 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
nevertheless, referred to in this report as the code of practice for donors and partner countries applying at the time of 
carrying out this study.      
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Box 1.3   Role of World Bank ‘task team leaders’  - continued 
Aside from the six-monthly missions, the extent of interaction between task team leader and government 
counterparts during projects varies, from case to case, and at different times in projects‟ lives. Some task 
team leaders stay in regular contact, e.g. phone calls, advice and (if they are based in-country) informal 
meetings. Much day-to-day contact is with the procurement team. If the Bank feels a project is going off-
track, first, it works with the implementing agency to try to resolve the issue, secondly, it is taken to 
higher levels of government; ultimately, in the worst case - in the event of a severe breach - the World 
Bank (just as any banker or funding institution) may opt to terminate the financing agreement. 
 
How far a project incorporates lessons from other projects depends very much on the task team leader and 
his/her team, as well as the peer reviewers of the PAD who are staff from other countries/regions. The role 
of the Washington-based staff also involves dissemination of knowledge and experience of different 
projects including, from time to time, commissioning comparative studies. Subsequent to project 
evaluations, the findings in the Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs) are discussed.  
 
 
 
1.5.4 Status of „PADs‟ 
Box 1.3 refers to the negotiation between the government officials and Bank staff during the project 
preparation process. PADs are written in coordination with the respective governments. The content 
of each PAD is a function of the project components and other design features which have been 
proposed and discussed by government and Bank representatives, and - depending on the respective 
strengths of argument and the relative bargaining position of the parties - incorporated into the 
design.  
 
The Bank team are required to certify in the PAD that the project complies with all applicable Bank 
policies, for example environmental social safeguards policies17, or, alternatively, to specify an 
exception to such policies, for which special approval is requested. The title of the 2004 World 
Bank document on urban WSS, referred to in section 1.5.1 above, is that of „Operational Guidance 
for World Bank Group Staff‟ which suggests that the section on „Extending Services to the Poor‟ 
(pages 11-12) may not have policy status. This document provides a “framework within which staff 
can design assistance programs and individual operations, in a manner that ensures the quality of 
our interventions” (Foreward, p.(iii)). It “cautions against one-size-fits-all-prescriptions” in 
recognition of “variations in circumstances in developing countries”. This flexibility allowed to 
Bank staff in WSS project design echoes that of the task team leader‟s role, in Box 1.3.        
 
PADs are distributed to the World Bank Board of Executive Directors after permission has been 
sought on the entire project approval package from governments. As to the status of PADs, they are 
not formal contractual documents. The contract between the World Bank and each Government is 
comprised by the finance agreement and other legal documents, which include a summary of the 
main project components and objectives, and the performance indicators - which nevertheless 
mirror the PAD. The „project agreements‟ are separate, as also are the „subsidiary agreements‟, 
those, for example, relating to on-lending and on-granting, as well as the performance contracts 
between government ministries and utilities. The role of Bank staff in relation to those subsidiary 
agreements is “to review and give no objection”, particularly where development of those 
performance contracts is funded by the Bank finance. 
 
                                                 
17 E.g. a check in relation to adverse environmental and social impacts of the proposed project, e.g. persons required to 
be re-settled due to infrastructure works. 
  
 
 
 
During project implementation, the terms of PADs may be modified, by amendment to the legal 
agreements, drawn up by legal counsel and submitted to the Board of the Bank for approval. In this 
way, a project component may be cancelled, or the indicators of a project may be modified. More 
major alteration of a project requires “project restructuring” which entails a more lengthy legal and 
administrative process.  
 
1.6 Structure of this report  
The following sections of this report are organised in the following way:- 
Section 2 describes the scope and results of the Ghana case study. 
Section 3 describes the research in Burkina and the findings of the study in Ouagadougou. 
Section 4 summarises the investigations carried out in Dar es Salaam and the results from that 
Tanzania study. 
Section 5 summarises the findings of the case studies on the projects in the three countries, 
including review of progress against goals which are common to the projects, and considers the role 
of the World Bank. 
Section 6 sets out conclusions and recommendations.  
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2 Ghana case study  
This section has been written by Dr. Kate Bayliss of SOAS and Mr Joseph Ampadu-Boakye of 
Maple Consult, drawing from an earlier country report prepared by Mr Ampadu-Boakye . 
 
 
 
 
Updating 
The main research was completed in December 2009. This report has since been updated in 
Autumn 2011 to reflect availability of new information, but primarily reflects the situation in 2009.  
Since the end of the research period, some developments have occurred. The management contract 
with AVRL for the management of GWCL finished in 2011 and was not renewed. Management of 
the utility has since reverted back to GWCL. There have been socio-economic studies 
commissioned under the Urban Water Project - as discussed in section 2.3.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
2.1 Background; context 
 This chapter aims to assess the impact of Ghana‟s Urban Water Project (UWP) on poor households. 
The UWP was financed by a grant from the World Bank‟s International Development Association 
(IDA) of US$103m with US$12m from the Government of Ghana (GoG) and US$5m from the 
Nordic Development Fund (World Bank, 2004e).  The findings presented here are based on a 
literature review as well as interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) held in Ghana between 
June and November 2009. The UWP was approved in 2004 and scheduled for completion by the end 
of 2010. However, implementation was severely delayed. At the time of this research in 2009, 
disbursement was reported to be only in the region of 40% of total funds. The closing date of the 
project has now been re-scheduled for 31
st
 December, 2012. Thus, the findings presented here are of 
the project progress to that date.  Observations are based on information made available which is 
clearly cited, but the researchers encountered considerable constraints in accessing information. 
Greater transparency in information sharing would enable a more accurate assessment of the project‟s 
contribution towards equitable water access. 
 
 
2.1.1 Water access and coverage 
There is considerable unmet demand for water in urban areas of Ghana although care must be taken in 
interpreting the data. Water distribution in Ghana is assessed in terms of both „access‟ and „coverage‟ 
- see Box 2.1.  
 
 
Box 2.1: Some Terminology 
 
Access figures are typically based on surveys where households are asked about the source of their 
drinking water. Where this source is classified as „improved‟, these households are defined as having safe 
access. However this indicator fails to account for the regularity of supply and distance from water 
sources.   
 
Water coverage measures water supply as a proportion of assumed demand derived from an inferred 
consumption that is based on the population of a locality. More populous settlements are expected to have 
higher commercial activity and so per capita consumption rates are assumed to be higher.  This indicator, 
however, does not capture actual usage and fails to account for equity in the distribution of water 
provided.  
 
Water poor - the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) has adopted a working definition of the 
urban poor as those i) without direct access to regulated piped supplies (including standposts as public 
piped water services); ii) who depend on secondary and tertiary suppliers and iii) who buy by the bucket 
(PURC 2005a). 
 
 
According to official figures from the Joint Monitoring Project (JMP -WHO/UNICEF, 2008), in 
2006, 90% of the urban population of Ghana had access to safe drinking water.18 This is higher than 
the average for SSA, which was 81% according to the JMP.  The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 
(MICS) in Ghana was one of the sources from which the JMP indicators were extrapolated. The 
survey asked 10,315 household members about the water that they use and the findings are shown in 
Table 2.1.  
                                                 
18
 The JMP was created by UNICEF and the WHO to monitor progress towards the MDG targets for water and 
sanitation. The data they use is derived from national surveys and statistics. 
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Table 2.1 Main Drinking Water Source in Urban Areas in Ghana 
Source Proportion 
Improved sources  
Piped into dwelling 10.1 
Piped into yard or plot 16.8 
Public tap or standpipe 38.8 
Borehole  6.5 
Protected well 6.6 
Spring  0.3 
Sachet water 11.3 
Bottled water 0.3 
Sub total 90.7 
Unimproved sources  
Unprotected well  3.5 
Rainwater collection 0.2 
Tanker truck 2.4 
River/stream 0.7 
Sub total 6.8 
Missing data 2.5 
Total 100 
Source: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2006  
 
Thus these data indicate that about 90% of the urban population has access to a safe water source 
which ties in with the JMP data above.  However, only 27% of these households have water piped 
into their house or compound and these statistics fail to capture the whole picture.  Many of those that 
say they use a piped source may be using water bought from neighbours with a piped source. 
Furthermore, these figures do not indicate the cost of the water or the time taken to collect it.  
 
Water coverage by region is shown in Table 2.2 and the figures indicate that water produced is 59% 
of estimated demand but the coverage rate does not necessarily imply household connections. The 
Upper West, Eastern, Brong Ahafo and Volta Regions have the lowest coverage rates. However, 
considering the absolute quantum of unmet demand for water, the Greater Accra region has the 
highest figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Coverage Rates in Urban Water Supply-2008  
Region  Population Demand 
(m
3
/day)  
Supply 
(m
3
/day)  
Coverage 
%  
Ashanti  2,000,728 187,118 91,500 49 
Brong-Ahafo  602,840 48,125 14,385 30 
Central  1,129,733 90,225 38,415 43 
Eastern  1,015,155 77,995 21,470 28 
Gt.- Accra  3,837,236 532,570 401,800 75 
Northern  560,820 44,449 20,375 46 
Upper-East  172,168 13,239 5,665 43 
Upper-West  106,735 8,539 1,180 14 
Volta  575,287 43,974 17,115 39 
Western  694,399 54,799 34,535 63 
National  10,689,366 1,101,032 646,494 59 
 
Source: Presentation by GWCL at Annual Government of Ghana/ Development Partners Sector Review Conference, 
2008.   
 
The situation for poor households is very different from the story told by the official statistics above. 
A study by the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) found that within the areas covered 
by the urban piped system, only 15% of poor households had access to piped water either directly or 
via yard taps (PURC 2005a). The broad statistics fail to indicate fully the level of deprivation facing 
poor households in a number of respects. First, the population data on which the coverage and 
demand estimates are based are extrapolated from the 2000 population census using earlier growth 
rates but the urban population has been growing rapidly since then. According to data from UNICEF, 
the rate of urban population growth in Ghana has accelerated from 3.9% during the two decades from 
1970 to 1990, to 4.5% between 1990 and 2007 (www.unicef.org). Not only has the provision of urban 
services been overwhelmed by urban growth, but also most of this is from rural migrants who settle in 
slum areas (WaterAid 2008). According to Keener et al (2009, p.2), slum households account for 70% 
of the country‟s urban population and, of these, 66% are not connected to the piped water network. A 
study based on extrapolation will fail to capture the shifting demographic structure and the rapid 
escalation in the rate of growth of urban slums.  These residents might not even feature in official 
data. 
Second, there is a gender dimension to water deprivation with women mainly responsible for water 
collection (MICS 2006). Research from Kumasi based on a survey of 210 households indicates that 
91% of residents accessed water via a neighbour. Seven percent owned a piped connection while two 
percent used a public standpipe. The research also revealed that 78% of the households surveyed 
spent between two and six hours a day fetching water which was done mostly by women and children 
and affected attendance and punctuality at school (Nyarko et al 2006). 
Third, the data do not account for intermittent supply which can penalize poor households. For 
example sometimes water may only be available between 1-4 am, requiring people to wake in the 
middle of the night to store water and to have the money to purchase water storage containers 
(CONIWAS 2009). Often households and communal taps do not provide water for several months at 
a time. Fourth, the figures do not account for equity of provision. The 59% coverage that is cited in 
Table 2.2 is skewed to wealthy locations and little formal access reaches poor areas. Houses are 
cheaper, the further they are located from the piped network so this is where poorer people live. It is 
poor households that lack access to safe water (WaterAid 2008). Finally, this information is based 
solely on access to water from the piped network. Meanwhile many rely on wells and boreholes. The 
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extent of water deprivation cannot be fully understood without wider knowledge of the availability 
and use of water from different sources 
According to Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), the company ensures in its tariffs that no 
consumer spends more than five percent of net income on a quantity of water sufficient to meet basic 
domestic needs and this, they say, is borne out by data found in the Ghana Living Standards Survey 
(GLSS) (GWCL 2009). This is, however, not the case for poor households. A survey of poor 
households in Kumasi indicated that they spent on average about 15% of their income on water 
(Nyarko et al 2006). Forty percent of the low-income households in the largely slum areas of Nima 
and Teshie in Greater Accra, spend over half of their income in accessing water and sanitation 
(WaterAid 2008 p.9). But most of these are not customers of GWCL – at least not directly.  
The majority who live in low-income settlements depend on private water vendors for their daily 
water needs. It is estimated that those without direct services pay around 20 times (and in some cases 
more) what it would cost them if they had a direct supply from GWCL (WaterAid Ghana, 2008). 
According to a PURC survey in 2000/2001, the majority of poor households that were connected to 
the piped water supply spent less than 5% of their income and used around 35 litres per capita. Their 
counterparts who depended on alternative suppliers consumed only 15 litres of water per capita and 
spent about 12% of household income on water (PURC, 2001). Thus a piped connection means higher 
consumption and lower costs. 
Households in poor urban communities such as Nima and Teshie in Accra use different sources of 
water for different purposes. Often, tap water or sachet water is reserved only for drinking and 
cooking, whilst hand-dug well and river water is used for washing. The main reason for this is the 
high cost and/or long distance associated with reaching a tap that provides safe water. Alternative 
sources may be of lower quality but they are closer and are either free or cost only a small fee 
compared to the safer sources (WaterAid 2008). These households would be classified as having 
access under the MICS.  
The water supply in the capital, Accra and nearby Tema (known as the Accra-Tema Metropolitan 
Area (ATMA)), is in a precarious state. The city is serviced by two water treatment plants: the Kpong 
(along the Volta River) and Weija (along the Densu River). Combined production from these two 
treatment plants is approximately 90 million gallons daily, whilst demand is approximately 150 
million gallons and rising with increasing industrial and domestic demand.19 These treatment plants 
(commissioned in the 1930s) have far outlived their productive lifespans (Sarpong and Abrampah, 
2006). The plants have not witnessed any expansion in their production capacity despite the near 
tripling of the population of Accra and Tema. GWCL also pumps about 0.6 million cubic metres 
annually from boreholes located at Dodowa in the Dangme West district of the Greater Accra Region 
to supplement the supply system in Accra. The piped supply network covers only 36% of the 200 
square kilometre land size of Accra (Van Rooijen et al., 2008).  
Challenges with poor physical planning and development control and high non-revenue water means 
that there is not a regular supply of water within the supply network. Water is rationed. Some areas 
have not received piped water for years. The majority of residents in Accra including those within 
GWCL/AVRL‟s supply network rely on small-scale water entrepreneurs (SWEs) for water supply 
(Sarpong and Abrampah, 2006).  The activities of SWEs are poorly regulated. Some SWEs have 
exploited the current situation, illegally extracting water from GWCL/AVRL pipelines to create 
scarcity and charge exorbitant rates of up to about eight times the official GWCL tariff (Van Rooijen 
et al., 2008). The Town and Country Planning Department in its design and planning of layouts for 
settlements in Accra has not considered the provision of utility services including water to informal 
                                                 
19 AVRL Website, „AVRL explains recent water shortage‟, Posted by Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (admin) on Nov 12 
2009, accessed 25.4.10 http://avrl-ghana.com/pages/posts/avrl-explains-recent-water-shortage43.php  
  
 
 
 
settlements. For this Department, these informal communities do not „exist‟ (Sarpong and Abrampah, 
2006, p.21). The lack of legal status is a major barrier towards extending services to low-income 
communities.  
 
2.1.2 Institutional framework 
Overall responsibility for the delivery of water lies with the Ministry of Water Resources, Works and 
Housing (MWRWH) through its Water Directorate (www.water-mwrwh.com). This is the lead 
government institution responsible for broad policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of the activities of all official organisations and stakeholders in both the rural and urban 
water sectors in Ghana.  
Water in urban areas is provided by the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) which reports to the 
Ministry in the performance of its functions. Under the private sector participation (PSP) component 
of the UWP, GWCL in 2006 handed over the operation and maintenance of its water supply systems 
to a private operator, Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (AVRL) under a five-year management contract 
(2006-2011).20 GWCL however continued to own the company‟s assets within the framework of the 
management contract and was responsible for monitoring the performance of AVRL.  One of the 
members of the consortium that makes up AVRL, a Dutch utility, Vitens, has a charitable foundation, 
Water for Life (W4L), which is operating in Ghana. W4L has approved seven  projects in Ghana. One 
is in Teshie, a poor urban area of Accra (see Annex 1.). 
The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) is an independent body established by Act 538 
of 1997 and is responsible for examining and approving rates chargeable for provision of urban water 
and monitoring the standards of performance of GWCL. PURC is not responsible for regulating 
AVRL directly. This is the responsibility of GWCL. The PURC reports to the Office of the President 
of Ghana.  
Given its regulatory mandate and, as will be seen in section 2.4, the absence of leadership on the part 
of other actors in the urban water sector (e.g. GWCL and MWRWH), PURC has effectively assumed 
a leadership role in addressing social and poverty issues in the urban water sector. However, 
responsibility for providing potable water supply to all urban settlements remains within the legal 
mandate of GWCL.  Although tasked with monitoring the water sector, the Water Directorate in 
MWRWH is not adequately staffed to fulfil this role effectively. At the time of this research in the 
second half of 2009, the Directorate had just one professional staff member.  
Other institutions involved in the delivery of water include the Community Water and Sanitation 
Agency (CWSA) which is responsible for water delivery in small towns and rural areas and the Water 
Resources Commission (WRC) responsible for the management of water resources. For a 
comprehensive review of the actors in the Ghana water sector see Fuest et al (2005). 
 
2.1.3 Financing 
Ghana‟s National Water Policy states that the policy objective is to ensure that adequate funds are 
available for the development of the water sector to achieve the goal of making water available for all 
(NWP 2005). However, GWCL is in a weak financial state. At the start of the UWP the company was 
unable to pay its substantial debts.  According to the PAD (World Bank 2004e), the PURC had not 
allowed debt service payments to be included in the water tariff so GWCL had for some years 
serviced only a few of its 40 loans. The project appraisal document (PAD - World Bank 2004e) called 
for a debt write-off and supported a debt rationalization for GWCL although this did not receive 
financial support from the UWP (World Bank 2004e, para 138). However, it has since been reported 
that PURC does allow GWCL debt service in tariffs for loans that PURC has authorised but will not 
                                                 
20 The management contract finished in June 2011 but was in place at the time of our research. 
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allow it for loans with which it does not concur. In addition, after the start of the project, most of 
GWCL‟s debt was either written off through HIPC or taken over by the GoG (Correspondence with 
World Bank, July 2010).  
The Strategic Investment Plan (discussed below) estimates that around US$100m a year needs to be 
spent to achieve universal coverage for urban water but average sector inflows over the past several 
years come to around US$35m of which US$30m comes from external support agencies, US$2m 
from the government‟s annual budget and US$3m from internally generated funds through water sales 
(Quaye 2008). 
The urban water sector relies substantially on external grants and loans. Available information in 2009 
from GWCL indicated that a total of US$630.16m had been invested by various Development 
Partners in the urban water sub sector since 1990. Over 90% of sector finance comes from donors and 
such inflows can be unpredictable. For example, the allocation for WSS for 2006 was lower than 
previous years even though the GoG was required to increase the funding devoted to WSS to meet the 
MDGs. In 2006, out of total sector funding of US$85m only 3.7% was provided by the government 
with the rest coming from donors (WSP 2006b p.27). On-going investment projects (listed in 2008) 
amounted to around €539m of which the UWP constitutes around ten percent. The biggest project is 
funded by a concessional loan from China for the Kpong water supply extension works and accounts 
for nearly 30 percent of the total on-going projects (Quaye 2008). This is a loan for US$270m to 
increase capacity of the Kpong treatment plant by 40million gallons.21 The project is expected to be 
completed by October 2012.22 
Water and sanitation attract only a small proportion of the government budget (WaterAid 2008). 
Available data from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) indicates that budget 
allocations by the GoG to the water (and sanitation) sector as a percentage of total social sector budget 
have been low, averaging about 3.6% (Water Sector Monitoring Platform 2009). The 
recommendations from the 2009 Ghana Water Forum call for higher cost recovery and budget 
allocation to reduce dependence on donor finance.23 
 
2.1.4 Water pricing 
Tariffs are set by the regulator, PURC. A uniform tariff is applied across the country which 
effectively entails some degree of regional cross subsidy as the costs of delivery are not uniform. The 
tariff system uses an increasing block tariff (IBT) structure so that the first 20m
3
 per month is 
provided at a lifeline rate and the price for further units is charged at a higher rate (see Table 2.3). For 
a lifeline tariff to be applied, a connection needs to be metered. It was reported in interviews with 
AVRL that only around 30% of connections in Accra were metered. Connection charges are passed 
on to the end user in full. 
Research from Kumasi indicates that the lifeline tariff fails to benefit poor households in high-density 
housing. Findings cited in Nyarko et al (2006) indicate that low-income, multi-occupancy households 
in single-meter compound houses were paying 20% more per unit volume than high-income users in 
single-family houses with a direct connection to the piped network. The same study also revealed that 
low-income households were using 56 litres/capita/day while high-income households were using 120 
l/c/d . In addition, according to a review by PURC, the lifeline tariff fails to reach the poorest as most 
do not have a connection to the piped network and so PURC is planning to replace the lifeline tariff 
system at some stage in the future (PURC 2005a). Many of those that are not connected, rely 
                                                 
21 „$273m To Expand Kpong Water Plant‟  The Ghanaian Times 12.2.2010. 
22 Tema, Accra, Sekondi to enjoy free-flow of water soon, Ghana News Agency, 30.4.2011, accessed 14.12.2011 
23 Statement Issued by Ministerial and Development Partners Roundtable At The 1st Ghana Water Forum, Accra, 22nd 
October 2009 
  
 
 
 
indirectly on the piped supply through neighbours and water vendors and an increase in the price 
charged by GWCL will be passed on to them, through private vendors so tariff adjustments need to be 
carefully assessed to determine their full equity impact.  
 
Table 2.3 GWCL Tariffs 
Category of Service Quantity Ghanaian 
Cedi/Pesewa 
US$/m
3 
Metered Domestic 0-20m3 GHp 0.66 per 
m3 
0.46 
 21m3 and above GHp 0.91 0.63 
Commercial /Industrial Flat rate GH¢ 1.10 0.76 
Public institutions/government 
departments 
Flat rate GH¢ 1.10 0.76 
Unmetered premises   Flat rate per house 
per month 
GH¢ 3.89 2.71 
Premises without a connection  
(public standpipes)  
per 1000 litres GHp 0.66 .46 
Special commercial per 1000 litres  GH¢ 2.04 1.36 
Reconnection fee Domestic  GH¢ 288 197.20 
Reconnection fee Commercial  GH¢ 922 631.50 
Source: Ghana Gazette 13th November 2007 
 
The National Water Policy calls for the establishment of a Social Connection Fund to support the 
connection of low-income consumers to the network (NWP 2005), but this is not supported in the 
tariff structure in Table 2.3. The PURC does not support subsidies for connection charges for the poor 
but prefers more targeted interventions for the following reasons: 
“It is often cited that the principal barrier for the poor to access water supply is the 
connection charge as opposed to the volumetric unit tariff. This is demonstrated in Ghana 
whereby the non-serviced customers pay substantially higher volumetric rates to secondary 
market service providers than those connected to the GWCL system. However, in Ghana the 
barrier is not through customer choice but as a result of a lack of adequate infrastructure. It 
is considered that the full costs of connections can be met by the customers once the service 
is expanded to reach them. Consequently, PURC sees no need at present to cross-subsidise 
connection charges. Notwithstanding this position PURC shall promote and support 
strategies designed to assist the poor to gain access to the piped water supply system through 
funding mechanisms specifically designed to help the urban poor” PURC 2005b, p8. 
Prices have increased substantially in recent years and it was reported in interviews with the regulator 
that the tariff was approaching one of cost recovery. In the short term, the tariff structure is to be 
based on GWCL cash-flow requirements plus some allowances to cover the cost of depreciation. In 
the long term, the tariff policy supports increases to allow for a return on capital (PURC, 2005b). 
GWCL also reports that the current tariff is approaching the full cost recovery price. The full 
economic cost of a unit volume of potable water is about US$0.8/m
3
 while current average sale price 
is about US$0.63/m3 (GWCL 2009). These tariffs are in keeping with those in the rest of the region 
but they are high by developing country standards (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). In addition, 
the idea that the tariff is approaching a stage where it can recover costs through user charges does not 
seem to be consistent with a financing profile that is so heavily dependent on donors and where 
investment needs are so high. There may be scope to cover operations costs but the sector is far from 
financially self-sufficient. 
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2.1.5  Inclusion in policies and strategies for urban water 
In theory, there is strong commitment to universal water access but this is not matched by policy 
implementation. Water is an inalienable right for every citizen of Ghana including the poor according 
to Section 35 (3) of the Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana but it is not clear how these rights 
are justiciable and enforceable by the Supreme Court of Ghana. Constitutional provision is not 
sufficient to ensure practical outcomes. Furthermore, strategies and policies are often fragmented.  
Currently, Ghana does not have a comprehensive urban development policy. Rather, a number of 
strategies for urban development including slum upgrading have been outlined in the Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) with a focus on strengthening physical planning and improving 
infrastructural facilities. Implementation of these strategies has been at a slow pace due to lack of 
political commitment and inadequate financing. Although most urban areas in Ghana have planning 
schemes with clearly defined layout for infrastructural delivery including water supply, in practice 
most of these areas are characterised by sprawling and unplanned physical development. The Ministry 
of Local Government and Rural Development is currently developing an Urban Development and 
Growth Policy.  
Ghana‟s development blueprint, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) II (2006-2009), and 
the National Water Policy (adopted July 2007) both articulate the government‟s aspiration to improve 
access to potable water especially for the poor as key to sustained poverty reduction in Ghana. 
Strategies mentioned in these policy documents include mobilising new investments, establishment of 
a programme such as a Social Connection Fund, extending distribution networks especially to low 
income consumers, assessing the lifeline tariff for poor urban households and recognising and 
providing support where appropriate to small scale providers (secondary and tertiary) in the water 
supply chain.  
While there is commitment to supporting poor households on paper, the challenge has been to 
translate these strategies into action by the relevant institutions. A number of commentators have 
pointed to this gap. According to WaterAid (2008), policy statements on water supply and sanitation 
in a range of national policy documents (such as the GPRS, Water Policy and Environmental 
Sanitation Policy) are inconsistent and/or contradictory.  
In addition the strategies and plans fail to be backed up by adequate resources: “WSS is clearly 
articulated in national strategies and expenditure framework but the link between targeted goals and 
resource allocations remains limited…what is becoming clear is the wide gap between the 
requirements needed to meet the government‟s more ambitious WSS targets (unconstrained budget) 
with what is annually released to meet them (constrained budget)” (WSP 2006b, p 27). Furthermore, 
the implementation of the National Water Policy has been slow due to the lack of sufficient 
professional staff and operational budget at the Water Directorate.24 
In a bid to promote greater water access for poorer households in urban areas, the PURC in 2005 
developed a social policy and strategy for urban water regulation and an urban water tariff policy. In 
its Social Policy document, PURC stated its intention to “take the lead in water sector stakeholder 
involvement in improving services for the urban poor” (PURC 2005a, p10).  PURC has outlined a 
number of initiatives aimed at improving accessibility and affordability of potable water for the urban 
poor notably leading the formation of a working group of stakeholders to address provision of service 
to the urban poor. The group‟s tasks include the targeting of social funding or other relief schemes for 
                                                 
24 Statement Issued by Ministerial and Development Partners Roundtable At The 1st Ghana Water Forum, Accra, 22nd 
October 2009 
  
 
 
 
the poor as well as undertaking pilot studies to test interventions in delivering water to low-income 
communities. These proposed studies are to provide lessons to inform PURC‟s regulatory policies, the 
supply and payment options available to the utility and the criteria for determining investments 
targeted to the urban poor. While this idea was first articulated in the PURC‟s 2005 Social Policy, it 
was the World Bank‟s UWP that provided financial support for the pro poor pilot projects.   
2.2 Inclusion in project design 
The design of the World Bank project is articulated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) (World 
Bank 2004e). This is a 94-page document that sets out the details of the project rationale, schedule of 
implementation as well as the monitoring framework. The document translates the broad policy 
objectives into detailed activities and assesses the risks involved.  A detailed review of the PAD 
shows that in the broad project design, while equity is a stated objective at the start, its prominence 
slips when it comes to the evaluation criteria by which the project will be assessed.  
The Urban Water Project (UWP) was conceived with two main objectives:  
 to increase significantly access to the piped water system in Ghana‟s urban centres, with an 
emphasis on improving access, affordability and service reliability to the urban poor; and  
 to restore the long-term financial stability, viability and sustainability of the GWCL.  
The Project was approved in 2004 and originally scheduled to finish in 2011. The closing date has 
now been extended to 31 December 2012. Procurement problems caused project implementation to be 
delayed by nearly two years (World Bank 2011a). A Project Management Unit (PMU) has been 
established within GWCL to implement and  monitor the project. The project has four components: 
(1) System Expansion and Rehabilitation (2) Public-Private Partnership Development (3) Capacity 
Building and Project Management and (4) Severance Programme.  Each of these is aimed at achieving 
the objectives described above.  
The poverty focus of the UWP is cited throughout the PAD and summarized early on (p.4),  
reproduced below (Box 2.2): the majority of household connections provided by the UWP will be to 
low-income households and the PAD makes explicit reference to targeting of poor consumers.   
 
 
Box 2.2         Poverty Focus of the Project –as stated in the PAD  
The provision of easily accessible potable water is a key component of poverty alleviation in Ghana, as it is 
in every country. For the Urban Water Project, the Government has identified three areas of poverty focus: 
Access, Affordability and Targeting.  
Access: Increasing access to improved water supplies is a major water sector policy objective of the 
government. Therefore, over 75 percent of Project funds (US$91 million) are for civil works and associated 
engineering. The government has set a Project goal [of] at least 50,000 new household connections, 
themajority of which will be to low-income households and for the provision of stand-posts.  To complement 
these efforts, the proposed management contract will contain a performance criteria for increasing cubic 
meters sold at the “life line” portion of the tariff, thereby giving the private operator an incentive to extend 
service to as many new connections as possible.  
Affordability: The emphasis on new connections also means that poor households will buy less water from 
high price vendors, significantly lowering their average cost of water. The Project supports efforts of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC) to put in place programs to ensure that tanker trucks deliver 
water to consumers at affordable prices. This study must be completed by time of the mid- term review and 
recommendations implemented in the second half of the Project.  
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Targeting: The PURC has defined a program to ensure better targeting of the poor with affordable delivery 
of water supply services. PURC‟s pro-poor program consists of actions to (i) rationalize lifeline tariff to 
better target poor consumers living in compound houses; (ii) improve affordable access to water supply for 
the very poor living in areas served by water vendors; and (iii) enhance the quality of tanker delivery 
including rationalizing the cost of service. To realize the pro-poor objectives of the proposed project, the 
PURC will be supported to implement its set of pro-poor actions including the setting up of identified pilots 
in selected cities.  
                                     Source: PAD, World Bank 2004e, Page 4 
 
Thus, according to this extract, poor households will benefit from: 
 new connections and stand-posts,  
 from a reduction in reliance on expensive water vendors and  
 because PURC will be given support to implement tariff rationalisation, improved service 
delivery in poor areas and improved tanker delivery services.  
However, the poverty focus becomes muted when it comes to the results and indicators of success 
which are set out in Annex 3 of the PAD (p.20). An extract is presented in Table 2.4 below. The 
access objective is that residents have access to more affordable and reliable piped water but it does 
not specify which residents. Similarly, the indicator for this objective is the addition of 50,000 new 
connections or stand posts. Thus if only wealthy households are provided with connections, this 
objective will have been achieved.  
Table 2.4   Extract from Annex 3, Results Framework and Monitoring 
Project Development Objectives Outcome Indicator 
Residents in targeted urban centers have 
access to more affordable and reliable 
piped water. 
GWCL is operated on a sound commercial 
and financial basis. 
Urban centers receiving civil works add at 
least 50,000 new connections or stand posts. 
GWCL in the five largest cities meet 100% 
of their cash obligations from collected 
revenues 
Intermediate Results per component Results Indicator for Each Component 
Component One 
Investment Program is fully implemented. 
Component One 
At least US$80m is invested to extend and 
rehabilitate the piped water network 
 
 
Component Two 
The urban water sector establishes a 
successful PSP track record 
 
Component Two 
A 5-year management contract is closed 
financially and carried out 
 
Component Three 
The principal actors in the country‟s urban 
water sector establish a reputation for 
capacity and professionalism 
 
Component Three 
MWH establishes a Water Directorate that 
conceives and implements policy and reform 
initiatives 
  
 
 
 
 
Two well targeted pro-poor programs are put 
in place by PURC 
Component four 
GWCL is efficiently staffed with capable 
employees 
Component Four 
Number of GWCL staff per 1,000 
connections 
Average GWCL wage compared to 
equivalent post in private sector. 
Source: World Bank Project Appraisal Document for Ghana Urban Water Project, p.20 
In terms of the design of the UWP, as set out in the PAD, the poverty focus of the project is not 
explicitly expressed in the results and outcome indicators. There is no reference in the Results 
Framework to any socio-economic or other studies/surveys to monitor which water users will benefit 
from the 50,000 new connections. The question arises, therefore, as to how the pro-poor aims of the 
project, as set out in Box 2.2 above, will be realised in the implementation of the project and how 
these can be evaluated. Issues of targeting are discussed in section 1.3.1. 
2.3 Inclusion in project implementation 
Implementation of the UWP was slow due to procurement delays and the introduction of additional 
works. Project progress has been difficult to assess due to the absence of baseline information. It was 
reported in stakeholder interviews carried out for this study in November 2009 that an amount of 
about US$40m had been spent until then on the project, compared with a target disbursement amount 
of US$89m by the end of 2009, although details on actual expenditures were not made available to the 
study team. We assess below the extent of inclusion in terms of each of the project components as set 
out in the PAD (World Bank 2004e, p.11).25 
2.3.1 System expansion and rehabilitation (US$91.8m) 
This is by far the biggest component of the project and comprises: 
- First Year Investment Programme (FYIP) of US$17m which is for minor works for which no 
major preliminary studies will be required to achieve immediate impacts on improved service 
coverage and reduce UFW.  
- Subsequent Year Investment Programme (SYIP) of US$70m to cover individual water supply 
systems, extension of water production, transmission and distribution works taking into account 
long-term requirements. These funds are to be distributed across the ten regions of Ghana, with 
all regions included. 
- Repair, Replacement and Rehabilitation Fund (RRRF) to be managed by the operator, originally 
with a value of US$5m but since increased with extra donor funding to US$12m. 
 
At the time of the research, the FYIP was just about complete, some five years after the start of the 
project and calls had just been put out inviting bids for the SYIP. As a result, our research was unable 
to assess the pro poor impact of the disbursements ex post but we are able to consider the process of 
allocation. The project funds were to be distributed across all the ten regions of the country and then 
to be dedicated to specific water systems within each region (GWCL owns 81 water systems across 
the country). The allocation criteria are set out in Box 2.3 although the water borne diseases factor 
was not used due to lack of data. 
 
                                                 
25 Except the severance programme. 
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Box 2.3: Criteria for distribution of UWP funds 
 
Distribution across the ten regions: 
i) Urban population for each region according to latest census with the most populous region to be 
given a factor of 1 with factors to be given for other regions to be in direct proportion to relevant 
populations;  
ii) The GDP expressed in US$ per capita (or any other feasible measure) with the region with the 
lowest US$ per capita to be given a factor of 1 with factors to be given for other regions to be in 
direct proportion to relevant US$/capita; this should give due weight to the economic situation in 
the respective region;  
iii) The service coverage, percentage population connected to a water supply system, compounded 
on regional basis with a factor of 1 to be given to the region with the lowest service coverage and 
with factors to be given for other regions to be in direct proportion to relevant service coverage; and  
iv) Parallel investments taken place or proposed to take place during the course of project 
implementation expressed in US$/capita with a factor of 1 to be given to the region with the lowest 
US$/capita and with factors to be given for other regions to be in direct proportion to respective 
US$/capita. 
 
Distribution across water systems within each region 
 
i) Water availability (or production capacity) per capita (total urban population) (litre/capita and day 
(l/c.d) with a factor of 1 to be given to a water supply system with lowest l/c.d and with factors to 
be given to other urban water supply systems to be in direct proportion to relevant l/c.d.;  
ii) Population coverage by service connections as a percentage of total population with the water 
supply system with the lowest coverage to be given a factor of 1 and with factors to be given to 
other water supply systems to be in direct proportion to relevant population coverage;  
iii) Investment per capita (to be based on previously prepared proposed investments for urban water 
supply systems) with the water supply system with the lowest investment per capita to given a 
factor of 1 and with factors to be given to other water supply systems to be in direct proportion to 
relevant investment per capacity; and  
iv) Water borne diseases (one representative indicator to be selected) with the water supply system 
with the highest incidence (cases per 1000) to be given a factor of 1 and with factors to be given to 
other water supply systems to be in direct proportion to relevant incidence. – Although this criterion 
was not applied due to lack of data.  
 
Source: World Bank 2004e, pp. 22-24 
 
 
Extrapolating from the 2000 population census and previous population growth rates, the design 
consultants made assessments of water demand compared with actual provision to estimate the 
investment requirements for each region and then used the allocation criteria (Box 2.3) to determine 
where the SYIP funds should be spent. The results for the regional allocation are shown in Table 2.5. 
For more details on the allocation of funds to initial systems within regions, see Annex 2. 
Box 2.3 shows that the fund allocation process has given priority to low-income, highly populated 
regions with low coverage and low sector investment. This exercise does go some considerable way 
towards the targeting of investments towards the areas of greatest need, although the actual amount 
per region is small (Table 2.5).   
 
  
 
 
 
Table 2.5 Allocation of SYIP funds across regions 
 Population 
Water 
demand 
 
Funds for investments 
 2007 2007 FYIP SYIP 
  M3 US$ US$ 
Greater Accra 3,750,214 476,593 2,900,000 4,364.024 
Ashanti 1,579,082 139,434 3,900,000 2,861,748 
Brong Ahafo 530,052 40,766  4,874,213 
Central 1,067,073 66,355  4,230,765 
Eastern 679,067 52,381  4,915,372 
Northern 523,564 41,096  6,798,985 
Upper east 146,257 15,228  4,354,344 
Upper west 84,790 9,073  6,811,316 
Volta 568,723 37,472  11,129,035 
Western 558,687 38,039  15,160,198 
Total 9,507,510 916,435 6,800,000 65,500,000 
 
Source: Adapted from Tahal presentation to MTR (Tahal, 2008) 
 
This approach clearly diverts funding to the poorest regions. However, allocating funding to the 
regions and systems according to income, existing coverage and investment does not necessarily 
mean that the services will reach those suffering the most from water deprivation for two main 
reasons. First, the figures for water coverage do not take account of the distribution of water access 
within a region or system. The data are based on analysis of water production and population figures 
and there is no way of knowing if the supply is fairly allocated or if the rapidly growing urban slum 
population living in informal settlements even feature in the data.  Second, the allocation of funds is 
based on utility water produced and an inferred demand based on an assumed per capita consumption 
but no consideration is paid to alternative water sources.  The availability of ground water and 
alternative means of access has a considerable impact on the extent of water deprivation and on the 
impact of interventions. 
The limitations of such funding allocation based on such a numerical exercise are recognised in the 
PAD, which specifies further steps that were to be taken to improve the pro-poor targeting26 (citing the 
paragraph from the PAD):-  
The pro-poor emphasis will be a major objective in the design of water supply systems in 
terms of maximizing the supply to low-income households within the existing service 
areas as well as prioritizing extension of water supply services to predominant low-
income areas, either by house-connections and/or stand-posts. The design consultants will 
carry out socio-economic surveys, sub-contracted through qualified survey firms, in order 
to determine the current status of water supply to low-income households in each of the 
                                                 
26 In written comments on an earlier draft of the present research report, the World Bank requested that this paragraph 
from the PAD be reproduced in full. 
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selected water systems. The surveys will be carried out during the early stages of the 
feasibility studies in order to maximize the impact of the scheme designs on water 
services to the poor. The feasibility studies will clearly describe this pro-poor design 
process and indicate the numbers of new low-income households that will be served 
by the schemes as well as the method of service: i.e. house-connection or stand-post. The 
actual requirements under the RRRF will be determined during the course of project 
implementation (PAD, World Bank 2004e, p.24, para 74, emphasis added).   
 
There was, then, considerable importance attached to this paragraph in the PAD. These socio 
economic surveys were to be the essence of the pro-poor design element of the project and were key 
to the pro-poor targeting mechanism envisaged by the Bank. However, in the course of our research, it 
emerged that when it came to implementation, the decision was taken not to carry out these surveys. 
Instead, the Bank and the PMU decided to make use of already existing material rather than, it was 
argued, waste resources by duplicating what had already been done (NB: additional material was 
provided in May 2011). 
Five additional documents were provided in May 2011. Of these, three were from 2009 and were 
presentations to the Mid-term review meeting including the socio economic survey for the pro poor 
pilot projects under PURC. Just two of the five additional reports predated the start of the UWP. 
These are presumed to be the already existing socio-economic studies which provided the justification 
for not carrying out the surveys outlined in Para 74 of the PAD.  The information provided is outlined 
below.  
a) Summary of results and recommendations (final chapter) of a study of Willingness to 
Pay for water carried out by John Young Associates (1999). We were only provided with 
the summary of results for this study so we are not able to comment on the methodology. The 
authors find that households that are not connected to the water distribution network are 
willing to pay to have a piped connection. Based on an assessment of the cost of water for 
those that use water vendors as well as the share of household expenditure spent on water, the 
study concludes that a simple tariff structure should be applied where consumers pay the same 
rate for each cubic meter of water consumed but they recommend that the tariff is varied 
according to the customer category (domestic, government, industrial, standpipes).  
b) Louis Berger (1998) Private Sector Participation in the Urban Water Sector. The 
principal objective of this study was “to develop the Business Framework for the 
implementation of PSP in the Ghana urban water sector” p. ES2. The study includes the design 
of an institutional framework for private sector participation, evaluation of the legal and 
regulatory framework, analysis of technical aspects of urban water supply operations, financial 
analysis of the urban water sector (mainly to establish a tariff level that would mean the sector 
would be financially viable), socio economic analysis to determine the impact of PSP on the 
lower income segments of the population and to assess the tariff level affordable to these 
consumers and finally, preparation of the Business Framework for PSP.  
The socio-economic analysis (Chapter 7 of the Louis Berger study) is from the perspective of 
the design of the PSP framework. The purpose of this chapter of the study was to “determine 
the impact of the PSP programme on the lower income sector of Ghana and to study the means 
for minimising any negative impact. In particular, the necessity for increasing tariff rates as 
indicated in the Institutional Framework and Financial Analysis sections of this report will 
have to be balanced in terms of affordability criteria amongst the lowest income consumers.” 
(P. 7.1). The conclusions reached are the following:- 
  
 
 
 
 Landlords should be given incentives to connect. Yard connections should be given special 
incentives as they serve more than one household. Outside ATMA standpipes should 
continue to be used.  
 The tariff structure should be simplified. 
 A social tariff should be applied – at least in the short term. 
 Affordability should be set at a threshold of 2-5% of household expenditure. The report also 
says that: “Detailed socio-economic data regarding other regions [i.e. outside ATMA] 
(where income levels are significantly lower) is missing. Further studies are recommended”  
(p. ES15).  
This study was itself based on earlier research and used no new data collection was carried out. 
The consultants used material from previous studies. The main sources were (p. 7.1) 
 Study of the ATMA Development and Investment Programme whereby a socio-economic 
survey of more than 1,000 households was carried out in Jan 1996. 
 Water Utilisation and Valuation in Urban communities in Northern Ghana (CIDA 1991). 
According to the authors: “with an inflation rate of over 300% the results require significant 
updating. Nevertheless these willingness to pay surveys give some indication of socio 
economic conditions outside the ATMA area which are otherwise lacking” p. 7.1  
 Ghana Living Standards Survey (1992) – data regarding average income levels.  
 Extended Poverty Study (World Bank 1995) 
 Ghana Statistical Services.  
The consultants state that in some cases the data is not adequate for firm analysis: “These 
figures are considered indicative. A detailed affordability and willingness-to- pay survey is 
required in the regions outside ATMA is required in order to obtain up- to-date data” (sic) p. 
7.14. Later, “Of course, the above data applies only to ATMA. More data regarding low-income 
consumers is required for the urban areas outside the capital” P 7.17. 
As we had made repeated requests for information on the socio economic analysis, we have to 
assume that the information that we finally received in May 2011 covers the main socio economic 
analysis on which the pro poor dimension to the UWP was based. There are clearly some 
limitations: 
 This research is dated. The date of the PAD is July 2004. At that stage the Louis Berger study 
was six years old and furthermore their socio economic analysis is based on studies that go as 
far back as 1996 and 1991.  The study itself made repeated reference to the need for further 
research. 
 The focus of the background studies (particularly the Louis Berger study) is on private sector 
participation and the impact it will have on low-income households and not about the 
investment needed to alleviate conditions for poor families. 
These two studies would appear to fall far short of the surveys that were to be carried out during 
the early stages of the feasibility studies in order to maximize the impact of the scheme designs 
on water services to the poor as stated in paragraph 74 of the PAD.  
Other elements that were important for ensuring that the project met the needs of poor households 
were also neglected.  The PMU was supposed to track a number of indicators including new low-
income households added to the piped water system as a result of the project (PAD para 31). National 
stakeholder surveys were intended to produce “comprehensive social impact indicators and changes on 
stakeholder attitudes during implementation” (PAD, Para 48). These surveys were supposed to identify 
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zones with the highest concentration of low-income households. The PMU was supposed to monitor 
the number of low-income households connected under the project. At the time of the revised report 
(November 2011) we were informed that the PMU does not have data on the number of low-income 
households added to the piped water system (source: Maple 2011 update report).   
There seems to be a major gap between the pro poor rhetoric of the PAD and the practical project 
implementation. There was a strong sense in the research interviews that targeting the poorest was not 
in practice a project priority as that there were so many poor households that targeting was not really 
required. Just improving the bulk supply would be sufficient to help the poor although possibly not the 
poorest. There was little effort to address the specific needs of low-income households. The PMU was 
of the opinion27 that funds available for the SYIP were adequate to provide 100% coverage in all the 26 
selected systems for the SYIP except for Accra and therefore there was not considered any need to 
specifically target the poor.  In addition, we were told that such socio economic studies would divert 
resources from water delivery and delay project implementation. 
However, without analysis of water access methods and efforts to identify the needs and constraints 
facing low-income households, there is a risk that the project funding will be just directed to the 
middle classes and that the impact of improvements to the water supply just helps those that can afford 
connections. In practice, investments may not necessarily guarantee access to water for every 
household as discussed above. For example, currently, although the Greater Accra region has the 
highest urban water coverage rate (75% - Table 2.2), some communities within the region have no 
access to GWCL supply.  
In addition, a focus on asking households how much they are willing to spend on water will reach the 
widely held, and intuitively plausible conclusion that poor households are spending a fortune buying 
water from private vendors. They would much prefer to have a connection because it would be 
cheaper and obtaining water would be quicker.  But this approach neglects some of the more complex 
nuances in water access such as why exactly do households not obtain a connection to the piped 
network and what other sources are available.  In practice there are many reasons why households do 
not connect including onerous bureaucratic processes as well as lack of legal tenure. In written 
comments in response to an earlier draft of this report (July 2010), the difficulties in reaching slum 
areas were acknowledged by the Bank: 
“In general, expanding slum areas in Ghana are predominately informally settled areas 
where the inhabitants do not have land tenure.  Ghana law requires property ownership 
before a water connection can be given.  This law also discourages the provision of 
standpipes by the municipality or GWCL as technically the provision of piped water supply 
to untenured inhabitants violates the law.  The project design is obligated to respect the 
country‟s legal framework.” 
 
Thus the Bank project is constrained by the national legal framework which means that the project – 
and other Bank activity - risks missing large numbers of the poorest households located in informal 
areas. We were also informed that the Bank at the time was discussing a new project including 
provision to peri-urban and informal areas (World Bank comments on draft report, July 2010).  
 
In 2011, the GWCL PMU issued a call for consultants to carry out community entry and sensitivity 
activities in selected towns to design ways to facilitate access for low-income communities in four 
regions. According to the ToR: 
 “GWCL, acting through its Project Management Unit (PMU), now wishes to engage 
Consultant(s) to carry out the Community entry and sensitization activities in the 
towns/systems selected for improvement under the SYIP, aiming at sustainable 
                                                 
27 Interview with PMU, June 2009. 
  
 
 
 
community-managed water delivery systems with special emphasis on ownership and 
women‟s participation  in the delivery of good quality water in poor communities in the 
selected urban areas.” 
 
The consultancy was to be located in four geographical areas Area 1: Ashanti, Upper West and 
Northern Regions; Area 2: Central and Eastern Regions; Area 3: Volta Region and Area 4: Western 
Region. The consultants were required to carry out field surveys to to determine the “locations and 
numbers of standpipes or technically equivalent options that optimize access of the predominantly 
low-income populations to potable water supply” (Terms of Reference, 2011). This study should go 
some way to identifying how best to serve communities and help them to manage new water facilities. 
But, this is late on in the project which finishes in December 2012. Contracts for the capital investment 
have been awarded and it seems doubtful that this study will affect the project design significantly.  
 
Obuasi case study 
Our research intended to review the impact of the UWP by holding discussions with project 
beneficiaries and end users. However, due to the delays in the project implementation, at the time of 
our research in November 2009, contracts for civil works under the SYIP were being put out to tender 
so it was too early to assess the impact of the SYIP. However, it was reported by the PMU that some 
work had been carried out under the FYIP in the Ashanti Region. According to the PMU, a total of 
55km, 45km and 15 km of pipelines had been laid under the FYIP in Accra, Kumasi and Obuasi, 
respectively. Only details on interventions in Obuasi were made available by the PMU. We conducted 
a short field visit to the region to review the work of the UWP. The information provided by the PMU 
is presented in Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6 Update on FYIP Intervention in Obuasi 
Name of 
community 
Pipe-
lines 
Population Before FYIP After FYIP 
Gausu Ramia 2785 5398 House connections House connections 
Abompekrom/ 
Nyamebekyere 
3950 4394 Private wells House connections, 
stand pipes 
 
Industrial Link 
 
2175 
 
6676 
 
Nil 
 
House connections, 
stand pipes 
Bediem  1800 1702 Nil House connections, 
stand pipes 
Akaporiso  3290 12029 Nil House connections, 
stand pipes 
Brahabebome  1060 11199 Limited house 
connections 
House connections, 
stand pipes 
 
Source: Presentation by PMU at Mid Term Review of UWP, August 2009 
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Our field visit to Obuasi, however, revealed some findings that were contrary to the information 
reported by the PMU. It emerged that almost 60% of public standpipes (10 out of 17) provided under 
the UWP had been disconnected just seven months after completion of the intervention because they 
had been used so little.
28
 This was due to complaints about sour taste, intermittent water supply and 
the easy availability of alternative water sources – most houses have private wells. Moreover, there 
were indications that additional standpipes would also be disconnected in the near future. A total of 28 
household connections had been made to date, out of which 12 were in areas (four out of six 
communities) that were hitherto not connected to the GWCL distribution network. Through 
consultations with AVRL Obuasi District officials and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with 
residents during our field visit to Obuasi, we established the following (Table 2.7):-  
 
Table 2.7: Update on FYIP Intervention in Obuasi from Field Visit 
Name of 
community 
Before FYIP After FYIP 
 
Gausu Ramia 
 
House connections 
 
10 household connections; 2 
standpipes were provided in 
Mensakrom, a suburb of Gausu 
Ramia, but they have all been 
disconnected due to low patronage.  
Abompekrom 
 
Private wells 3 household connections; no 
stand pipes were provided.  
Industrial Link 
(Kunka) 
Private wells and boreholes 1 household connection; 5 stand 
pipes provided, but 2 have been 
disconnected due to low 
patronage  
Bediem  Private wells and a borehole 4 household connections, 1 
stand pipe provided, but it has 
been abandoned for low 
patronage 
 
Akaporiso  
 
Private wells and a borehole  
 
4 household connections; 14 
stand pipes were provided, but 5 
have been disconnected due to 
low patronage 
Brahabebome  Limited house connections, 
private wells, 1 borehole and 5 
standpipes 
 
6 household connections; no 
additional stand pipes were 
provided  
 
Discussions with a cross section of residents in the six communities in Obuasi revealed that 
community members either made a financial contribution towards the establishment of standpipes or 
provided communal labour for the exercise. This assertion could not be verified by the AVRL 
                                                 
28 Civil works in Obuasi were completed in March 2009.  
  
 
 
 
officials in Obuasi because the officer who was in charge during the civil works had been transferred 
to Accra and was on leave. Besides, all attempts to access implementation reports on the FYIP were 
unsuccessful.  
FGDs revealed that residents in Obuasi, generally, were not interested in water supplied by GWCL 
because of the intermittent supply and sour taste. The residents contended that private hand dug wells 
guaranteed an almost all year round supply of water and so they did not see the need to connect to 
GWCL supplies. In response to the issue of sour taste, the AVRL District Customer Care Officer 
admitted that the overhead tanks for distributing water had not been washed for a while and that the 
organisation was in the process of arranging for the tanks to be cleaned. This situation questions 
mechanisms for ensuring the quality of water supplied to residents.  
The cost of water at public standpipes was not reported to be a barrier to accessing water in Obuasi, 
although some residents preferred fetching water free of charge from hand-dug wells rather than from 
public standpipes and boreholes. Water vendors in all the other communities except Kunka were 
selling water with a total value of about one Ghanaian Cedi (US$0.70) daily (a 20 litre bucket is sold 
for about 0.02 Cedi). Vendors were paid 20% commission on water sold and did not find the service 
sufficiently lucrative.   
In FGDs, residents expressed frustration at the bureaucratic process involved in obtaining a household 
connection, as well as the cost. Applicants are required to provide a site plan and a building permit 
and few residents (particularly in poor and rented households) have this. In addition, the cost is also a 
deterrent. Charges for connection are based on the actual cost and so will vary depending on the 
distance from the network, but were reported in the FGDs to be about US$200.  Furthermore, 
residents reported that it took them over six months to get household connections even where they had 
all the required documentation. Meanwhile, it cost about the same to have a private well constructed 
within two weeks. The Obuasi District AVRL Office admitted that household connections were 
delayed due to the bureaucratic approval process.  
To conclude, our research found that some connections were established under the UWP, but there 
was little evidence to suggest that the investment under this component will reach poor households 
extensively. Investment in capital works is vital as supply is intermittent and infrastructure is old. 
However, spending on this alone will not alleviate conditions for the poorest as most are outside the 
piped network. Indirectly there will be knock-on benefits as many depend indirectly on the piped 
network, but still they will be paying higher prices and have to devote long hours to water collection. 
Evidence from Obuasi indicates that reaching poor households is challenging, as, after only a few 
months, some stand posts are no longer in use. In Obuasi, households prefer hand dug wells, which 
are cheaper, provide water of higher quality and are more reliable. In Obuasi, these stand posts are 
wasted resources which would be better devoted to urban areas where alternative water sources are 
more scarce – as for example in the slum areas of Accra discussed below. It is not simply a question 
of the siting of stand posts; also important is the quality and regularity of supply, as well as the 
availability of alternatives which match the needs of end users, if conditions of water poverty are to be 
alleviated. This suggests that the pro-poor intervention could be better targeted towards on the needs 
of low income households and a standard text-book approach fails meet their needs 
The UWP has devoted funds to providing services that have fallen into disuse just a short time after 
implementation. There is no evidence to suggest that Obuasi was covered in any of the socio-
economic studies that preceded the UWP and it is not clear that the kind of socio economic approach 
followed would reveal the issues faced in the town. Asking households how much they spend on 
water and how much they would be prepared to pay may have revealed that there was extensive 
reliance on alternative water sources but even then, deeper investigation would be required to 
determine that the bureaucracy is a major barrier to obtaining a household connection.  
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Furthermore, the situation in Obuasi may be different from elsewhere so all recipient towns would 
benefit from an assessment of the obstacles to access and alternative water sources to identify the 
areas where disbursement will have the greatest pro poor impact.  
It should be noted that in its written comments on the earlier draft of this report, the World Bank 
expressed it disagreements with some points in the research‟s findings in Obuasi, including the 
following comments:- 
 Communal labour was the only contribution by the people through the Assembly for 
excavation of the trenches for the connecting pipelines to the standpipes. 
 Standpipes were not built unilaterally but in direct consultation with Assembly members and in 
some cases community elders who assisted in the identifying sites in which to build pipes 
without offending community members who refused to allow pipes to build on their lands or 
close to their buildings.   
 According to the Bank, three out of 17 standpipes have been disconnected as a result of small 
catchments and resultant low commissions and low returns rather than ten as our research 
indicated.  
 The Bank agrees that high connection fees as well as long delays are a deterrent to securing 
household connections although they contend that the delays are not as long as indicated in the 
responses to our FGD questions.  
Even taking the Bank‟s perspective, however, standpipes were disconnected soon after the project 
start because they were not sufficiently used due to the prevalence of alternative water sources and 
connection fees and bureaucracy are major obstacles to increasing household connections. It is 
unfortunate that this information was not discovered in the project design stage or in socio-
economic studies that could have preceded investment so that the limited funds could have been 
more effectively targeted to those that would have derived most benefit from the investments.  
To conclude this section, the PAD set out pro poor objectives but these are not followed through. It 
may be that to conduct these studies would have delayed the project further or it may be that these 
were never going to be feasible. For whatever reason, the key pro poor elements of the study, to 
which project implementation was clearly attached, were not carried out. From interviews it seems 
that the reasoning behind this is that the water supply everywhere is weak and so directing 
resources to make sure it reaches the poorest was not the best use of them. But this is not reflected 
in the design of the UWP and goes against the operational aims of the World Bank as stated in its 
2004 Operational Guidance (section 1.5.1 of the present report refers). Clearly there is a high risk 
that the project will only benefit the middle classes, particularly where end users have to pay for the 
cost of their own connection.  
 
2.3.2 Public private partnership development (US$6.5m) 
The aim of this component of the UWP is to improve the financial performance of GWCL by 
transferring operational control of the utility to a private company. Although only a relatively small 
proportion of the UWP was devoted to this component, the privatisation of GWCL was an attempt to 
induce a major reorientation of the company with a view to bringing in sound financial management 
and commercial practices. Following an international competitive tender, the contract was awarded to 
AVRL, a consortium comprising two public water utilities: Rand Water from South Africa and Aqua 
Vitens from the Netherlands. The five-year contract started in June 2006 and finished in June 2011. It 
was not renewed. AVRL was responsible for operation, repair and maintenance of the already existing 
works and systems, maintaining current water quality and production levels, water distribution, meter 
  
 
 
 
reading and bill collection. Technical and financial auditors were also engaged under this component 
to measure the operator‟s performance.  
According to the terms of the management contract, AVRL was entitled to a bonus payment if the 
consortium achieved the following: reduced the level of accounts receivable, provided plans within 
twelve months of the start of the contract for optimization of chemical usage, reduced power 
consumption and reduced water consumption by public-sector entities (the last plan was to be 
submitted within the first 12 months). Similarly, AVRL forfeited a penalty payment in the event of 
failure to meet service standards with regard to water quality and pressure, reductions in non-revenue 
water (NRW), treatment plant operations, customer response plans and customer accounts receivable. 
The reduction in NRW was a significant target for the management contract as this was reported to be 
more than 60% in and around the capital - the Accra Tema Metropolitan Area (ATMA) area - and was 
a critical constraint to adequate service. It was estimated that around 55% of this leakage was due to 
„commercial‟ losses (unauthorized consumption and meter inaccuracies), rather than „physical‟ losses 
(Lievers and Barendregt 2009). 
 
Three years into the implementation of the five-year management contract, an assessment of the 
performance of AVRL, required for the mid-term review (MTR) of the project (which took place in 
August 2009) was inconclusive due to the absence of baseline studies.  At the MTR, the auditors said 
that baseline data had not yet been gathered by which to determine water production, due to the lack 
of bulk meters, procurement of which had been delayed29. In addition, some three years after the start 
of the five-year management contract, the required plans had been submitted by AVRL, but had yet to 
be agreed with GWCL (Ernst and Young 2009). 
 
The financial auditor reported that progress relating to few of the performance targets for calculating 
incentives or penalties for AVRL under the management contract had been agreed upon by AVRL 
and GWCL to date (Ernst and Young 2009). As a result, neither the penalty nor incentive elements of 
remuneration of AVRL were applied. 
 
In addition, there was limited cohesion between GWCL and AVRL. There was lack of consensus over 
the interpretation of some clauses in the management contract by GWCL and AVRL, which 
culminated in the signing of two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) in 2007 and 2008 
respectively.  
 
Although some progress was made towards the attainment of some targets under the management 
contract as reported by AVRL (water production, non-revenue water, revenue collection ratio, 
chemical cost, 100 percent cash obligations from collected revenues in the five largest cities and 
energy consumption), most of these outcomes fell short of the performance targets in the management 
contract. Moreover, progress with regard to some performance indicators (e.g. increase in connections 
and water production levels) cannot be directly attributed to interventions under the UWP. For 
instance, although the water production level increased from 211.7mm
3
 in 2006 to 222.6mm
3
 in 2008, 
the increases were as a result of civil works carried out in the Central and Northern regions, which 
were not financed by the UWP. A summary of the performance of AVRL on selected indicators vis a 
vis the position of GWCL is presented in Annex 3.  
 
In a bid to increase household connections especially for the urban poor, the PAD proposed to 
introduce a performance criterion for increasing cubic meters sold at the “life line” portion of the 
tariff by the operator. This was aimed at providing the private operator with an incentive to extend 
service to as many new connections as possible. It was established in our research that this 
                                                 
29 It was reported in the Ghanaian press in February 2010 that these meters were finally being installed, nearly four 
years after the start of the Management Contract “GWCL invests GH¢4.2 million to purchase bulk water meters” 
Ghanaweb, 24.2.10 
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performance criteria was not included in the management contract. In fact, no aspect of the 
management contract was related to social policy.
30
  There was no incentive in the Management 
Contract for the operator to expand the existing system. The targets for AVRL were just based on the 
financial viability of the existing system.  
The draft management contract does include the requirement that the operator shall perform the 
services in the spirit of  the Government of Ghana‟s Low Income Household Policies and the PURC 
Regulatory Social Policy.. According to the draft management contract (unsigned) that we had access 
to (Paragraph 3.1.3):  
“The Operator shall perform the Services in accordance with Applicable Law (including 
environmental legislation and PURC Regulations), Prudent Industry Practice, the Consumer Charter, 
the Service Standards, the Low Income Household Policies and the PURC Regulatory Social Policy.” 
 
This is the limit of the social requirements of AVRL and there is no mention of how this might be 
evaluated or what sanctions might be applied if such requirements are not observed.  
Evidence presented by AVRL at the MTR indicated that the number of connections has increased 
(AVRL 2009). However, none (or very few) of these were attributable to the UWP as there had not 
been much investment in infrastructure at this stage.  As noted above, to obtain a connection is a 
bureaucratic and expensive process (as highlighted by the FGDs in Obuasi). Poor households often 
live in rented accommodation and it is the landlord that would have to arrange the connection. It was 
reported informally that many connections are obtained through unofficial means, which can be both 
quicker and cheaper. When the bulk system is strengthened and extended (usually as a result of donor 
funding), more households opt to apply for a household connection, for which they pay. So, new 
connections are financed largely by households and increases are largely due to greater demand as a 
result of investment in the bulk water system which is not due to the UWP at this stage.  
It may be that the UWP will lead to greater demand for connections once the capital works are 
underway and yielding improvements in bulk supply. The fact is that there is little information in 
the civil works programme or in the project document that relates to the detail of how to reach those 
most in need. Whilst one of the PDOs is to increase connections, the UWP is vague in terms of how 
they will serve poor households. It is not specified if free or subsidized connections will be 
provided under the UWP.   The connection increase since the start of the contract with AVRL is 
mainly to those that can afford to pay for a connection.  Table 2.8 shows the distribution of 
connections since the start of the management contract. Only a small proportion of connections are 
standpipes and the majority are household connections (for a more detailed discussion of the role of 
standpipes, see section 1.4.3). 
AVRL was implementing a disconnection programme in the event of non-payment according to 
rules set out in the Customer Charter. In interviews, we found that the perception was that those 
disconnected were not forced into hardship as a result. The view was that users had chosen not to 
pay, rather than that they could not afford to pay. In addition, some were probably not receiving 
water anyway due to the weaknesses in the distribution system. There is a risk, however, that 
disconnections force poor households to use unsafe water sources. Further research is required to 
determine what happens to those who are disconnected to understand the equity implications of this 
policy. The PAD described the requirement for three national stakeholder surveys which would 
generate social impact indicators – one at appraisal, one just before the MTR and one just prior to 
the Project Completion Date. These were to produce “comprehensive social impact indicators and 
                                                 
30 This view is based on interviews and a review of a draft of the management contract. The actual signed agreement 
was not available. 
  
 
 
 
changes on stakeholder attitudes during implementation” (World Bank 2004e, p.13, para 48). 
Despite repeated requests for information on the pro-poor targeting mechanisms of this project, we 
have not seen any trace of such a study.  
 
Table 2.8 Distribution of Household Connections and Public Standpipes  
 June 2006 June 2009 
Regions Households Standpipes Households Standpipes 
Greater Accra 
Region 
91,130 244 104,463 257 
Ashanti Region 35,166 400 42,559 537 
Western Region 11,599 364 12,986 405 
Central Region 13,462 892 16,229 1,178 
Eastern Region 13,681 427 13,881 417 
Northern Region 4,796 71 11,670 213 
Volta Region 10,762 608 13,619 689 
Brong Ahafo 
Region 
6,844 487 8,111 500 
Upper East 
Region 
3,270 19 4,455 25 
Upper West 
Region 
1,018 57 1,287 60 
Total  191,728 3,569 229,260 4,281 
Source: Documentation provided by AVRL 
 
2.3.3 Capacity Building and Project Management (US$7.7m) 
This component includes training for GWCL staff (US$2m), technical assistance (US$2.5m) and 
support for PURC (US$1m) as well as smaller components such as vehicles and office equipment. 
AVRL has prepared a training plan and has started carrying out training programmes for its staff. 
Although a copy of the training plan was not available to the study team as at the time this report was 
being compiled, AVRL reports an annual increase in the number of training days and staff trained 
from 2006 to 2009. We were informed by AVRL that the content of training delivered was generic 
and not tailored to addressing pro poor issues.  
The lack of pro-poor orientation of GWCL was seen as a critical risk to the project impact that would 
be mitigated in training in pro-poor interventions. However, it seems that training needs are so great 
on fundamental financial and technical issues31 that reaching poor households will not be part of 
training under this project. Although the PAD had proposed capacity development to improve 
orientation of the utility service provider towards addressing pro poor issues (p.9), elsewhere, in the 
PAD it is stated that the training needs would be up to the Operator to determine, once appointed. 
Provision for pro-poor training did not feature in the management contract of AVRL.  
                                                 
31 The need to improve capacity in these areas was highlighted in the Statement Issued by Ministerial and Development 
Partners Roundtable at the 1st Ghana Water Forum, Accra, 22nd October 2009 
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Capacity-building for the regulator, PURC, covers a number of activities including strengthening their 
website and establishing regional offices as well as the provision of training and programmes to raise 
consumer awareness.  As discussed above, PURC are leading social policy in the delivery of water. 
As far back as 2005 when the PURC published it social strategy, it announced a plan to pilot 
interventions in low income communities (PURC 2005 social strategy paper) and this is receiving 
funding under the UWP - although at just US$200,000 this is a tiny proportion of the total budget 
(US$120m).  
The pilot projects funded under this component are located in three low-income communities in Accra 
namely: Teshie (Nshorna), Nima and Glefe and the aim is to establish and then assess community 
management of urban water delivery (see Figure 2.1 for location of communities).  The selection of 
these communities was based on a number of factors including the strength of community 
organization, availability of local water supply capacity, extent of current service shortfalls and/or 
existing collection rate, impact on existing secondary suppliers, ease of construction/connection of 
pilot intervention (PURC proposal, undated).  
  
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Map of Accra 
 
Source: Presentation by The Consortium during the Mid Term Review of UWP, August 2009. 
 
The baseline studies established a bleak picture of the water supply situation in the three pilot 
communities and concluded that residents were willing and would be able to afford water supply 
services tailored to meet their needs i.e. uninterrupted water supply and buying “by the bucket” at 
affordable rates.
32
  
In the short term, it was not considered realistic to extend the distribution network infrastructure to 
poor areas so these pilots focus on taking water directly to public distribution points established under 
the project. The project will involve the construction of bulk water storage facilities (polytanks) and 
use of water tanker services (Nima and Teshie), extension of service lines (Glefe) and erection of 
standpipes and water kiosks in the three beneficiary communities. The idea is that these are placed so 
as to be accessible for tanker service to storage points.  
A key output of the community entry and sensitisation activities has been the establishment and 
training of Water Boards and Water User Associations in all the three pilot communities to operate 
and manage facilities to be installed under the project. The Water Boards have been mandated to set 
water tariffs based on their operational cost. Although no tariffs have been fixed yet, there are 
indications that the tariffs could be higher than the GWCL approved tariffs, given the anticipated cost 
of water delivery.    
This pilot project is critical in establishing alternative options including community management for 
providing water delivery in low-income urban communities. These are areas of high water poverty 
and were selected following a review of deprived areas by PURC.  However, there were some aspects 
of the projects which raised concerns regarding sustainability. In the rural water sector in Ghana, 
membership of the Water Boards is by election. PURC reports that membership of the Water Boards 
under this project was based on nominations by existing community based organisations and 
representatives such as landlords associations, assemblymen, traditional authorities etc. In Glefe, the 
Water Board had been established as a sub-committee of the landlords association. This arrangement 
                                                 
32 This phrase is used to identify consumers who buy water in portable plastic containers. 
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excludes the poor from participating in decision-making and so is unlikely to represent their interests 
and could threaten the independence of the Board.  
In Teshie, it was reported that there were about three assembly members of the Water Board. Given 
the political nature of the election of assembly members, their membership on the Water Board could 
cast doubts in the minds of residents about the neutrality of the Board. In addition, it was revealed that 
all the Water Boards do not have constitutions. Involvement of local government authorities in the 
activities of the Water Boards was low. The baseline study found strong support for women as water 
supply managers. Women were perceived by community members to have a higher ability to manage 
water systems because they are assumed to be better managers of domestic resources and they spend 
more time within the home environment as compared to men.   However, the management of the 
process seems to be dominated by men, although we were informed by PURC that the communities 
have been instructed to include at least one woman on the Water Boards. It is not clear that these 
Boards will adequately represent the most marginalized.  
Another critical challenge to the sustainability and replicability of the pilot projects is the lack of 
ownership of the intervention by GWCL. Although a working group with representation from PURC, 
AVRL, GWCL/PMU and WaterAid Ghana had been established to coordinate the implementation of 
the project, there are doubts about GWCL‟s commitment given its inability to find a replacement for 
their representative on the working group who had resigned from GWCL over a year before our 
research.  
Water supply in these areas is dominated by informal private providers who stand to lose out from the 
introduction of the PURC projects. It is not clear how such vested interests will respond to the 
introduction of the pilots. When this subject was raised in stakeholder interviews, the view typically 
expressed was that the community would bring any illegal activity to light. It was reported that some 
such providers had managed to infiltrate membership of the Water Boards but had been exposed by 
community members. The approach of the pilots is demanding on communities. 
The UWP is also providing support to PURC to rationalise lifeline tariffs to better target poor 
consumers living in compound houses and enhance the quality of tanker service delivery, including 
rationalizing the cost of service. The results of these interventions are yet to materialise. In a bid to 
rationalise lifeline tariffs, PURC is educating existing and prospective landlords to develop houses to 
allow for multiple household connections for tenants within a given house. PURC is also engaged in 
dialogue with tanker operators and GWCL in a bid to establish more water hydrants located in areas 
of poor supply to reduce cost of water supplied by water tankers.    
It was originally anticipated that these pilot projects would be completed prior to the mid-term review 
of the UWP to enable lessons to be fed into the implementation of the SYIP but it seems that the 
timing will prevent this happening effectively. 
At the time of this review, in November 2009, civil works had yet to start in the pilot projects and it 
would be several months before any kind of assessment could be made. Furthermore, the process of 
the baseline study and community sensitization in the three localities had taken more than a year to 
complete and there would not be time to replicate this process in other areas before investments in the 
SYIP would take place. These pro poor projects have suffered setbacks due to delays in procurement 
processes. PURC reported that baseline studies, community entry and sensitisation activities, 
technical design and tendering of proposed civil works had been completed at the time of this research 
(November 2009). PURC was at the time of this research in the process of obtaining a “no-objection” 
from the World Bank on the procurement of contractors before civil works could start. While there 
may be an attempt to roll out these pilots at a later date, this will not be achieved effectively in the 
duration of the UWP 
 
  
 
 
 
2.4 Key Issues 
2.4.1 How well does this project serve low-income households? 
The bulk of project funds have been set aside for civil works.  Clearly, funding for bulk water is 
urgently required as water provision is crippled by intermittent supply and dubious quality, but the 
extent to which this will benefit poor households is yet to be seen. The timing now is such that the 
findings from the small pro poor pilot projects will not emerge soon enough for lessons to be included 
in a national roll out in the SYIP.  The detailed socio-economic studies that were to be undertaken 
were not carried out. Our findings from Obuasi indicate that resources can be wasted without careful 
consultation with the target communities. In addition, the reports from the baseline and community 
entry studies for the PURC projects demonstrate that communities can incorporate numerous interest 
groups which can often be conflicting. While the importance of community ownership is widely 
acknowledged, achieving this in practice can be difficult in transient communities that lack cohesion.  
The main achievement of the UWP in terms of promoting inclusion is in boosting PURC and its social 
policy. While the limitations of the project in reaching poor households has been widely referred to 
above, the process of implementation, for example, with the PMU required to employ a Low Income 
Customer and Safeguard Officer (p.7), has increased the profile of reaching low-income households. 
The PURC pilot projects look set to make a significant impact on poor households. Most importantly, 
communities have been involved at all stages and so the interventions are innovative, having been 
designed to suit their needs. Furthermore, the approach of the PURC is to treat this as a learning 
experience, so results will be monitored and lessons evaluated.  However, only a tiny amount of the 
project funds have been allocated to this.  
 
2.4.2 Implementation: Processes and practices 
Implementation has been extremely slow. The project was originally scheduled to be completed at the 
end of 2010 with 89% of disbursement by the end of 2009 but has since been extended to the end of 
2012 (World Bank 2011a). Implementation of civil works was in part delayed because the scope of 
work was reviewed and additional works introduced during the early stages. Notable among these 
works was the preparation of a Strategic Investment Plan (SIP) to identify and assess the overall 
physical and investment requirements for rehabilitation and expansion of the existing 81 urban water 
supply systems to meet their short term (2011) and long term (2015, 2025) water demands. These 
studies took almost one and a half years to complete.  
Slow implementation was also attributed to changes to the procurement system. The start of the 
project coincided with the enactment of Ghana‟s new Public Procurement Act of 2003, Act 663. As a 
result, a series of capacity building programmes on the new public procurement system had to be 
organised for all procurement entities including GWCL. Further to this, the World Bank nullified the 
award of all ten FYIP contracts awarded under the UWP through national competitive tendering due 
to non-compliance with the procurement process (Ref: – Interview with former Director of PMU). It 
was also revealed that it took some considerable time to receive a “no objection” from the World 
Bank for the award of contracts. The remaining three contracts for the FYIP were awarded through 
international competitive bidding (ICB). One of the ICB contracts was terminated by the PMU for 
non-performance by the contractor and the civil works for this was rolled unto the SYIP. All these 
reasons accounted for the loss of almost two years of the project lifespan. 
The UWP follows the procurement procedures of the Government of Ghana for national competitive 
bidding only but refers the outcome of the procurement process to the World Bank for prior review 
and approbation in the form of “no objection” for contracts above determined thresholds. The World 
Bank uses its own rules for ICB. To speed up domestic procurement processes, the PMU has secured 
a special dispensation from the Public Procurement Authority for the Board of Directors of GWCL to 
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approve tenders rather than resorting to the Ministerial Tender Review Board in cases where the 
tender process is subject to external scrutiny (in this case by the World Bank). The waiver was 
introduced in order to fast track the procurement process for civil works under the project.  While this 
may have led to increased speed in some areas, processes are still slow. For example, during our 
research we were told by the community in Teshie they had been waiting several months for approval 
of the contractor to start civil works. 
During interviews for this research, we asked stakeholders what they thought were the main reasons 
for slow implementation. Some suggested that there are bottle-necks within the PMU which has a 
very small staff and yet is involved in all aspects of the project. Others suggested the difficulties lie 
elsewhere in government with documents waiting for several weeks for an approval signature. The 
recommendations from the 2009 Ghana Water Forum included streamlining the Government‟s 
lengthy procurement processes.33 Still others suggest that the World Bank is the cause of delay as the 
process to secure a „no-objection‟ can entail referral to Washington which can take a long time. 
Certainly, the UWP is administratively demanding as it covers the implementation of numerous 
contracts across the whole of the country incorporating capacity-building and civil works involving a 
number of institutions. The dispersion of project funds means that the amount received in some 
regions is small. Other donor projects tend to have a narrower focus both geographically and in their 
scope which may lead to speedier implementation. 
 
2.4.3 Access, Affordability and Pricing 
In Ghana, it was widely reported in interviews for this research that the main constraint for poor 
households was not affordability, but access. Households pay high prices to alternative water 
providers and are reported to be happy to pay a cost recovery price to GWCL in return for a regular 
safe water supply, as this is lower than the price they have been paying. This perspective has been 
incorporated into the tariff policy where PURC has deliberately not supported connection subsidies on 
the grounds that the supply constraint is with the water infrastructure and if this is improved then 
households can afford to connect themselves. 
If the UWP does not reach poor households, IDA funds will just improve water supply for those 
already connected and fail to reach those most in need. However, reaching poor households is 
complex.  First, it is not just about providing standpipes. These need to be situated and designed to 
support the needs of poor households. In Obuasi, these became quickly obsolete as our research 
indicates (e.g. due to poor water quality and availability of more attractive service options).  Second, 
urban poor communities are often transient and reaching poor households to secure payment can be 
challenging.  In Glefe, prior to the PURC pilot projects, GWCL established four standpipes to be 
managed by the community in 2006, but after a year, three of these had run up large debts to the 
utility and were soon disconnected (PURC proposal, undated).  Our research found that some 
standpipes in Obuasi stopped operating soon after construction, because they were used so little that 
the operator had no incentive to keep them running.  This does not mean that standpipes should be 
rejected, but that pricing and payment need careful consideration. In addition, greater discussion with 
beneficiary communities may lead to more sustainable and widely used investments.  Finally, the 
bureaucratic process makes a household connection difficult to secure particularly for marginalised 
households mainly because of the need to have a site plan. Most poor residents are tenants. It was 
reported to be far easier to pay a bribe to secure a connection than to follow official procedures. These 
constraints to household connections are not addressed by the UWP.  
                                                 
33 Statement Issued by Ministerial and Development Partners Roundtable At The 1st Ghana Water Forum, Accra, 22nd 
October 2009 
  
 
 
 
Whilst it has become conventional wisdom in Ghana that poor households can afford to pay a cost 
recovery price, they just need access, there is no detailed analysis of the most marginalized 
households to see if this is the case.  An article published by the IRC presents observations from 
Oyibe, a peri urban settlement in Ghana, which indicates that a small price increase, of just one 
pesewa equivalent to half a Euro cent, led to reductions in consumption among poor households 
(McIntyre 2009).  While this is not a rigorous statistical study, it suggests that affordability may be a 
constraint to the poorest households. Evidence cited above indicates that tariff subsidies fail to reach 
the poor because mostly these are not connected to the piped network. But, the picture is more 
complex as many rely indirectly on piped supplies, and cost increases will be passed on to poor 
households which buy by the bucket. Providing water by tanker to areas where the distribution does 
not reach is an appropriate and immediate way to reach poor households. However, it is expensive 
and subsidies may be required to ensure affordability.  
 
2.4.4 Targeting 
There are two main elements to targeting in the UWP. First, the funds for capital investment are 
allocated across regions and systems according to criteria designed to ensure that they go to more 
deprived areas. This system of allocation shows clearly that finances are directed to areas of greatest 
need at the system or town level. Second, the PURC pilot projects are targeted at deprived areas. 
Targeting is on a geographic basis in the UWP. There are no attempts to identify particular cases by 
household type or income. While this makes the process simpler, there are leakages. The civil works 
may go to more deprived areas in terms of income and investment from GWCL, but they may not be 
the most deprived in terms of water.  In addition, the distribution of water resources within regions 
and water systems needs to be a factor in identifying areas of water poverty.  There seems to be some 
recognition of this in the PAD but these details do not feature in the project objectives and need to be 
more firmly anchored in the project structure if they are to have genuine impact.   
The project objective of 50,000 more connections needs to be fine-tuned to reach poor households. 
The details of who benefits, and how, need greater consideration. There is awareness of this as 
implementation is progressing. Policy makers are now talking in terms of 500,000 more people 
receiving water, so there is an awareness of the fact that the type of connection is important (although 
this is not a specific revision to the project target). The PURC pilot projects are more sophisticated in 
reaching deprived areas, but our analysis above raises concerns as to whether these reach the most 
marginalized as the system management is at risk of capture by local elites.  
 
2.4.5 Sustainability 
It was too early to comment on sustainability of the UWP as at the time of our research, most of the 
project had yet to be implemented. However, what little we have seen in Obuasi raises questions of 
sustainability given that some stand posts are no longer operational after just a few months. Pro poor 
issues are at a delicate early stage in policy and need to be more strongly anchored. The pilot projects 
need to be carefully monitored and findings incorporated into mainstream policy.  
 
2.4.6 Accountability for pro-poor services 
Pro poor service is being led by the regulator, PURC.  Part of the reason for PURC pushing the pilot 
projects is the need for a champion to promote equity in service delivery. PURC are leading a group 
of policy makers and NGOs in the promotion of pro poor service delivery which meets regularly. 
Reaching poor households is a learning process and PURC acknowledge this, building on earlier work 
for example, applying lessons from the W4L project in Teshie in their pilot projects.  
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The absence of GWCL in pro poor policy forums is noticeable. The PMU was supposed to have a 
Low Income Community Services officer, but this post was empty for some months. The PAD cites 
as a key risk (the first one listed) that the project will not achieve its objective the possibility that: 
“GWCL pays inadequate attention to the pro-poor issues thus limiting the impact of the project on 
improving access to the urban poor”. The risk mitigation measure to address this risk is to: “Improve 
orientation of GWCL through capacity enhancement towards addressing pro-poor issues” (World 
Bank 2004e, p. 9). The risk rating with mitigation is classified and „modest‟. However, as discussed 
above, no such training is taking place.  
It was mentioned that there may be plans to establish a pro poor unit in GWCL under AVRL, but it is 
not clear that it will be sustainable without more commitment from the utility. Simply establishing a 
unit in an institution that has shown no obvious interest in such issues may turn out to be another 
bureaucratic process. PURC has taken the lead in social policy in water but this needs to be 
implemented by GWCL. The roles of the institutions are blurred. PURC has proved an able champion 
for pro poor initiatives, but as a regulator, it needs to be able to hold GWCL to account for 
implementation.  
  
2.4.7 Policy emphasis: Financial/Engineering/Social (including on-lending) 
The emphasis of the UWP is on civil works, which receives the majority of the finance, and on the 
financial performance of GWCL. These two themes dominate and social policy is neglected. While 
project targets include an increase in the number of connections, the outcome indicator is that urban 
centres receiving civil works add at least 50,000 new connections or stand posts (World Bank 2004e, 
Annex 3). As discussed in section 3.2, the location and beneficiaries of this are not specified in the 
PDOs or the results indicators.  While poverty is mentioned extensively in the project design (PAD, 
World Bank 2004e), both design and implementation pay little attention to the detail of reaching poor 
households. There seems to be an implicitly assumed trickle-down process that is expected to emerge 
from investment in capital works and setting up a management contract.  
However, there are several linkages implicit in such an assumption. First, the capital investment needs 
to be sufficient to make a major impact. In the assessment of the project‟s Critical Risks, the Bank 
observes that the project impact may not be achieved if “Investment needs far outstrips available 
funding” (sic) (p.9). The Risk Mitigation measure for this is that “Restoration of GWCL to sound 
financial footing will improve availability of funds for investments and attract further sector 
investments.” Even with mitigation, this risk is classified as substantial. Second, it is not clear that the 
management contract has restored GWCL to a sound financial footing. Certainly NRW remains high. 
It is not a viable policy option to wait until the problems with bulk water and the financial issues of 
GWCL are dealt with before addressing the needs of poor households. These need to be pursued at 
least in parallel if not as a priority and need not use up large amounts of resources as the PURC pilot 
projects demonstrate. 
 
2.5 The role of IDA 
The World Bank has played a key role in the design and financing of this project which had explicite 
pro-poor objectives . However the lack of follow up, socio-economic analysis, consultation and 
technical support has meant that in the end the project outcomes are not pro-poor.  Slow 
implementation is also a barrier service provision for poor households. While the PURC pilot projects 
show promise in terms of reaching those with greatest water deprivation, it is not clear how the 
lessons learned from this activity will feed into the rest of the UWP. 
  
 
 
 
 
A key feature of IDA‟s participation in Ghana‟s urban water sector – at least on paper - is a kind of 
excessive optimism which does not seem to be justified by reality. For example, the PAD (World 
Bank 2004e) is extremely positive about the approach of GWCL to low income households – in 
contrast to our research findings:  
“The GOG considers service to existing and new low income customers to be a 
major water sector priority. As such, it continually evolves policies to promote low 
income household connections to the piped water network and it charges for water 
according to a tariff schedule (both for connections and at standpipes) that recognizes 
low income household budget constraints. It also directs a major part of its annual 
investment program to increase the number of low income households with access to 
its piped water network” World Bank PAD p. 73. 
Similarly the PAD presents a financial model based on a project case scenario where NRW falls to 
44% and connections increase by 50,000 in accordance with the PDOs. The figures show, perhaps 
unsurprisingly that GWCL will at that point become financially sustainable. However, NRW was still 
more than 50% in 2009 compared with a target of 40% (according presentations at the UWP MTR).  
Even in 2009, the World Bank‟s Status of Projects in Execution (World Bank 2009a) is upbeat about 
the project saying that “significant progress has been made towards achieving the objective of 
restoring long-term financial stability, viability and sustainability of the Ghana Water Company 
Limited” (p. 8) while the difficulties that have been encountered such as the two-year delay and the 
disagreement over baseline figures with AVRL, do not receive a mention. 
This positivity regarding the ease of implementation and anticipated benefits of the UWP seems to 
reinforce the picture of a strong desire for the project to achieve, but with insufficient attention to the 
complexities involved and little regard for the impact on low-income households. 
The interim project results which have been issued since the end of our research (in March 2011 – 
World Bank 2011b) demonstrate that reaching the poorest was not a core objective.  Overall the 
project is rated “moderately satisfactory”. This is because a number of boxes can be ticked:  
 Meeting 100% of cash obligations from collected revenues in the five largest cities; 
 64 community water points constructed or rehabilitated under the project 
 9,200 new piped household water connections resulting from project interventions 
 60,000 people in urban areas provided with access to improved water sources under the project 
 US$30 disbursed invested in civil works 
 5-year management contract was carried out 
 A Water Directorate was established in the Ministry 
 Three pro poor projects were established under the PURC in Accra 
 The number of GWCL staff per 1,000 connections was reduced from 15 to 7.5 
Overall, the project seems to be a success looking at this data, although much of it still has to be 
verified by consultants. However, these numbers do not show that the project has benefitted those 
on low-incomes. While 9,200 new piped household connections have been achieved, it is not 
possible to know who has benefitted from these. Our understanding from PURC is that households 
pay the costs of connection and so these new connections would have been paid for by households 
that perhaps are now within reach of the network as a result of UWP investments, but this rules out 
the most marginalised and poorest. Meeting cash obligations from collected revenues has been 
achieved in part by disconnections. The Water Directorate is understaffed; the three pro poor 
  
 
75 
 
projects are only a tiny element of the overall grant.  There is no mention in the evaluation of the 
effects on poor households. The poverty elements that were considered so important in the early 
sections of the PAD have fallen by the wayside. 
 
2.6 Conclusions and recommendations from the Ghana study 
2.6.1 Conclusions  
Water delivery in urban Ghana is caught in a downward spiral of poor service delivery and low 
payments. Weak infrastructure is inadequate to provide sufficient water for the growing demand. A 
strong network of illegal connections proliferates in a context of unreliable and intermittent supply 
with water „entrepreneurs‟ siphoning water to creating a shortage and thus a market which they can 
then „supply‟.  
 
While the UWP will provide much needed funds for investment in the water sector, based on our 
assessment it seems that targeting is more difficult than the PAD seemed to anticipate. Indeed, the 
main finding is that the extent of the challenge of reaching the urban poor was not adequately 
addressed at the start of the project.  
 
There seems to be an implicit assumption that by improving bulk water and the financial performance 
of the utility, improvements in delivery to the poor would emerge as a by-product. However these are 
tenuous linkages. Special measures are required to reach poor households. Innovation and pragmatism 
are important. 
 
Whilst efforts were made to target the capital expenditure to those regions that need it most, without a 
detailed assessment of water use in the area, our research in Obuasi suggests that this is not reaching 
those who need it most. Meanwhile, those in poor districts in Accra who desperately need the water 
supplied by the UWP have had implementation extensively delayed due to the cumbersome 
bureaucratic processes.  
 
It was only PURC, the regulator, who had already started operating a social policy that have spent the 
funds on careful targeting to reach those most in need and this is a tiny proportion of the total project. 
While PURC has made significant progress in highlighting pro poor issues, greater commitment is 
needed from the utility itself, GWCL.  
 
 
 
2.6.2 Recommendations  
 
For policy level: 
· The government needs to commit to time-bound targets for reaching poor households 
backed up with sufficient resources. Just having a pro poor policy means little without 
resources, detailed planning and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
· The targets themselves need to be carefully considered. Merely establishing standpipes is 
not enough to secure access; as well as the siting of stand posts, water quality and regularity 
of supply are also important. Activities need to be focused on the specific needs of low-
income households. 
  
 
 
 
 
· While connection subsidies can be an effective means of targeting poor households, they 
may not be appropriate in Ghana at this stage. For a connection subsidy to provide a means 
for poor households to access water, it has to be the case that the cost of connection is the 
only obstacle to reaching the piped network. In Ghana, there are currently additional 
obstacles. The bulk water supply is fragile with frequent breaks in supply. Some poor 
households are situated far from the piped network. The bureaucratic process involved in 
securing a connection rules out many poor households, especially those in rented 
accommodation. For these reasons, a social connection fund may not be the best approach to 
serving poor households until some of the further constraints are removed.  
 
· The PURC pilot projects present great innovations for reaching those most in need, but the 
projects need to be carefully monitored. The extent to which they represent the interests of 
the most marginalised needs to be assessed before the projects are rolled out across the 
country by GWCL 
 
· Reaching low-income households needs to be higher up the policy agenda. This means 
establishing a dedicated unit. The roles of PURC, AVRL and GWCL in reaching low-
income households need clarification. PURC has promoted social policy and implemented 
the pilot projects under the UWP. AVRL has an interest in social provision, particularly 
with its support for the NGO, Water for Life. GWCL has shown little commitment to 
reaching poor households. The utility needs to be the service provider while the regulator 
sets standards to hold the utility to account.  
 
· The tariff structure needs to be reviewed and revised to prioritise low income households. 
The current increasing block tariff does not benefit poor households (e.g. due to multi-
occupancy). 
 
· We encountered a number of difficulties in accessing information. Transparency is essential 
for effective civil society engagement. 
 
For project level: 
· The UWP is long on rhetoric and short on detail when it comes to reaching the urban poor. 
While there is ample reference in the PAD on reaching the urban poor (see paragraphs 31, 
48, 74) these are not followed through in implementation and fail to be mentioned in the 
Results Framework so there is no requirement for monitoring of the pro poor impact. 
Reaching poor households needs to be one of the key starting points for IDA support, of 
equal status with utility strengthening and financial goals, rather than assuming that greater 
access will be some kind of fall out from improved financial management and more 
investment. Without tackling the constraints that poor households reach, IDA support will 
simply serve more wealthy areas and households.  
 
· The absence of baseline data has made project evaluation difficult. This needs to be a 
prerequisite for future interventions and to effectively monitor progress. This has also been a 
source of tension between AVRL and GWCL with neither side sure of the facts. 
 
· Better background research would make the pro poor impact more effective. For example, 
an understanding of the constraints to access for poor households would enable better 
targeting. Similarly, a review of capacity needs within GWCL would clarify the limits to 
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which the lack of a pro poor perspective of utility staff could simply be addressed by 
training without regard to other more pressing training needs.  
 
· The impact of the UWP has been diluted in an effort to broaden the reach of the project. The 
total amount dedicated to system expansion is around US$65m. When spread over ten 
regions, the average amount is just $6.5m and this high level of dispersion is a major 
administrative challenge, with the PMU required to execute the tendering of a large number 
of projects. There are trade offs between dispersion and concentration of funding allocation.  
 
· There are mixed messages with the promotion of full cost recovery and pro poor service 
delivery. These are treated completely separately in the PAD and in implementation. There 
may be a disincentive for utilities to supply low income households where performance is 
measured only in terms of financial goals. Projects need to address these potential tensions. 
Detailed targets for expansion of access to target groups need to be incorporated in Project 
Appraisals at least as much as financial goals and to be carefully resourced and monitored.  
 
· In future projects, IDA could put more emphasis on project preparation, for example in 
collating baseline data, in assessing training needs and analysis of constraints to access for 
poor households, so that project design is better tailored to improving conditions on an 
equitable level.  The focus of the UWP has been on improving the performance of GWCL 
and social provision has been a side issue. An alternative approach would be to start with the 
impediments faced by those that lack adequate access to safe water and then to consider how 
Bank support could best be used to improve conditions for poor households.  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
3 Burkina case study 
 This section has been written by Peter Newborne, Research Associate to ODI. It draws heavily on 
the 2010 report from Burkina written (in French) by Dr. Claude Wetta of the University of 
Ouagadougou and M. Djimé Fofana, independent sanitary engineer (Wetta and Fofona, 2010), as 
well as the updating information supplied by Dr. Wetta in Autumn 2011.  
For the purposes of the mapping exercise described in section 3.4.2.1, Dr. Wetta worked with 
Monsieur Michel Koné of the Institut National de la Statistique et Démographique-INSD and 
Madame Aude Nikiéma of the Institut des Sciences des Sociétés-INSS.  
 
 
 
Updating 
In 2011, the contextual information studied by the researchers and considered in section 3.1 and this 
chapter overall has been supplemented by ONEA making available the report of the international 
consultants, ICEA/SOGREAH, referred to in section 3.3.2.1 (ICEA/SOGREAH, 2008 - this report 
was not made available to the researchers at the time of the research in 2009).  
In 2010 and 2011, the University of Ouagadougou has benefitted from further discussions with 
ONEA, at which the INSD was also represented.  
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Summary of chapter  
In the six years of the „Ouagadougou Water Supply Project‟, 2001-2007, commonly referred to as the 
„ZIGA‟ project, the strengthening of the capacity of the water utility in Burkina, „ONEA‟, resulted in 
significant progress in extending water infrastructure and services in the peri-urban districts of the capital 
city and largest urban centre, Ouagadougou. The number of people in the city with improved water access 
was doubled. Since 2009, a new phase of investment in urban water supply has begun. The „Urban Water 
Sector Project‟ (referred to in the present report as the „new‟ project) aims, over a further six year period, 
2009-2015, to also expand distribution and access in three cities in Burkina - Bobo-Dioulasso, Kodougou 
and Dédougou - as well as further extending water distribution in Ouagadougou. 
     
Together with a reduced tariff for the first tranche of residential water consumption, a key element of 
ONEA‟s policy is a subsidy to stimulate demand for household connections, called „social connections‟. This 
subsidy is made available to all households in the areas of the Ouagadougou beyond the centre that express 
the desire to connect - i.e. the subsidy is not targeted to any peri-urban districts or customer income 
categories in particular. The responses from focus groups conducted by the present study in surrounding 
areas (far from the city centre) suggest that, even with the subsidy, the reduced price is still not affordable by 
some poor households.   
 
In 2007, a survey conducted for ONEA by international consultants collected data on the „socio-economic 
profile‟ of households in Ouagadougou and other urban centres in Burkina. The consultants‟ report 
confirmed Ouagadougou as a city with identifiably different levels of wealth/poverty. In designing the new 
project, however, this socio-economic data was not utilised to inform a strategy for targeting low-income 
areas and households. The subsidy continued to be applied universally. As such, in the Ouagadougou 
context, it is too blunt an instrument to achieve the goal of equity set out in national water policy. Treating 
all customers‟ requests for connection to the network „equally‟ will not achieve equity. By not filtering out 
relatively wealthy households from their current eligibility to benefit from the social connection subsidy, 
people in poor peri-urban areas of the city are being made unduly to wait for improved access. ONEA 
is also missing out on revenue - which does not help it in its objective of maintaining financial equilibrium.   
 
Analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of urban districts and households needs to actively inform the 
provision by ONEA of water services for different water users. To-date, there has been, for example, no 
attempt by ONEA at poverty mapping for geographical targeting purposes, taking account of both formal 
and informal areas. Nor does ONEA currently organise customer data by income category. This means that, 
despite the progress it has achieved in installing water infrastructure and extending water services in 
Ouagadougou, it is unable to measure the benefits to low-income households in the city. As argued in this 
chapter, ONEA needs to further develop and deepen its social policy, including organising its client data so 
as to take account of the differing situations of the people it serves.  
 
ONEA has sought to justify its lack of a city-wide targeting strategy by the sweeping characterisation that 
the population of the „service territory‟ of the ZIGA project (17 peri-urban districts covering a large part of 
the city) was uniformly poor. This suggestion that poverty exists in Ouagadougou in a homogeneous form is 
surprising and misleading, e.g. significant areas in the east of the city are very poor, while some districts 
beyond the centre are relatively well-off. This view has not been challenged by the World Bank (section 3.6).  
 
The objective of targeting low-income households needs, further, to be recognised in the performance 
contract between the Government of Burkina and ONEA, with the Ministry of Water Resources (MAHRH) 
supporting and incentivising the articulation by ONEA of a national plan for targeting low-income 
households, by a combination of geographical targeting of poor areas and targeting of poor households by 
household characteristics (as per Table 1.3 of the present report).  Thereby, ONEA could achieve a balancing 
of commercial and social goals without neglecting equity.  
 
  
 
 
 
This chapter reviews two projects in Burkina Faso carried out by the urban water utility and funded 
by the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank: one begun in 2001 and 
concluded in 2007 and one begun in 2009. The chapter first outlines the context of the research 
before moving to a review of the policies and strategies governing the water sector in the country. 
This is followed by a detailed analysis of the design of both projects within the context of the 
„social policy‟ of the water company, „ONEA‟. The next section looks in detail at project 
implementation, referring to a water poverty mapping exercise, as well as citing findings from focus 
groups conducted by this research study. The subsequent assessment of the projects notes the 
positive achievements of the 2001-2007 project and discusses its lessons for the ongoing 2009-2015 
project as well as the further development and deepening of ONEA‟s social policy which - this 
chapter argues - will be needed for targeting of low-income households in low-income areas for 
their inclusion in affordable access to water supply and sanitation in line with the goal of equity in 
national policy. The penultimate section considers the significance of the IDA support to the 
projects in Burkina. The final section sets out conclusions and recommendations. 
3.1 Background; Context 
3.1.1  The projects 
The Burkina Faso case study focused on two utility projects supported by the International 
Development Association (IDA), the Ouagadougou Water Supply Project 2001-2007 - 
commonly known as the „ZIGA‟ project34 - and the Urban Water Sector Project 2009-2015, 
approved in 2009 - referred to in the present report as the „new project‟.  
 
The new project includes, within its scope, several urban centres in Burkina, although this research 
has investigated the implications of these projects for the capital and largest city in the country, 
Ouagadougou. The new project consists of both a water supply and sanitation component. The 
ZIGA project was for water supply only. Water supply is the principal focus of this chapter, 
although sanitation issues are also discussed. 
 
The objectives of the ZIGA project were, in outline, to construct new infrastructure, for increased 
bulk water supply to the city, and to extend water distribution networks within it, as well as to help 
strengthen institutional capacity to manage those networks. The objectives of the new 2009-2015 
urban water project in Burkina are, over the further six year period, to expand distribution and 
access in three cities in Burkina - Bobo-Dioulasso, Kodougou and Dédougou - as well as further 
extending water distribution in Ouagadougou. The detailed objectives of the projects are discussed 
in section 3.3.  
 
Between the conclusion of the ZIGA project in 2007 and the beginning of the new project approved 
in 2009, a period of some 2 years elapsed, during which urban water supply and sanitation (UWSS) 
operations (and some network extension) were pursued in Ouagadougou from the utility‟s own 
revenues and with donor funding other than that of the IDA, for example, funds of the French 
Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement - AFD) accorded in December 2007, 
and of the European Investment Bank in June 2008.     
 
3.1.2 The utility 
Responsibility for delivery of the projects lies with the Office National de l’Eau et de 
l’Assainissement (ONEA), as the state company leading UWSS. ONEA reports to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water (Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Hydraulique et des Ressources 
Halieutiques) (MAHRH). 
                                                 
34 „ZIGA‟ is the name of the village located 50 kms from Ouagadougou where river water is abstracted for the city.           
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Since 1994, ONEA has been a corporation owned wholly by the state, although run according to  
commercial principles, with a Board of Directors and, it was intended, enhanced autonomy from 
government to manage its activities across all urban centres of the country. The Government of 
Burkina (GoB) has complied with this undertaking to allow ONEA autonomy (within the 
parameters set by the MAHRH in its contracts with ONEA - see below), by not interfering with 
investment and staffing decisions and approving tariff revisions in a timely manner (World Bank, 
2009b, page 30).  
 
In 2001, when the ZIGA project commenced, ONEA was still „a small utility, essentially devoted to 
serving the richest part of the urban population‟ (Marin et al., 2010). Urban water coverage in 
Burkina through household connections stood at 32%. ONEA had only about 73,000 active water 
connections (half of them in the capital, Ouagadougou), which served fewer than 700,000 people 
nationwide, with 1,600 standpipes serving another half a million (ibid). 
 
In the first years after its creation in 1994, ONEA was criticised for management failings, including 
low staff productivity, low rates of bill collection and persistent problems in reconciling accounts 
(PAD for the ZIGA project, World Bank 2001, page 5)
35
. ONEA‟s productivity, in terms of staff 
per 1,000 connections, was low (at about 8), with a 15% failure rate in collection of bills from 
residential customers (Marin et al., 2010).  
 
ONEA operates within the framework of contracts periodically signed with the MAHRH defining 
ONEA‟s duties. At the time of carrying out the present research in 2009, the contract („Contrat 
Plan‟) was that applying to the period, 2007-2009. This contract is discussed in section 3.3.2.  
  
3.1.3 Water resources in Burkina 
In Burkina, bulk water for fast-growing urban centres has to be safeguarded within the context of 
water resource constraints
36
. Burkina is a predominantly arid country, receiving less than 900m3 per 
capita annually of fresh water on average and characterised by substantial variation in precipitation, 
both temporally and spatially. Since 1976, rainfall has been 10 to 20 percent lower than average, 
resulting in the lowering of the water table by about 0.5m per year. Groundwater is unevenly 
distributed and can only be extracted from weathered areas above the bedrock and in fractured 
zones by expensive boreholes with limited yields of about 10 m3/day. As for surface water, the only 
perennial river is the Mouhoun River. The most common way of storing water for dry seasons is by 
building hydraulic structures/dams to store water in surface reservoirs, even though evaporation can 
reach 2,000mm/year. In addition, a substantial portion of surface water resources is shared with 
neighbouring countries. The Nakambe River (now the main source of supply for Ouagadougou) is 
shared with Ghana under an action plan to coordinate the use of resources. The trend of diminishing 
rainfall has been associated with longer, more intense periods of drought, as well as intermittent 
flooding resulting from short, but intense, precipitation events. Rain-dependent agriculture has 
come under increasing pressure, leading to migration from rural to urban and peri-urban areas. 
 
3.1.4 Ouagadougou and its water services  
The city of Ouagadougou has grown rapidly over recent years. In the period from 1985 and 2000, 
the population of the city doubled, from 436,000 to 980,000 inhabitants (Wetta and Fofana, 2010). 
                                                 
35 According to the key informant interviews conducted by the present study, the critics of ONEA‟s record of 
performance in the 1990s included staff of the World Bank, among other commentators.  
36 The source for this information on the water resources context is the Project Appraisal Document for the 2009-2015 
urban water project in Burkina (World Bank, 2009, p. 24).   
  
 
 
 
The population growth rate between 1996 and 2006 - according to the census  carried out by the 
National Institute of Statistics (Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographique - INSD) - 
was over 7% and the city increased over seven times in size, from 6,800 hectares in 1980 to 
c.52,000 hectares in 2006 (Recensement Général de la Population et de l‟Habitat, INSD, 2006). 
The result was substantial expansion of the city into new areas  beyond the centre, referred to as the 
„surrounding areas‟ - „les quartiers périphériques’ (also referred to in this chapter as the „peri-
urban‟ areas). 
 
For planning and administration purposes, the surrounding areas are divided into two categories: the 
formal, or „urbanised‟, areas which are, at a given time, part of the officially recognised city (les 
quartiers ‘lotis’), and the informal, or „un-urbanised‟, districts (les quartiers‘non-lotis’). As will be 
seen in maps referred to in section 3.4.2.1:- 
- the city centre comprises the central „sectors‟ numbered from 1-13 („les secteurs centraux‟); 
- adjacent to the centre, and forming a concentric circle (roughly drawn) around it, are the 
surrounding peri-urban sectors numbered clockwise 14-30;  
- further from the centre, are located a number of villages (named instead of numbered).   
 
From the mid-1980s onwards, the growth in population in Ouagadougou put increasing pressure on 
water production and distribution capacity. The persons consulted during this study talked of, 
during the 1990s, more and more frequent service interruptions, with an urgent need to increase 
bulk water supply, including the provision of water for new residents in areas surrounding the 
centre, including many slum areas. These slums are of variable density. Some are characterised by 
dense dwellings, with narrow, winding access ways and limited space for installation of water and 
other infrastructure. In other areas, distance from water points (e.g. standpipes) and the water 
network, rather than congested space, is a key feature.  
 
ONEA‟s strict mandate is to provide UWSS infrastructure in urbanised areas formally incorporated 
within city plans. That said, the information supplied by key informants during this study qualified 
this: the administrative process of urbanisation (lotissement) (incorporation of new districts within 
the official city) is slow and, whilst it takes its course, in practice ONEA has come to recognise that  
many people live in the un-urbanised areas37. In practice, ONEA has, therefore, extended its 
activities to include residents living in those informal areas: the project appraisal document for the 
new 2009-2015 urban water project in Burkina refers to the need „reduce the access bias between 
formal and informal settlements where, until recently, ONEA did not provide water services‟ (PAD, 
World Bank 2009b, p. 20).   
The PAD for the new project (World Bank 2009b, page 2, paragraph 6.), discussed in section 3.3.2, 
adds the following comment on the circumstances in these informal areas:- 
 
“The population of major urban centres grew annually by more than 5 percent. Low-income 
newcomers frequently settle in areas not covered or even recognised by official urban 
planning. As ONEA essentially intervenes in formal neighbourhoods, few of them have 
direct access to water through connections and standpipes and must rely on vendors” 
(emphasis added).   
 
As for the reference to „low-income‟ settlers, despite that stated aim, the design of the new project - 
just as its predecessor, the „ZIGA‟ project of 2001-2007 - did not include analysis of income levels 
in the urban areas, formal or informal, to be served by ONEA‟s investments. This issue is further 
discussed in section 3.2.1.   
                                                 
37 As will be seen in section 3.4.3, the PAD of the new project acknowledges this.              
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3.1.5 Poverty in Burkina 
The project appraisal document for the ZIGA project provides very little information on poverty in 
Burkina. The PAD refers (World Bank, 2001, page 10) to urban poverty which, it notes, „increased 
by 5% between 1994 and 1998‟ („according to a „national survey in 1998‟) with 16% of the urban 
population considered poor at that time (according to the same source). No other general description 
of poverty is provided in the PAD, which confines its comments to the status of water supply: a 
connection rate in Ouagadougou, the PAD notes, of 30% (ibid, page 5).  
 
According to official census figures, by 2006 (shortly before the end of the ZIGA project), 40.1% of 
urban households in Burkina were categorised as „poor‟ or „very poor‟ by the National Statistics 
Institute (Institut National de la Statistique et Démographique-INSD) (cited by Wetta and Fofana, 
2010 on page 9).  In its report of that 2006 census, the INSD provided a composite indicator of 
poverty based on a specified set of variables (reproduced in Annex 5 of Wetta and Fofana, 2010), 
including nine variables relating to household living conditions (walls, roof and floor of houses; 
mode of lighting and supply of energy for cooking; means of accessing water and sanitation; and 
method of waste/wastewater disposal), plus nine variables relating to household equipment/assets. 
On that basis, the INSD identified five levels of poverty in Burkina, namely: „very poor‟, „poor‟, an 
intermediate category, and „wealthy‟ and „very wealthy‟. As noted above, in 2006 four out of every 
ten urban households in Burkina were classified by the INSD as poor or very poor.  
 
Using the same classification of households into five categories of poverty, the present research 
study carried out the water poverty mapping exercise described in section 3.4.2.1, which was 
conducted by the University of Ouagadougou in collaboration with the INSD.   
 
As for socio-economic information gathered by ONEA, section 3.3.2.1 refers to the study which it 
commissioned in 2007 (the survey carried out by ICEA/SOGREAH in 2007). The (limited) extent 
to which the results of that study were employed by ONEA is also described in that section.       
 
 
3.1.6 Water tariffs 
For water customers connected to the network, the tariff system introduced from 2003 onwards, for 
domestic customers, included a „social tranche‟ (tranche sociale). In August 2008, a revised tariff 
rate was approved. According to this38, the tariffs for monthly consumption by domestic customers 
are, in increasing blocks, as follows:- 0-8 cubic metres: Francs of the African Financial Community 
(FCFA) 188; 9-15 cubic metres: FCFA 430; 16-30 cubic metres: FCFA 509; over 30 cubic metres; 
FCFA 1040. All customers also pay a monthly fixed fee of FCFA 1,00039. It is noticeable that the 
rates increase substantially between the 1
st 
and 2
nd
 blocks, which makes it particularly important for 
low-income households to watch their consumption levels.  
 
Commercial and administrative (government/public sector) customers are charged a rate of FCFA 
1,040 on all their consumption, the highest of the above tariff levels, which represents a cross-
subsidy between major business/public consumers and residential customers.   
 
                                                 
38 As per the project appraisal document of the new project in 2009, page 35. 
39 The first 50m3 of domestic consumption is exonerated from Value Added Tax (VAT) which is normally charged at 
18% in Burkina (commercial and administrative customers are taxed on their full consumption). 
 
  
 
 
 
At standpipes, the price of water paid by customers (a regulated price) stayed unchanged since 
1997, at 60 FCFA for 220 litres (the size of the barrel or barrique, with FCFA 5 for a 20 litre bucket 
or bidon). The standpipe manager/„caretaker‟ (PAD, World Bank 2009b, p.35) pays a standard rate 
of FCFA 188 per cubic metre which works out at FCFA 41.36 for 220 litres, allowing the caretaker 
a margin of FCFA 18.64 per barrel. Households accessing water from standpipes pay the same rate 
as the tariff applying to the social tranche (for connected households), plus caretaker‟s (or vendor‟s) 
imargin. 
 
Any volume-based tariffs such as these require metering, which (according to the interviews 
conducted by the present study) is a standard item of equipment installed upon new connection to 
the network in Ouagadougou. 
 
3.1.7 Sanitation in Ouagadougou  
As to sanitation, the researchers in Burkina report that “the reality in Burkina is that sanitation and 
hygiene facilities are at an embryonic state in the country… with little progress achieved to-date in 
terms of promotion of sanitation and hygiene” (Wetta and Fofana, 2010, page 12). Despite 
initiatives of the GoB, in 2008 only an estimated 17% of the urban population of the country 
(according to the official figures in the mid-term review of the Strategic Framework for Poverty 
Reduction referred to in section 3.2.4). had access to urban sanitation, according to official figures 
(ibid). In Ouagadougou, “the city has long faced major public health problems due to lack of 
infrastructure” with “problems of disposal of human excreta, wastewater and solid waste” (ibid).   
 
To fund urban sanitation, the GoB introduced, in 1985, a „surcharge40 on water bills of 21 FCFA per 
m3 of water sold, applying to all ONEA‟s urban customers - a system of cross-subsidy to provide 
finance for construction of urban sanitation facilities, as set out in the strategic sanitation plans for 
urban centres including sewerage and urban drainage, as well as on-site sanitation (see section 
3.2.2)   
 
ONEA has also received support for sanitation activities from donors other than the IDA, including 
the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the AFD.  
 
This research study on Ouagadougou included consideration of the status of sanitation facilities 
resulting from the ongoing activities of ONEA (not funded by the ZIGA project), as well as the 
design of the sanitation activities planned under the new IDA-supported project, although, as 
alluded above,  the attention of the researchers was primarily focused on issues relating to water 
supply. Here „sanitation‟ refers to on-site sanitation - availability of latrines (household and public, 
in e.g. schools and markets) - and also, to a lesser extent, on drainage/evacuation of storm water and 
solid waste collection/disposal. 
3.2 Inclusion’ in national policies and strategies 
3.2.1 Water policy 
In 1998, the GoB identified provision of potable water facilities to urban settlements as one of its 
priorities. The subsequent Letter of Sector Policy in 2001 recognised the economic and social 
nature of water, at the same time identifying the strengthening of ONEA, as the responsible national 
agency as a primary objective (Wetta and Fofona, 2010, page 20). Under the Decentralisation Law 
of 2004, the general responsibility to provide water and other urban services lies with local 
authorities (at the level of the communes) who are not expected to deliver services by themselves, 
                                                 
40 Called in French « frais pour services rendus assainissement ».                       
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but rather to delegate delivery to public or private bodies, primarily ONEA but not exclusively - as 
illustrated, for example, by the pilot projects for the delegation of management of parts of the 
outlying urban network to small, local, private suppliers. 
 
Water law in Burkina - the Water Policy Management Act of 2001 (La loi d’orientation relative à 
la gestion de l’eau) - recognises, in Article 2 (ibid, p.19), the right to water of all citizens, according 
to the Constitution. The law adopts the order of priority, common in national water laws, whereby 
water for essential human needs comes before other uses.  
 
In the 1998 National Water Policy (la Politique Nationale de l’Eau), the first stated objective is 
(ibid, p.20) to “satisfy sustainably, in quantity and quality, the water needs of a growing population 
and an economy in development…”.  This National Policy adds that: “The right of access to 
drinking water is recognised by the law. In relation to access for water for drinking, the different 
categories of population must be treated equitably…” (emphasis added). 
 
The 2004 „Strategic Framework for Poverty Reduction‟ („CSLP‟ according to its acronym in 
French) (République du Burkina Faso, 2004) - the second-generation poverty reduction strategy 
paper - confirmed the importance of securing water supplies for growing urban centres, as a 
component of the second „pillar‟ of the CSLP, as part of increasing access to social services. 
Subsequent policy papers and plans, and a consultation process, culminated in the 2006 „National 
Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation‟ (Programme National d‟Approvisionnement en Eau 
Potable et d‟Assainissement), referred to as the „PN-AEPA‟ (Wetta and Fofana, 2010, p.21). 
  
The PN-AEPA fixed the national water supply target for 2015 under Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) 7, including increasing drinking water access in urban centres in Burkina to 87% by 
2015, from a base in 2000 estimated at 42% (World Bank, 2009b). Based on an urban population of 
Burkina Faso in 2008 of 3,292,300, this goal entailed the provision of access to water in urban areas 
to an additional 1.8 million people overall (ibid)
 41
.  
 
The PN-AEPA refers to the need to investigate low-cost solutions for provision of water services to 
districts surrounding town centres.  
 
3.2.2 Sanitation policy 
The sanitation target referred to in the PN-AEPA is an increase to 57% in urban centres, by 2015, 
from a base sanitation coverage level in the region of c.15% (judging from the 17% figure in 2008, 
cited above, in section 3.1.7). The PN-AEPA recognises the need to take action to provide 
sanitation to households in peri-urban areas. 
The specific national strategy relating to sanitation, the 2006 „Stratégie Nationale 
d‟Assainissement”- SNA) (République du Burkina Faso, 2006), provides (in paragraph 3.4.1) that:- 
“The poorest populations are those which are most lacking sanitation facilities. The National 
Strategy should allow for these target groups to be reached in order to facilitate their access to 
sanitation facilities” (emphasis added). 
 
The same paragraph in the National Sanitation Strategy refers to means “which will be developed to 
satisfy the demand of this segment of the population: demand-led approach‟; communication for 
                                                 
41 In 1998, the urban population was 1,761,203 of a total population in Burkina of 11,007,522 at that time (i.e. 16% urban), 
rising to 20% in 2008.  
                       
  
 
 
 
behaviour change; adoption of appropriate technologies; micro-credit, subsidies and other 
appropriate financial methods” (emphasis added). The SNA does not, itself, elaborate on these 
methods. The earlier 1990 Strategic Sanitation Plans (Plans Stratégiques d’Assainissement - PSAO) 
for the two principal urban centres in the country, Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, had referred 
to “a range of technologies” for on-site sanitation (assainissement autonome) from which 
households could choose “according to their financial resources” as well as their hygiene practices 
(Wetta and Fofana, 2010, p.22).  
 
3.2.3 Equity 
The above targets for increases in UWSS coverage establish the goal of providing improved UWSS 
facilities to previously unserved, or inadequately served, persons. In the PN-AEPA, however, no 
guidance is given for deciding who will benefit, in what order of priority, for example, there is no 
criterion stated for targeting the increase in access (or a proportion of the increase) to specified 
districts in the city, or categories of household identified, e.g. by poverty levels.  
The laws and policies in Burkina relating to urban water supply include recognition of equity as a 
principle in relation to access to water supply, with investigation of low-cost solutions for 
surrounding areas, and talk of poor populations as a target for sanitation services according to 
affordability (particularly, it seems, by self-targeting). But, in national planning relating to 
UWSS, no framework is stated or process is referred to by which the principle of equity will 
be realised. For the principles in policy/strategy documents to be converted into practice, they 
would require to be developed by the GoB in, for example, the contract between MAHRH and 
ONEA and expressed in more detail in the plans of the utility, ONEA, by, for example, proposing 
criteria for targeting low-income areas or households in an equitable manner, or by determining a 
process for developing such criteria, with a specified time-frame. 
The PAD for the new project reports that “all customers [of ONEA] and all requests for social 
connections are treated equally and fairly”. 
Given the focus on aggregate service delivery, the question arises: on what basis did ONEA 
determine who was to benefit from its investments? In the context of a fast-growing urban 
population, and given the challenge of extending water infrastructure to peri-urban areas (formal 
and informal), choices made by ONEA would entail serving some households while making others 
wait until a subsequent phase of investment. But which households in which areas, and 
according to which (published) criteria?  
 
 
3.3 Inclusion in project design 
The project appraisal documents of the ZIGA project (World Bank, 2001) and the new project 
(World Bank, 2009b) are important as statements of the projects‟ aims, supported in each case by 
some useful information in the PADs. For the purposes of the present study, the PADs are, 
however, problematic because, as will be seen below, the stated „social‟ aims of the projects are not 
supported by analysis of poverty in different districts of Ouagadougou, nor reflected in the key 
project performance indicators set out in the PADs.  
 
3.3.1 The ZIGA project (2001-2007) 
In 2001, the IDA approved funding of US$ 70 million for the Ouagadougou Water Supply Project, 
the „ZIGA‟ project, alongside the GoB and ten other sources of finance: see Box 3.1.  
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As noted in Box 3.1, the IDA was the largest single financial supporter of the ZIGA project. 
 
The terms of financing of the IDA component of the ZIGA project, took the form of a concessional 
loan from the World Bank to the GoB with a maturity period of 40 years and grace period of 10 
years. 
 
The 2001 PAD describes (page 11) the „On-lending arrangements‟, the terms on which the IDA 
funds are made available by the GoB to ONEA, namely: - in the form of a loan (US$ 28 million) 
“with a maturity of 20 years, including 10 years of grace period (World Bank, 2001, page 12); the 
service charge payable was of 0.75 percent”; and as a grant (US$ 42 million), as “contribution to 
equity capital [of ONEA] in cash” (World Bank, 2001, page 50). The other donor which provided 
finance to the ZIGA project in the form of both loan and grant funding was AFD. 
 
ONEA was responsible for leading execution of the ZIGA project. Within ONEA, a project unit 
was created called MOZ-ONEA („Maîtrise d’Ouvrage de ZIGA’). 
 
The objective of the ZIGA project, in infrastructure terms, was to increase the water collection and 
storage capacity at the river source, at the ZIGA site, to build a water treatment station, to bring the 
increased bulk water supply to the city and extend the distribution network within the city, through 
water towers and pumping stations and over 200 kms of secondary and 500 kms of tertiary conduits 
- to address the problem of intermittent supply, which had caused service interruptions (60% of the 
service areas in Ouagadougou experiencing severe water shortages during the three hottest months 
of the year (PAD, World Bank (2001), page 5)). 
 
A further objective of the ZIGA project was the strengthening of ONEA‟s finances, expressed as 
moving towards the “financial equilibrium” of the urban water sector - see Box 3.2. 
Box 3.1  The ZIGA project (2001-2007): sources/amounts of finance (in millions of US $)  
1. Government of Burkina (5.36)  
2. World Bank, via the IDA (70) 
3. French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement-AFD) (27.83) 
4. European Development Fund (EDF) (23.18) 
5. European Investment Bank (EIB) (20.71) 
6. Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KFW) (18.30) 
7. Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (8.44) 
8. Islamic Development Bank (6.85) 
9. African Development Bank (AfDB) (6.67) 
10. OPEC Fund (6.95)            
11. Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (9.76) 
12. West African Development Bank (1.83). 
                                                 Total: US$ 205.88 million 
                                        Source: the Project Appraisal Document (World Bank, 2001) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Among the stated aims of the ZIGA project, the 2001 PAD includes the statement that the project 
was to provide connections to “low-income households” (World Bank, 2001, page 3, paragraph 1) 
and install standpipes (bornes fontaines) (e.g. ibid, page 7, paragraph 3). How far this was realised 
in practice is discussed during the course of this section 3.  
  
The PAD for the ZIGA project notes (ibid, p.7, paragraph 3.) that “Ouagadougou has one of the 
lowest connection rates to a water network in the region...”. The project, it says, will finance 
expansion of the distribution and tertiary networks to “new housing developments and peri-urban 
areas” (emphasis added). 
 
The PAD for the ZIGA project, further, refers to „Benefits and target population‟ (ibid, para 3, page 
10) as follows:- 
 
“A national survey, conducted in 1998, showed the poverty line to be around US$103 per 
year per adult. There was a 5 per cent increase in urban poverty, between 1994 and 1998, 
and 16 per cent of the urban population is considered poor according to the survey. 
Unplanned development along the outskirts of Ouagadougou house … most of the poor and 
these areas lack appropriate water services. According to a recent study, 70 percent of the 
poor households in Ouagadougou get their water from public standposts or from water 
vendors. The same study reveals that water vendors distribute 80 percent of the water sold at 
standposts to household premises…” (emphasis added).  
 
The above outline of poverty and water access in the PAD talks in general terms, without saying 
where the poverty is located and without elaborating on the information in the survey. It does not 
say how the “target population” may be identified, other than that it is mostly located in the 
                                                 
42 In full, the definition of ‟financial equilibrium‟ is as follows: the “capacity of the water sector to meet its financial 
obligations, expressed in terms of flows of funds as they become due, including on-schedule payment of commercial 
debts (settlements with suppliers) and financial debts (reimbursement of principal and payment of interest on 
government subloans from IDA credits, donors‟ credits, direct loans from donors or commercial banks, and payment of 
taxes), while at the same time long enough to minimize the annual tariff adjustments necessary to reach financial 
equilibrium.”               
Box 3.2  ‘Financial equilibrium’  
The definition of financial equilibrium in the PAD refers to ONEA‟s capacity to meet its financial 
obligations as they become due, including settlement of commercial debts (to suppliers) and service of 
loans, including “government sub-loans from IDA credit”42‟ (the interest rate charged by the GoB - the 
Ministry of Finance - in relation to the on-lending to ONEA was 5.4%). The timeframe for achieving 
financial equilibrium was to be: “no more than five or six years”, i.e. within the duration of the ZIGA 
project.  
 
“The project will support the reaching of financial equilibrium of the sub-sector while keeping annual 
water tariff increases as low as possible by: (a) reducing operating costs in the sub-sector through increased 
efficiency; (b) increasing financial management capacity; (c) developing an appropriate system to ensure 
timely payment of water bills by the Government and quasi-government entities; and (d) establishing 
policies and procedures to adjust the average water tariff at the beginning of any given year in order to 
reach sector financial equilibrium by December 31, 2006. A financial model has been developed and will 
be used to monitor progress towards this objective” (emphasis added).        
 
                                        Source: the Project Appraisal Document (World Bank, 2001, page 7-8) 
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“outskirts” of the city (as noted above, those peri-urban districts include both formal and informal 
areas).   
 
The PAD states on page 7 that the project will, first, address the lack of water access by “(a) 
extending the network; (b) easing access to connections by reducing the price...”.  The PAD 
explains that connections will be affordable to those low-income households (paragraph 3.): the 
“strategic shift in the connection policy is to reduce the connection price, which was a major 
impediment for low-income households connecting to the tertiary networks”. This is a “social 
connection policy” („les branchements sociaux’) aimed at “easing access” to household connection 
for previously unconnected customers. How this is intended to work is discussed in section 3.3.2.1.    
 
As well as the connection policy, the design of the ZIGA project also aims to substantially increase 
the number of public standpipes. 
 
How the stated aims of the ZIGA project above are expressed in terms of objectives is seen in the 
list of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in Box 3.3 reproduced from the „Project Design 
Summary‟ which is set out in logical framework format, in Annex 1 of the PAD for the ZIGA 
project (World Bank, 2001, pages 25-27).  
 
Out of 20 KPIs listed in Box 3.3:- 
 seven performance indicators relate to engineering/infrastructure; 
 two indicators refer to training and capacity-building of utility staff; 
 six indicators are financial; and 
 two talk of additional water users to be served by the project (new connections and 
standposts); but 
 there are no indicators specifically addressing inclusion of low-income areas or households.    
 
The KPIs relating to the new connections and standpipes are highlighted (in italics) in Box 3.3: the 
increased distribution network constructed by the ZIGA project is to make possible “45,000 new 
house connections” and “400 new standposts”, to serve 48,000 persons (defined as being at a rate of 
120 persons per standpipe). The wording of the KPIs does not, however, indicate which city 
inhabitants are to benefit from the 45,000 new connections or the 400 new standpipes. The 
indicators talk in aggregate figures in relation to the “population” of the city. No geographical 
criteria are proposed to determine where standpipes are to be sited within sectors 14-30, or, 
alternatively, a process stated for development of criteria for targeting on a geographical basis.    
 
In the Project Design Summary, in the first column of the logical framework which sets out the 
“Hierarchy of Objectives”, there is reference to “social” connections, but the social element is not 
reflected in the indicators in the second column.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
   Box  3.3   Key performance indicators  -  ZIGA project 
  Outcome/impact indicators of Project Development Objectives 
- Increase water reliability (24 hours per day); 
- Population connected to the water network (from 300,000 inhabitants to 800,000 inhabitants in 
2007); 
- Recovery rate from private customers (from 86% in 2000 to 92% at end of 2004 and 95% thereafter); 
- Accounts receivable of private customers (from 160 days to less than 120 days at the end of 2004 and 
   to 90 days in 2006); 
- Productivity of commercial staff (from 186 to 230 in Ouagadougou at the end of 2006 and thereafter) 
- Financial statements prepared according to international standards (on time and certified for Yr 
2002+). 
 
  Output from each component 
- Storage capacity (5,400 m3); 
- Length of network (210 kms of secondary networks and 1,200 kms of tertiary); 
- Number of new connections installed (45,000); 
- Number of new standposts (400); 
- Average time between meter reading and invoicing (from 30 - 15 days at end of 2005 and   
thereafter); 
- Metered consumption increased (from over 90% to over 95% at the end of 2004 and thereafter); 
- Computerized administrative system for billing, collection, receivables, complaints tracking and 
   accounting in place at the end of 2003; 
- New connection policy and procedures in place at the end of 2002; 
- Inventory management program for connection equipment and meters in place in January 31, 2003; 
- Computerized cost accounting system in place in January 2003; 
- ONEA‟s financial management information system in place in June 2002; 
- Training program developed and implemented by June 30, 2002.       
 
Source: PAD (World Bank, 2001), Annex 1, pages 25-27  
 
   
 
In the third column on “Monitoring and Evaluation”, the basis of monitoring of this social objective 
will be “surveys and beneficiary assessments”. A survey was commissioned by ONEA and 
conducted by international consultants in 2007 (ICEA/SOGREAH, 2008), including, in the survey 
questionnaire, questions on the living conditions and incomes of urban households, as well as levels 
of satisfaction/dissatisfaction of ONEA‟s recently connected customers. Just how selectively the 
information from that survey was utilised by ONEA is discussed in section 3.3.2.1.  
 
In the fourth column of the Project Design Summary, one of the “Critical Assumptions” is that the 
“Government agrees on a new connection policy regarding social connections” (World Bank, 2001, 
p. 28). The social element of the policy applied by ONEA during the project was subsidy of the 
connection price (discussed further in sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.5.2.)   
 
In other words, other than the stated objective to provide new water infrastructure and services in,  
broadly, the seventeen sectors outside the centre of Ouagadougou (in sectors 14-30), the ZIGA 
project design (as set out in the 2001 PAD) left it up to the utility, ONEA, to decide what weight (if 
any) to attach to inclusion of low-income areas and households43. The PAD did not give, or 
                                                 
43 In its written comments on an earlier draft of the present report, the World Bank states that: “the project was designed 
to cover the poorest areas of the city, especially the standpost and social connection program, which were almost 
exclusively limited to the peri-urban areas”. The above reference to the „poorest‟ areas is puzzling in view of the  
Bank‟s comment later in the same document that “the entire population in the service territory is poor”, so that 
(according to ONEA and the Bank) ONEA does not need to target water supply programmes and interventions to 
households according to differing levels of poverty. This important issue is further discussed in section 3.6.                           
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envisage giving of, guidance to ONEA in setting criteria for siting the new connections and 
standpipes. As far as the KPIs are concerned, the „social‟ element of connection policy is 
subsumed into a connection policy applying to all households. And this characteristic of design 
was reflected in the practice applied by ONEA; the reduction of the connection price was a 
universal subsidy, accorded to all unconnected households in those sectors 14-30 applying for 
connection44 and evaluated in those terms. The implications for low-income households are 
discussed in sections 3.5.2.  
 
Looking again at the PAD, the lack of a „pro-poor‟ purpose in the detailed design of the ZIGA 
project is confirmed in the section on the „Project Development Objective‟ on page 3 of the PAD, 
according to which “the main objective of the proposed project is to increase access to adequate and 
reliable potable water supply in Ouagadougou…”. There is no reference to low-income households.  
 
As alluded to above, the ZIGA project did not include a sanitation component45. 
 
  
3.3.2 The new project (2009-2015) 
In May 2009, the IDA approved funding, of US$ 80 million, for the new project, the Urban Water 
Sector Project (despite including a significant sanitation component), alongside the GoB funds of 
US$ 12.92 million.  
The financing of the IDA component of the new project took the form of a grant to the GoB. This is 
a non-reimbursable grant, and (as per the 2009 PAD, page vii) no interest rate or other fees or 
charges apply. As to the transmission of funds from the GoB to ONEA in the form of a combination 
of on-grant and on-loan, see section 3.3.2.1. 
The new project is designed to support UWSS in both Ouagadougou, and beyond: three other urban 
centres for the water component46, and one other for the sanitation component47. The amounts of 
funding (IDA and GoB) available for Ouagadougou (according to the 2009 PAD) are US$ 13.33 
million for water supply and US$ 18.11 million for sanitation respectively. Under the new project, 
there is to be a cross-subsidy from Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso to support the development 
of water services in the two other urban centres. 
The overall objective of the new project is to increase access to sustainable UWSS services by 
(page 5 of the PAD): “(a) facilitating access to services through programs for constructing social 
water service connections, public standpipes and on-site sanitation facilities; and (b) consolidating 
the achievements of the reform of the urban water supply sub-sector and strengthening capacities to 
deliver and manage services” (emphasis added).  
ONEA is the executing agency of the new project, as for ZIGA. The water supply component of the 
project in Ouagadougou will be the responsibility of „DMOZ‟ within ONEA (Direction de la 
Maîtrise d’Ouvrage de ZIGA) and ONEA‟s Department of Sanitation (Direction de 
l’Assainissement - DASS) will lead implementation of the sanitation component, in Ouagadougou 
and Bobo-Dioulasso.  
 
                                                 
44 As will see seen in section 3.4.1, a substantial reduction in connection price was offered by ONEA. This subsidy was 
made available to all households in the peri-urban districts of Ouagadougou (sectors 14-30).                         
45 Although, according to a key informant interview conducted by this study, it was agreed between the GoB and the 
World Bank that, in parallel to ZIGA, ONEA would carry out sanitation activities.       
46 Bobo-Dioulasso, Koudougou and Dédougou.        
47 Bobo-Dioulasso.       
  
 
 
 
3.3.2.1 Water services - in the design of the new project 
The design of the new project makes a clear option in terms of infrastructure type, which has  
implications for „inclusion‟. The design of the new project as set out in the PAD clearly prefers 
household connections to standpipes. Annex 4 of the 2009 PAD (World Bank 2009b, page 40) 
provides that, in Ouagadougou, the new project will install water service connections for 220,000 
additional people compared with access to standpipe services for 15,000 additional persons, i.e. 
over 14 times more persons are to be served by household connection than by standpipe. This 
15,000 figure compares with the ZIGA project objective to provide standpipe access to 48,000 
persons with 400 standpipes48. The implications of this focus on connections rather than standpipes 
are considered in section 3.4.3. 
Page 6 of the 2009 PAD notes that: “the water consumed at standpipes is heavily subsidized” which 
means that “expanding the number of [household] connections will benefit the financial situation of 
ONEA”. The footnote on the same page of the PAD elaborates on this, with details of revenues 
from household connection as compared with from standpipes. These are revealing. An average 
household of nine people connected to the water network, it says, consumes 45 litres of water per 
capita per day and generates a monthly revenue for ONEA of FCFA 5,025 (including the monthly 
fee and sanitation surcharge), whereas the same household supplied by a standpipe will generate a 
monthly revenue for ONEA of only FCFA 1,420. The above figures reveal to what extent there 
are, in effect, two major water economies in Ouagadougou. The water sold at standpipes is, in 
aggregate, low revenue-earning - much lower - yielding less than one-third (28%) of the revenue of 
water sold through house connection. The tariff of FCFA 188 for water at standpipes is a flat rate 
(no increasing blocks).  
It is this key revenue issue which underlies the infrastructure option preferred in the design of the 
new project. The preference for house connection, rather than standpipes, obeys the financial 
concern of the utility to increase the number of higher paying connected customers49. The raising of 
revenues from customers who are capable of paying higher tariffs is a legitimate element in the 
financial operation of the water utility, but, as we will see, the stated aim of the new project (as per 
the PAD) is to reach out to water users in formal and informal settlements - the social element of 
ONEA‟s role. The water sold from standpipes represents a significant proportion of total water 
sales: “33 percent of water distributed” (page 6 of the 2009 PAD) - an average figure, applying, it 
seems, to ONEA‟s mandate in urban centres (at the time of writing the PAD). For the purposes of 
this research study on inclusion, the question arises as to how the standpipe part of ONEA‟s 
customer portfolio, which is much lower revenue-earning, is to be financed. Households, says the 
PAD, want to connect.  
For this, the PAD refers (World Bank 2009b, page 6) to a „Willingness-to-Pay‟ (WTP) study 
conducted in July 2007 among households in the largest cities in Burkina. The information 
collected by this survey -  conducted by the international consultancy firm, ICEA/SOGREAH - 
included, alongside the type of water services to which households had access, other details on 
household circumstances (of a total sample of 760 households in the 7 cities surveyed). Box 3.4 
lists the aspects covered by questions in the questionnaire employed by ICEA/SOGREAH for the 
2007 survey (set out in the annex to its 2008 report (ICEA-SOGREAH, 2008). 
The ICEA-SOGREAH report also refers (page 3, section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) to information published 
by the National Statistics Institute - INSD) (INSD, 2003), the findings of a study on the living 
conditions of households in Burkina (the EBCVM) (INSD, 2003). This information from INSD (as 
                                                 
48 So, under the ZIGA project, the equivalent ratio was 11.66 times.        
49 The issue of which customers are good payers in terms of paying their water bills on time is a separate consideration 
from the tariff level (amount of the bill) affordable to each customer (although the entering by a customer into a 
contract with the water utility which results in that customer incurring water charges above his/her capacity to pay may 
lead to default in payment).   
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cited by ICEA/SOGREAH, 2008) relates to the following items: - the size of households and 
number of people living in each plot; the nature of title/status of occupation (owner or tenant); the 
type of house/dwelling; the material used to construct the walls of the house/dwelling; the type of 
sanitary facility and means for evacuation of grey water. These items of information in part 
complement, in part overlap with, the aspects of household circumstances listed in Box 3.4.  
 
   
In the ICEA/SOGREAH report (ICEA-SOGREAH, 2008) supplied to ONEA50, the description of 
Ouagadougou (and the other urban centres) which is presented, including some insights on relative 
wealth/poverty in the city, clearly draws on responses to the questionnaire (as well as the INSD 
data).  
 
In the PAD for the new project, however, the results of this ICEA/SOGREAH study are very 
selectively cited. The information referred to on page 6 of the PAD is limited to customer 
preferences as to future mode of supply (as compared with present supply) with particular attention 
focused on the proportion of unconnected households who are interested in a household 
connection51. That proportion is recorded as being “82 percent” (the figure is highlighted in bold). 
That tends to explain why the ICEA/SOGREAH work is referred to as the „Willingness to Pay‟ 
study52 because this seems to have been the prime (and perhaps exclusive) area of concern to 
ONEA. Otherwise, the information collected by ICEA/SOGREAH (and INSD) on household 
circumstances is not cited. In other words, the broader socio-economic data gathered from the 
                                                 
50 Made available by ONEA to the researchers in 2011.   
51 With lesser degrees of preference for alternative service modes, including „simplified networks‟ and standposts.     
52 The 2008 report of the ICEA/SOGREAH study is entitled „Tariff study‟ (Etude tarifaire), but it is the same report as 
the „Willingness to Pay survey‟ referred to in the PAD. That seems clear from the timing in 2007, which is the same, 
and the number of households  studied: the figure given for the total number of households in the sample as noted on 
page 1 of the ICEA/SOGREAH report (version finale) tallies with the figure on page 28 of the 2009 PAD, namely 
1,079 households in seven cities (760 HHs not connected in formal neighbourhoods, 145 households not connected in 
informal neighbourhoods and 174 households having recently benefitted from social connections).       
Box 3.4  Example of data collected on urban households, in ONEA-commissioned study   
- Age and education of head of household and his/her spouse/partner 
- Principal activity of the head of household and his/her spouse/partner 
- Regular monthly income of the head of household and his/her spouse/partner 
- Other working members of the household 
- Total regular monthly income of the household  
- Transfers to the household received from other household members 
- Equipments in the possession of household members (refrigerator, gas cooker, bicycles, scooters, etc.) 
- Principal energy source employed for cooking 
- Principal means of lighting the house/dwelling 
- Type of toilet/sanitary facility and means for evacuation of grey water    
- Regular monthly outgoings: rent; food; electricity; other energy supply; transports/petrol; telephone; etc.  
- Type of house/dwelling 
- Nature of title/status of occupation: owner or tenant? 
- Length of time in current house/dwelling 
- Principal material with which the house/dwelling is constructed 
- Number of persons living on the plot of land on which the house/dwelling is situated. 
 
Source: questionnaire annexed to report of „tariff study‟ (ICEA/SOGREAH, 2008) 
 
  
 
 
 
ICEA/SOGREH questionnaire (147 questions in total) has not been utilised in the project 
design  - at least, not visibly in the PAD. 
 
The PAD notes that this „WTP‟ survey qualifies the general preference among the urban population 
as being for a household connection at an affordable price. As to what is affordable, the results of 
this WTP study suggest that unconnected households “are prepared to pay on average FCFA 27,600 
for connection, or FCFA 20,800 for connection to a simplified network53” (and FCFA 3,100 per 
month corresponding to a daily consumption of 38-44 litres per person per day). The issue of levels 
of affordability is returned to in section 3.5.2.            
 
The reliability of „WTP‟ surveys in low-income areas is unclear. For households living in 
precarious circumstances, for example, it may be difficult to predict in advance what will be 
payable in monthly bills presented retrospectively by the utility. Indeed, the 2009 PAD notes that 
expressed willingness to pay may be an unreliable indicator of bills subsequently paid:-  
 
“In addition, the current experience with social connections shows that some of the 
connections become inactive as the household incomes are not regular enough to allow them 
to set aside the amount of the monthly water bill” (emphasis added).       
 
An alternative approach would have been for ONEA to develop a means to measure differentials of 
poverty objectively, so as to make choices according to income category and adapt payment terms.  
 
Standpipes are one means of reaching surrounding districts in Ouagadougou, alongside others being 
piloted. The PAD refers (on page 29) to a pilot project54 in Ouagadougou being carried out by 
ONEA which is testing several types of alternative service, in “low-density, peri-urban 
neighbourhoods and in long-standing and informal urban communities (villages urbains) which 
have not yet benefitted from water services”55, namely simplified networks”, and “local 
neighbourhood operators operating the tertiary networks…”. From the key informant interviews, 
the researchers learnt that AFD has, in 2009, accorded funding to ONEA for operation of local 
supply networks by private operators, in six neighbourhoods of Ouagadougou including informal 
areas (i.e. these pilots are overseen by ONEA, although not specifically under the new project). The 
schemes will be tested to see whether small local operators, with lower overheads than ONEA, 
succeed in providing a good quality service at competitive prices, which are affordable to 
households in surrounding districts. 
    
The alternative access solutions56 should, says the PAD, be “affordable to the broadest strata of 
population” and, at the same time, “consistent with the financial equilibrium of the sub-sector” 
(emphasis added). In the 2009 PAD, the term „financial equilibrium‟ is defined in the following 
terms (World Bank 2009b, page 3): that ONEA is “able to recover from water sales its cash 
operating expenditures (excluding depreciation) plus debt service and a contribution to investments, 
without Government subsidies” (emphasis added). This reflects the expectation that ONEA will 
operate according to commercial principles without being a burden on the national budget. One of 
the successes of the ZIGA project was, as per the 2009 PAD for the new project (page 2), that: “The 
urban water sector reached financial equilibrium in 2006”. 
 
                                                 
53 Simplified networks use (PAD, page 28) “adapted standards (use of PEHD pipes, lower excavation) to accommodate 
the absence of official delimitation of properties and streets”.         
54 The PAD does not state whether this pilot is part of the new IDA-supported project or an activity of ONEA funded 
from other sources - the timing suggests the latter.         
55This pilot project “aims to serve about 84,000 people (through c.65 standpipes and 3,000 service connections)” (ibid).        
56 These solutions could also include special billing arrangements for low-income customers (e.g. providing for more 
frequent payment of bills at shorter intervals).   
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The 2009 PAD (paragraph 57 on page 17, entitled “On-lending Conditions”) states that:-  
 
“The [financial] model … shows that the financial equilibrium is quite sensitive to the 
financing conditions of the investment program. Therefore it was agreed in the proposed 
project to replicate the on-lending conditions in the [ZIGA project]”.    
 
As noted above, the World Bank is to make the IDA finance for the new project available to the 
GoB as a grant. As to the terms of transmission of funds from the GoB to ONEA, according to the 
PAD 200957, there is to be, as in the ZIGA case, a combination of „on-granting‟ and on-lending:- 
- for the water component: 50 percent of the IDA financing, US$ 25.87 million, to be transferred to 
ONEA as a grant, and 50 percent to be on-lent to ONEA as an IDA loan58;  
- for the sanitation component59: all the IDA funds (US$ 24.44 million) to be transferred to ONEA 
as a grant, as this component does not “generate commercial revenues” (World Bank 2009b, p.17). 
 
The PAD here could have added that some elements of the water component (standpipes) generate 
9in aggregate) lower commercial revenues, but it does not. The PAD for the new project, like the 
ZIGA project, envisages subsidies, for both the water and sanitation components, but those 
subsidies are not targeted to a particular category of water or sanitation. This issue, of how the 
Government and ONEA choose to invest the grant (as compared with the loan) element, is returned 
to in Section 3.7.  
 
The key performance indicators of the new project are reproduced in Box 3.5 (from the second 
column of the “Results Framework” in the 2009 PAD (Annex 3, page 37-38), at outcomes and 
intermediate outcomes levels).  
  
     Box  3.5          Key outcomes -  the new project (2009-2015) 
Project Outcome Indicators 
- Percentage of population having access to safe water: in Ouagadougou; in Bobo-Dioulasso; 
- Percentage of population having access to adequate sanitation services: in Ouagadougou; in Bobo. 
 
Intermediate Outcome Indicators 
- Additional individuals in the project area having access to improved water sources through household 
   connections and standpipes;    
- Additional individuals in the project area having access to improved onsite sanitation facilities; 
- Additional students in the project area having access to adequate sanitation in their schools; 
- Financial equilibrium of the urban water sector maintained with the implementation of an agreed tariff 
   policy based on cost recovery;   
- Ratio of ONEA‟s water employees per 1,000 connections; 
- Bill collection ratio of private water customers.  
 
Source: 2009 PAD, World Bank 2009b, Annex 3, page 37 (emphasis added) 
 
 
                                                 
57 For this purposes of the discussion below, the researchers carrying out the present study have not had access to the 
subsidiary agreements between government and water companies/utilities in relation to any of the projects, only the 
summary information in relation to on-lending/on-granting in the PADs.     
58 Over 20 years with a 10-year grace period and an annual interest of 4 percent.    
59 And all the funds for Components 3 and 4 on „Institutional support and capacity building‟ and „Environment and 
social management‟ respectively, at US$ 3.56 million and US$ 0.26 million contributions of IDA.    
  
 
 
 
As in the case of the ZIGA project, the KPIs in Box 3.5 talk in aggregate figures. The indicators do 
not make any reference to the location of either infrastructure type, e.g. no mention of surrounding 
or peri-urban areas of Ouagadougou. No process is envisaged for development of criteria for 
targeting on a geographical basis. In the first column of the logical framework, setting out the 
“Hierarchy of Objectives”, there is reference to “more people in targeted urban centres” having safe 
piped water and access to improved sanitation services (emphasis added), but the indicators do not 
elaborate on that (nor do any other items in the logical framework). The KPIs do not specify which 
categories of “population” and “individuals” are to benefit from the new connections and standpipes 
(they do not explicitly incorporate the 220,000 and 15,000 figures mentioned above and discussed 
in Annex 4 of the 2009 PAD).  
 
Based on the manner of writing the KPIs, there is a risk that, again, reduction of the connection 
price and other „social‟ elements of ONEA‟s policy (the subsidy to the cost of household 
connections) will not actually benefit low-income households in poor areas of the city. In the 
“Arrangements for results monitoring” also in Annex 3, on page 38, the data collection instruments 
for the project are to include a “household survey in YR 3”. How ONEA has to-date carried out 
beneficiary surveys is considered in section 3.4.1. 
 
Similarly, in the contract between the MAHRH and ONEA (‘Contrat Plan’) applying to the 
period 2007-2009 (i.e. current at the time of the 2009 research), Article 6 on „Service of the 
Population‟ defines only aggregate annual increases of coverage in Ouagadougou (and other cities). 
The contract does not specify the nature of ONEA‟s role in relation to low-income households, 
and does not require it to draw up or apply any targeting policy (cited by Wetta & Fofana, 2010, in 
Annex 1).  So, the lack in the GoB‟s national programmes/plans for UWSS of a strategy for 
inclusion is repeated in the contract between the MAHRH (the ministry of the GoB responsible for 
supervising ONEA). A clear „inclusion gap‟ exists in government programming for UWSS.  
 
 
3.3.2.2 Sanitation - in the design of the new project 
As regards the sanitation component of the new project, onsite sanitation options to be provided 
will include (PAD, World Bank 2009b, page 19): (i) improved traditional latrines; (ii) ventilated 
improved pit latrines with two pits and a variety of superstructures, depending on the available 
materials; (iii) pour-flush toilets with a variety of superstructures; and (iv) basic sanitation units that 
comprise a shower and/or sink and a soakway pit.  
 
The 2009 PAD (Annex 4) quantifies the number of persons who, it is intended, will benefit from 
new sanitation facilities in Ouagadougou, as follows: construction or rehabilitation of 18,000 
household latrines60 and 27,000 soak-away pits connected to washing facilities, serving 158,000 
people and 238,000 people respectively. Again, in the KPIs, there is no disaggregation of the 
population into differing categories of household who are to benefit from the sanitation investments 
under the new project.  
 
The PAD refers (World Bank 2009b, page 29) to ONEA‟s practice of making subsidies of, on 
average, 40 percent of the cost of sanitation facilities. The IDA funding apparently provides for 
“roughly 60 percent of the total cost of the household sanitation facility” (page 49). The PAD notes 
the difference between household onsite sanitation facilities and water infrastructure, that the onsite 
sanitation facilities fully belong to the households and then also refers at one point (page 14) to the 
possibility that “the level of subsidies may be adjusted”. Sector actors present at the mid-term 
                                                 
60 I.e.: “construction of VIP latrines (double-pit) or pour-flush toilets and rehabilitation of traditional latrines”. 
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review of this research study questioned whether the level of subsidy to be provided by ONEA for 
construction of improved household latrines would be sufficient for poor households.  
 
3.4 Inclusion in project implementation 
3.4.1 The ZIGA project 
The „Implementation Completion and Results Report‟ (ICR) by the World Bank, of June 2008 
(World Bank, 2008) notes that the objectives of the ZIGA project as originally approved were not 
revised during the course of the project, and reports that the overall outcome of the project was rated 
as “highly satisfactory because the project has achieved or surpassed all its stated development 
performance indicators” (page 11). Reliability of water supply in Ouagadougou has dramatically 
improved. The bulk water supply to the city has been secured, at least for satisfying current 
demand61.  
The ICR continues (page 11): “In addition, [the ZIGA project] successfully turned around ONEA, a 
public water utility and closed the gap... with best performing water utilities in the region (Côte 
d‟Ivoire, Senegal, Niger) which are all entirely managed by private operators” in respect of “the 
level of access to improved water services, reliability of the service, operational efficiency … and 
sustainability”.  
 
Against the performance indicators for the ZIGA project, those in Box 3.3 above which are of 
particular interest to this research study,  the ICR rates the percentage achievement as follows:-  
 
- 860,000 inhabitants connected to the water distribution network in Ouagadougou; percentage of 
achievement is 107%; 
- 56,000 new connections and 400 standposts installed:  percentage of achievement is 124% for 
connections and 100% for standposts. 
 
In a striking paragraph, the ICR then comments, in section 3.5 on page 11-12:- 
“Through the successful implementation of the Social Connections and Standpipes Program 
(construction of 56,000 subsidized water connections  and 400 standpipes), the project provided 
access to safe water to about 680,00062 additional people mostly living in peri-urban areas of 
Ouagadougou and belonging to low-income groups. As a result of the increased water production 
and network rehabilitation programs, service quality has considerably improved so that there are no 
longer frequent water distribution interruptions as it was the case before the project. These 
improvements especially benefitting the poor have improved basic hygiene practices and thus will 
contribute to the reduction of water related diseases” (emphasis added).    
The above comment from the ICR is striking for what is omits to say: the words „mostly‟ and 
„especially‟ are left hanging - without the evaluation report elaborating on these statements with 
information to support them. That was presumably because no such information was available. The 
evaluators refrain from commenting on the inability of the project to say who has benefitted from its 
work. The evaluators may have thought that was curious, but, once the number of connections and 
                                                 
61 None of the key informants challenged this in the interviews, although one informant stressed the need for review of 
whether/when future growth in demand in the city would outstrip the volume of the current bulk supply provided by the 
ZIGA project.  
62 A footnote on the same page of the ICR states: “56,000 connections X 10 pers. conn + 400 standpipes x 120 pers/stp 
= 680,000 person served » (On the face of the calculation as it is presented in this footnote, the figure of 680,000 seems 
to be a typographical error – the total served figure comes out at 608,000).   
  
 
 
 
standpipes was verified, their job in relation to that element of the project was accomplished 
according to the terms of the KPIs set in the original project design (and not varied during the 
course of the project).   
 
With regard to the social connection programme, a footnote on the same page of the ICR states that: 
“…beneficiaries are required to pay a reduced amount of CFAF 30,000 which represents only 24% 
of the real cost of the connection (FCFA 25,000)”. This is a substantial subsidy. The question, 
however, which remains is: which areas and households took up the subsidised connection (and 
how long did they sustain payment for the connected supply)? The beneficiary survey to which the 
ICR refers63 does not answer that question, at least as reported in the ICR - see in Box 3.6.  As to 
whether the subsidy rendered the connection cost affordable to low-income households, section 
3.4.2.2 reports on that issue based on the information gathered by the present research project.  
 
The PAD for the new project (page 27) comments that demand for household connections increased 
dramatically after their price was reduced, from FCFA 120,000 (US$ 240) to FCFA 50,000 (US$ 
100) and then to FCFA 30,000 (US$ 60). But, demand from which households, in which districts of 
the city, is not said. 
 
In the ICR, the “Lessons Learned” section (pages 15-16) notes that “the financial model …has been 
a powerful tool to optimize investments and assess required operational efficiency gains consistent 
with the financial equilibrium of the sector and socially acceptable tariffs” (emphasis added). But, 
among the Lessons Learned there is no discussion of the social connection policy and its pricing, 
just this assertion of consistency.  
 
Box  3.6   Beneficiary Survey results 
The ICR states that consumer satisfaction surveys were conducted during the project, in six urban 
centres in Burkina. Annex 5 of the ICR sets out the “Beneficiary Survey Results” in 2007 for 
Ouagadougou (the date in 2007 is not stated in Annex 5). The questions related to water users‟ 
satisfaction with regard to water availability, quality and price as well as ONEA‟s service. The survey 
consulted both “households with private connections” and “households taking water at public taps”. 
According to the results, as reported in that annex, levels of satisfaction expressed are generally good. 
Levels of satisfaction are higher for water quality (mid-upper 60 percent) than availability, especially 
during the dry season (mid-upper 50 percent). In relation to “the price of water”, satisfaction is at 57 
percent for those taking water at “public taps” (standpipes). The expressed level of satisfaction of 
connected households is lower, at 43%64.  
It is difficult to assess what this 2007 survey signifies and in particular the 43% level of satisfaction. 
The ICR says, on page 12, that: “there is significant customer satisfaction with … (ii) the decrease in 
the cost of a private connection ... to FCFA 30,000”. It is not clear how this conclusion is reached, at 
least not from the results of the survey (ICR, Annex 5 again). It is noticeable that the above 43% figure 
is the lowest in the results reported in Annex 5, apart from the level of satisfaction at waiting times at 
pay offices (40%). As alluded to above, in the ICR, levels of satisfaction with water availability and 
quality are reported to have been higher, in the 50s% and 60s%. The 43% score may have some 
significance in relation to the issue of affordability of connection - Section 3.4.2.2 of this report returns 
to that. Meanwhile, in this Beneficiary Survey no specific question was asked, it seems, in relation to 
the reduction of the connection cost (nor on functionality of „public taps‟)65. And, in Annex 5, it is not 
stated where the surveys were carried out in the city. 
Source: World Bank, 2008, section 3.6, on page 12, and Annex 5 (pages 23-25) 
 
                                                 
63 From Annex 5 of the ICR, it appears that this Beneficiary Survey of 2007 was a different exercise from the 
„Willingness-to-Pay‟ study in July 2007 which the 2009 PAD describes on page 28 (as discussed in section 2.3.2.1)   
64 It is not clear whether “price” here refers to the connection price or the tariff for consumption, or both. 
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3.4.2 The UWSS activities pursued by ONEA (2007 - )  
For the purpose of assessing the status of UWSS services in Ouagadougou at the time of this study, 
the researchers have taken into account not only the accumulated activities of the ZIGA project 
from 2001-2007, but also operations carried out by ONEA since the conclusion of the ZIGA project 
in 2007 with the support of funding sources other than the IDA66, including sanitation activities.      
As noted in section 3.2, the sector strategies - the PN-AEPA, the National Sanitation Strategy and 
the Strategic Sanitation Plan for Ouagadougou - provide the national policy framework within 
which ONEA is mandated to increase UWSS coverage rates, including investigating low-cost 
solutions for the provision of water services to areas surrounding town centres and reaching the 
poorest populations with sanitation facilities.  
To contribute to assessment of the degree of inclusion of poor areas and households in UWSS 
services in Ouagadougou, the researchers have adopted two means67:- 
- mapping: information on levels of poverty in Ouagadougou has been overlaid onto maps provided 
by ONEA showing water infrastructure including standpipes;  
- survey: focus groups were carried out in five villages in surrounding areas of the city which are 
both urbanised areas (quartiers lotis) and un-urbanised areas (quartiers non-lotis).  
This water poverty mapping exercise - carried out by the University of Ouagadougou, the Institut 
National de la Statistique et Démographique-INSD and the Institut des Sciences des Sociétés-INSS 
- seems to have been the first of its kind (at least in Burkina). This was the first time that the INSD 
had been approached for this purpose and INSD is the national entity which led the collection and 
presentation of evidence for the 2006 census, comprising (prior to the new project) the most recent 
and extensive set of official data on the population in the country.  
The findings from this mapping exercise and a summary of the responses from the focus groups in 
three quartiers lotis (Yamtenga, Toukin and Bissighin) and two quartiers non-lotis (Yamtenga et 
Nioko 2) are set out in the two sections which follow. 
 
3.4.2.1 Mapping  
Map 1., in Annex 4., was supplied by ONEA to the researchers (soon after the key informant 
interviews with ONEA staff in the first weeks of the study in 2009), and shows, against the 
background of the sectors of the city of Ouagadougou (numbered 1-30) and named villages around 
it, the spatial distribution of standpipes („répartition spatiale des bornes fontaines’) up to 2009. 
Those standpipes installed before 2003 are marked in red, and those constructed between 2003 and 
2009 are marked in blue. It is clear, first, that the activities of ONEA during and since the ZIGA 
project have substantially increased the spatial coverage of standpipes which constitutes substantial 
progress overall in terms of extension of standpipes in Ouagadougou.  
According to this Map 1, the post-2003 standpipes are located especially in the districts of the city 
outside the central sectors 1-13, in sectors 14, 16, 17, 19, 20-27, 28-29 (at the limits of the latter two 
sectors, on the frontier with their zone of extension) and sector 30.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
65 Were there questions posed to non-connected households, e.g. as to why they had not connected? 
66 The interval period of c.2 years between conclusion of the IDA-supported ZIGA project in 2007 and commencement 
of the new IDA-supported project from 2009, as referred to in section 3.1.   
67 As mentioned above, the 2008 report of the ICEA/SOGREAH survey carried out in 2007 was not made available by 
ONEA to the researchers at the time of the research in 2009 (it was supplied later, in May 2011).    
  
 
 
 
According to Map 1., there are gaps in provision where few standpipes were installed between 2003 
and 2009, e.g. in sector 15 and the extension of sectors 28, 29 and 30 which are (unurbanised) 
districts called Tabtenga and Yamtenga (discussed in section 3.4.2.2).  
The question which arises for the purposes of this study is as follows: what rationale (if any) is 
evident in the siting of the 2003-2009 standpipes? What approach to geographic targeting, if any, 
is detectable? 
To explore this question, the University of Ouagadougou, INSD and INSS drew up Map 2. in 
Annex 5, based on information on poverty levels in different parts of Ouagadougou from the 2006 
census - the most recent available information for calculating the poverty indices of the city68. In 
Map 2, the areas coloured in green are the poor areas of the city (the darker the green, the poorer) 
which surround the wealthier central sectors of the city which are coloured in beige to red (the 
darker, the more wealthy, as per the index of poverty used by the INSD, as described in section 
3.1.5 of the present report).  
The overlaying of the levels of poverty/wealth with the information supplied by ONEA on the 
spatial distribution of water infrastructure, including standpipes, allowed the researchers to analyse 
how far the extension of infrastructure corresponded, or not, to targeting of poor areas (reading 
Maps 1 and 2 in combination69). The mapping exercise stimulated a further exchange between the 
University of Ouagadougou and ONEA. After the key informant interviews and production of Map 
2, ONEA subsequently made available to the University the Figure in Annex 6. This Figure is a bar 
chart of the number of standpipes („bornes fontaines‟) installed by ONEA in numbered sectors and 
named „villages‟ surrounding Ouagadougou in the period between 2003 and 2009. 
The following are the insights from the mapping exercise and the Figure in Annex 6:- 
• ONEA‟s focus (2003-2009) was on districts outside the central area (beyond „sectors‟ 1-13): 
only five central sectors are listed in the Figure in Annex 6. and each received less than five 
standpipes; meanwhile seventeen sectors in areas beyond the centre are listed by ONEA‟s as 
receiving standpipes;    
 
• it is possible to identify levels of relative wealth and poverty, district by district, in 
Ouagadougou, using existing data (from the 2006 census): despite the extent of poverty in 
Burkina as a low-income country, it is not true - or at least not analytically useful - to say that 
the entire population of the peri-urban areas in sectors 14-30 is „poor‟; a substantial part of east 
Ouagadougou, for example, is very poor; at the same time, not all districts beyond the central 
area are poor: two surrounding districts which received standpipes (sectors 18 and 24) are 
relatively well-off, and two other outlying areas (sectors 21 and 14) are in the intermediate 
category; 
 
• the remaining thirteen districts which received standpipes are poor or very poor; the siting of 
water infrastructure contains a targeting error from an equity perspective, in that it has excluded 
poor persons (what is called in Wetta and Fofana, 2010, a „Type I‟ error70), based on 
information supplied by ONEA, in sectors 15, 16, 20, 23, 25 (all marked on Map 2 as poor or 
very poor areas), as well as in the extension of sectors 28, 29 and 30;  
 
                                                 
68 The mode of calculation of the poverty index of each sector is simple (Wetta and Fofona, 2009): the number of poor 
persons per sector is divided by the total population. So, in a given sector, if the number of poor is (to make the example 
simple) 20 persons out of a total of 100 persons in the sector, the poverty index is 20 percent. 
69 On Map 2, areas well covered by water infrastructure (“couverture > 80%”) are marked in wide hatching  and areas 
“not equipped” (“zone non-équippée”) with narrow hatching.        
70 E.Lavallee, cited by Wetta and Fofana, 2010, refers to Type I targeting errors which are errors where poor persons are 
missed out, and Type II targeting errors where more wealthy persons are included.    
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• the siting of standpipes has also included non-poor districts and persons (a „Type II‟ targeting 
error): especially in sector 21 (the outer part) and (based on Map 1) sectors 14 and 24;  
 
• it is noted that some unurbanised districts (quartiers non lotis) have been reached by standpipes 
installed by ONEA, to the east, west, north and south of the city, e.g. Saaba (evidence of the de 
facto policy of ONEA to work in informal areas);  
 
• the water-poverty Map 2 suggests that the sectors are not the same size (in hectareage), so one 
would not expect the number of standpipes to be the same in each; but it is clear that further 
investment post-2009 is required to install more standpipes in sectors 16 and 25, and especially 
15, 20, 26, 28 and 2971.  
 
• Sectors 28 and 29 are examples of very poor districts where this analysis by the University of 
Ouagadougou and INSD suggests that standpipes are relatively lacking; 
 
• ONEA said (May 2010) said that siting of standpipes in peri-urban areas had taken account of, 
inter alia, population density, and also existence of standpipes pre-2003 (presumably 
functioning standpipes only); 
  
• the logic of the allocation of standpipes is not clear: there is no strategy document articulating 
ONEA‟s rationale for targeting of standpipes in peri-urban areas; e.g. it is not clear why sectors 
15, 20 and 26 (each poor) and sectors 28 and 29 received less than 10 standpipes; in other 
words, the mapping exercise suggests (with ONEA not giving an explanation to the contrary) 
that, in terms of inclusion of low-income areas, extension of standpipes to Ouaga surrounding 
districts was „patchy‟; 
      
• as discussed in section 3.4.2.2, the focus group discussions (FGDs) in two areas raised questions 
of  the affordability of household connection cost72. 
  
Map 3. in Annex 7 is another map supplied by ONEA and cited in the report of Wetta and Fofana. 
It shows elements of the water distribution network in Ouagadougou - its actual status and planned 
extension in the period of 2008-2011 („Etat actuel et Programmation de l’équipement en réseau de 
distribution pour la période 2008-2011) . This map does not show standpipes, but, usefully, it 
includes areas of extension of the city beyond the city limits as portrayed on Maps 1. and 2. (e.g. 
sectors 15 and 17 in the south and sector 18 to the west), i.e. it is cartographic indication by ONEA 
of the directions in which the city is growing. Given that the city continues to evolve, the issue of 
where water infrastructure is sited to reach new areas continues under the new project.  
 
3.4.2.2 Focus groups  
The following is a note of the information collected from the focus groups in surrounding districts 
of Ouagadougou in named villages, as shown on Map 2, in three urbanised districts (quartiers lotis) 
- Yamtenga, Bissighin and Toukin - and two un-urbanised areas (quartiers non-lotis) - Nioko 2 and 
Tabtenga 73. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the responses from these focus groups. 
                                                 
71 As a measure of average incomes, Wetta cites the estimate of the INSD that the average household budget available 
for daily expenses in Ouagadougou in 1998 was 611 FCFA.       
72 And/or provide for a viable alternative service mode affordable to low-income households.   
73 In a subsequent exchange between the University of Ouagadougou and ONEA, ONEA staff have commented that   
other areas outside the centre are better equipped than the five villages selected by the present study - those other areas 
are, comments ONEA, well covered by water infrastructure (e.g. Map 2: “couverture > 80%”).        
  
 
 
 
In the un-urbanised districts, as shown in the right-hand column in Table 3.1, the situation is 
especially concerning (« particulièrement préoccupante”, Wetta and Fofana, 2010). Poor 
households in these districts face major difficulties of access:- 
- they travel long distances to collect water from standpipes situated at the boundaries of 
neighbouring urbanised areas; 
 
- households who can afford their own barrels on wheels (200 litre barriques) , generally pay 
the standard price of 60 FCFA per barrel at standpipes (at all seasons of the year); 
 
- the persons consulted in these un-urbanised districts expressed their demand for nearby 
installation of standpipes, as the means of gaining water access - a standpipe every 200 
metres along the access roads in the district; 
 
- without that close access, poor households who cannot buy the 220 litres barrels are obliged to 
collect and carry water in small quantities (buckets or bidons of 20 litres) or acquire water from 
vendors, at  prices of FCFA 200-300 (increasing to FCFA 500-600 or more in the dry season74); 
in other words, households can find themselves paying ten times the „regulated‟ price at 
standpipes, e.g. in standpipes located closer to those households;  
  
- there are non-functioning standpipes (e.g. in Tabtenga, all 8 standpipes) which raises the 
question of sustainability („pérennité) and possible concerns regarding the rates of 
functionality of standpipes in other areas of the city. 
In Burkina, the poverty threshold (la ligne de pauvreté) was (at the time of the 2009/10 research)  
determined to be 0.5 US$ per day (Wetta and Fofana, 2010), which is the equivalent of 225 FCFA. 
Based on the above cost of a 220 litre barrel of 60 FCFA, according to Wetta and Fofana, each 
individual can supply 10 persons with 20 litres of water per day, i.e. at around 6 FCFA for those 20 
litres - in other words, the price of 60 FCFA is affordable (Wetta and Fofana, 2010). 
 
In the three urbanised areas, the water supply situation has seen improvements. The persons 
consulted said that successive activities of ONEA, during and since the ZIGA project, had 
succeeded in bringing about better water access, including installation of new standpipes. The 
number of standpipes varied in the three districts - see the left-hand column in Table 3.1 - e.g. just 
two in Toukin where the residents reported that those standpipes were sited on the opposite side of a 
major road which had to be crossed, at considerable risk.  
 
The respondents in the urbanised areas reported that the number of households with a connection to 
the water network had increased, although the proportion remained small. In Toukin, for example, 
an estimated 1 in 8 households currently had a household connection.  
 
According to the responses to the focus groups (Wetta and Fofona, 2010), for the majority of 
households in both urbanised and unurbanised areas, “the cost of connection is too high”. For 
example, in Toukin (urbanised): “as regards the cost of connection, even though the ZIGA project 
has allowed for a reduction in the price, it still remains inaccessible to the residents of our 
neighbourhood”75). The financial investment which is required by each household, for connection 
and water consumption, was mentioned as the principal obstacle to increasing the number of 
connections - rather than the waiting time of three months for installation of the connection to the 
house.  
                                                 
74 Unlike in, for example, Ghana, there is apparently in Burkina (according to one key informant) no system for delivery 
by water tanker of water at times of great water shortage.    
75 To quote the focus group respondents, « Concernant le coût du branchement privé, même si le projet Ziga a permis 
de réduire ce coût, il reste encore inaccessible aux habitants de notre quartier ».    
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According to the responses gathered during the focus groups, variations in availability of supply 
from taps (household or standpipes), caused by water shortages and equipment breakdowns, often 
cause long queues, which give rise to wasted time and tensions among water users.  
 
The focus groups reported back a desire to be more involved in the management of funds for 
UWSS, so their capacity to manage the water infrastructure and service is increased - according a 
greater degree of sustainability (gage de pérennité). 
 
As regards sanitation, the lower section of the Table 3.1 summarises the situation in the urbanised 
and un-urbanised districts76.  
 
In the two un-urbanised districts of Nioko 2 and Tabtenga, there are, currently, very few sanitation 
facilities, household or public - open defecation is the norm. There is demand for more public 
sanitation facilities, in markets, schools, which they would like to see every 500 metres along 
access roads. There is little expressed demand for improved household sanitation - households are 
not aware of efforts by ONEA to inform residents of the need for sanitation - a minority of 
households possess TVs or radios.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 As noted above, in section 3.3.1, the ZIGA project did not include a sanitation component, but ONEA did, as noted in 
section 3.4.2, have some resources available for pursing the sanitation part of its mandate, from sources other than IDA, 
as well as from the surcharge on water bills (section 3.1.5).          
  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1  Summary of the responses of focus groups in five surrounding districts of Ouagadougou –  
- from urbanised districts (quartiers lotis) and un-urbanised districts (quartiers non-lotis)                   
 
 URBANISED AREAS 
 (Yamtenga, Toukin et Bissighin) 
UN-URBANISED AREAS 
(Nioko 2 et Tabtenga) 
WATER SUPPLY (at the time of the research in 2009) 
Household 
connections 
(branchements 
particuliers) 
 
e.g. Toukin : 1 in 8 households  
 
 
To-date there is no network in these un-urbanised areas. 
Cost of connection For most households in these areas, the price 
of connection is too high.  
 
Standpipes 
(bornes fontaines) 
 
Standpipes exist in each of these districts: 
Toukin: 2, on the other side of the road; 
Yamtenga: 15 in total (10 within the area, 5 at 
the border with neighbouring area); Bissighin: 
15 standpipes. 
 
 Critical lack of infrastructure in these areas: standpipes do 
not exist, or are non-functioning (in that case households 
use wells). Access to functioning standpipes is to those 
located on the boundary with neighbouring urban areas.  
Cost of water at 
standpipes 
60 FCFA for barrel of 220 litres (all seasons) 60 FCFA for barrel of 220 litres (all seasons)  
Access to 
standpipes 
Poor households cannot afford their own 
barrels on wheels; they resort to vendors 
Poor households cannot afford their own barrels on wheels; 
they resort to vendors 
Cost from vendors 200 FCFA : normal price  
500/600 FCFA+ : price in dry season 
200/300 FCFA : normal price 
500/600 + FCFA : price in dry season 
The further a household is located from a standpipe, generally the higher the cost of accessing water via 
vendors 
Demand A standpipe every 200 metres on the larger 
access roads (not tarmaced)   
More standpipes and a lower water tariff at the standpipes: 
35/40 FCFA for a barrel   
Communication/ 
information 
Information from ONEA is «inaccessible»; 
lack of radios/TVs in households 
Information from ONEA is «inaccessible»; lack of 
radios/TVs in households 
SANITATION (at the time of the research in 2009) 
 
Latrines - 
household 
Few sanitation facilities: about 3 in 10 
households have benefitted from support to 
construction of improved latrines. Others 
practise open defecation, except those with a 
traditional latrine.  
Very few sanitation facilities - generally open defecation is 
practised.  
Latrines - public Exist in some public places. A few latrines exist in public places, built by collective 
community initiative.   
Drainage None, even beside major roads None at all 
Demand 
 
There is demand for public latrines (schools, 
markets, clinics, major roads). Residents are 
ready to contribute in kind to private latrines 
There is demand for public latrines (schools, markets, 
clinics, major roads). Residents are ready to contribute in 
kind to private latrines 
Communication/ 
information  
Information from ONEA is «inaccessible»; 
lack of radios/TVs in households. 
Information from ONEA is «inaccessible»; lack of 
radios/TVs in households 
(Source: Wetta and Fofana, 2010 - the report includes sketch maps of UWSS facilities in each of the five districts) 
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The sanitation picture is a little better in the three urbanised districts. The FGDs in Yamtenga, 
Bissighin and Toukin reported that a minority of households, about 3 in 10, had, up to the date of the 
survey, benefitted from support for construction of an improved latrine (with 40% subsidy to costs of 
construction). The remainder used either traditional household latrines, or practised open defecation. 
There was - at least at the time of the research in 2009 - no roadside drainage in either the urbanised 
or un-urbanised districts. After the intense precipitation event on 1
st
 September, 2009, these districts 
suffered flooding.   
 
3.4.3 The new project 
 
Given that the new Urban Water Sector Project was approved in May 2009, it was too early at the 
time of this research study to assess its implementation.   
 
As set out in section 3.3.2, the new project is designed to increase access to UWSS in urban areas and 
continue the strengthening of capacities to deliver and manage UWSS services. 
There are aspects of the design of the new project (as set out in the 2009 PAD) which, this report has 
argued in section 3.3.2.1, require to be clarified and further developed, not least the disconnect 
between project objectives on engineering/infrastructure, utility strengthening (including financial 
performance) expressed in the key performance indicators and other objectives (social) which by their 
absence from the KPIs, are effectively de-prioritised to a secondary status of stated, but not monitored 
and measured, aims of the project. Out of the USD 52 million budgeted for infrastructure, USD 32.7 
million was for infrastructure (stand posts and social connections), but, as shown in this chapter, the 
„social‟ policy of ONEA has so far failed to take account of disparities in income/wealth. 
As noted in section 3.3.2.1, a key aspect of design of the water component of the new project is that it 
plans to focus on serving an additional 220,000 via network connections, as compared with only 
serving 15,000 extra persons by standpipe. Given the low revenue-earning status of standpipes, there 
will be little incentive for ONEA to install standpipes - unless a specific Government subsidy 
(financed by the IDA grant) is targeted towards this part of the water economy- see Section 3.7.   
 
In paragraph 69 of the 2009 PAD entitled „Social‟, it is stated (emphasis added):- 
“The primary goal of the proposed project is to contribute to a sustainable improvement of hygiene 
and environmental health by improving access to safe drinking water and sanitation in poor fringe 
areas of Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, and other urban areas where high prices are currently paid 
to alternative water service providers. As such, the proposed project will seek to reduce the access 
bias between formal and informal settlements, where, until recently, ONEA did not provide water 
services. Beneficiary assessments77; and a Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) study78 helped to design 
access mechanisms (social connection programs and alternative types of services) that will be 
tailored to local neighbourhood conditions and to customers‟ willingness-to-pay” (World Bank 
2009b, page 20) .  
 
The above is a key part of this section on „Social‟ issues (which is short - covering less than one 
page). The term „goal‟ is used to refer to the intention to improve access in poor fringe areas of 
Ouagadougou. The desirability of reducing the access bias between formal and informal settlements is 
borne out by the results of the focus groups conducted by this research project (section 3.4.2.2). Yet, 
the status of this social goal as a „primary‟ goal of the project is not reflected in the KPIs.  
                                                 
77 Presumably the reference here to “beneficiary assessments” is to such as the survey described in the ICR, at page 12 
cited in this present report, in section 3.4.1.    
78 Namely, the study (ICEA/SOGREAH 2008) discussed in section 3.3.2.1 of the present report.  
  
 
 
 
3.5 Assessment: achievements and weaknesses of the ZIGA project 
This section assesses the achievements of ZIGA project, which were considerable, as well as its 
weakness when viewed through the „lens‟ of inclusion (it is too soon to assess the new project). 
 
3.5.1 Achievements: water infrastructure and services 
 
The following were the achievements of the ZIGA project:- 
- the ZIGA project applied the donor and GoB funds to substantially increase the bulk water 
supply to the „gates‟ of the city of Ouagadougou; the production capacity was increased 
threefold, from 40,800 m3/day in 2001 (2001 PAD, World Bank, 2001, page 5) to 122,000 
m3/day in 2007 (2009 PAD, World Bank 2009b, page 1);  
  
- thereby, the bulk water supply produced by the ZIGA project was sufficient to meet 
demand79. According to a senior government official in the MAHRH, the situation will be 
reviewed in 2015, taking account of the rate of growth of Ouagadougou in the intervening five 
years80; 
 
- in terms of delivery of water services, the number of persons with access to the water network 
in Ouagadougou more than doubled in six years, from 300,000 in 2001 to over 800,000 in 2007, 
an increase of one-third of the city‟s residents at the time of the 2000 Census, according to 
which the total population of the capital, including peri-urban areas, was around 960,00081;  
 
- as to spatial distribution, the water infrastructure (connections and standpipes) installed during 
and following the project has focused on the seventeen districts outside the city centre (on 
sectors 14-30) which are in most cases (not all) poorer than the central districts (sectors 1-13);  
in that sense, the statement in the evaluation of the project (World Bank, 2008) that standpipes 
are “mostly” located in poorer districts is correct, although not analytically useful, because of   
targeting errors (described in section 3.4.2.1) ; 
 
- the project introduced a social connection policy to reduce the cost of connections by 50% and 
later 75%; this substantially increased demand for household connections; 
 
- the ZIGA project saw a substantial turn around in the financial and operational management of 
ONEA; the 2009 of the new project describes the “main measurable improvements in ONEA‟s 
performance” as set out in Box 3.7.; in the period from 2003-2007 (financial years), ONEA‟s 
total revenue increased by an average annual rate of 12%, well above inflation (WSP, 2008); 
 
                                                 
79 The 2009 PAD (page 6): “the production and storage capacity installed under the [ZIGA project] is sufficient for the 
time being”. The new project provides, instead, for sub-components to increase water production and storage capacity 
in Bobo-Dioulasso, Kodougou and Dédougou, as well as expand distribution and access in those cities (and in 
Ouagadougou) (World Bank 2009b, p.7-8).  
80 Given Burkina‟s water resources context (as summarised in Box 3.1), such a review will need to consider competing 
demands on water resources, for example between agriculture and urban use.   
81 Source: INSD. 
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  Box  3.7   Improvements in ONEA’s performance - according to the 2009 PAD 
 Bill collection: the bill collection ratio increased from 86 percent in 2002 to 95.4 percent in 2007. 
Accounts receivable from private consumers have decreased from 21 8 days to 73 days82. 
 Unaccounted-for-water: UFW was stabilized at 18 percent of the production, which is one of the best 
performances in Sub-Saharan Africa; expressed in terms of losses per km of distribution network, UFW 
decreased from 5.5 m3 per km per day to 4.8 m3 per km per day;  
 Staff productivity: the commercial staff productivity index, which stands at 810 connections per 
employee by the end of the project, by far exceeded the target of 230 connections per employee 
initially set for 2007;  
 Financial reporting: “ONEA‟s annual financial reports are being prepared in a timely fashion, in 
accordance with international standards”;  
 Information: “the quality of information increased dramatically”: the Technical Auditor validated 95 
percent of the business indicators in 2007 as compared to only 48 percent in 2004; 
 Financial equilibrium: the financial equilibrium of the urban water sector was restored in 2006 as 
 initially expected.  
Source: 2009 PAD (World Bank 2009b) page 29-30 
 
 
- however, ONEA‟s debt serviceability remains a source of concern; the World Bank (2009b, 
p.14) details one of the „critical risks‟ to further progress by the utility: „The financial 
equilibrium that was achieved in 2006 may be jeopardized by the increasing debt service 
requirements and to a lesser extent by the payment arrears from public customers‟.  
 
3.5.2 Equity 
Considering the progress of the ZIGA project from the perspective of inclusion - i.e. how far low-
income households have been served by the project (2001-2007) and the activities of ONEA financed 
by other sources (2007-2009) - the following observations arise.  
This research study suggests that, in relation to extension of the distribution network within the city of 
Ouagadougou, service of poor areas has not been systematically planned according to a logic of 
inclusion; from that perspective the result has been patchy. The mapping exercise carried out by the 
University of Ouagadougou and the INSD/INSS points to some poor areas of the city surrounding the 
centre (les quartiers périphériques) which were included by ONEA in its programme of extension of 
standpipes, whilst others have been omitted. Given the rate of growth of the population of 
Ouagadougou and the dimensions of the challenge of extending water infrastructure to the 
surrounding area, choices made by ONEA will presumably entail making populations in some areas 
wait until the next phase of investment. But, which areas, and according to which criteria, 
articulated and applied in a transparent manner?  
To-date, there is no evidence of a strategy for geographical targeting by ONEA of surrounding 
areas based on an analysis of levels of poverty. As discussed in section 3.3.2.1, the socio-economic 
data gathered from the ICEA/SOGREAH study does not appear to have been utilised by ONEA 
(except, very selectively, as an argument in support of its household connection policy). 
 Similarly, as to how far poor households have benefitted from the investment to-date in extension of 
water services in Ouagadougou since the commencement of the ZIGA project, it appears that no 
                                                 
82A study by the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP, 2008) qualifies this, pointing to a problem of late payment by 
some government agencies and other major water-consuming customers. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
information is available, at least, none disaggregated and quantified by ONEA (and supplied to the 
researchers). Like many African utilities, ONEA does not organise customer data by income category. 
This means that, despite the progress it has achieved in installing water infrastructure and extending 
water services, it is unable to show the benefits to low-income households. 
During the key informant interviews, a comment was made to the researchers by ONEA personnel 
that Ouagadougou was composed of mixed wealth communities, such that it is “impossible for a 
utility to distinguish between rich and poor areas”. Before the results of the poverty mapping became 
available, there was a doubt in the minds of the research team as to whether the mapping exercise 
would, or would not, be useful. In line with the above comment, it could have been that rich and poor 
households in each sector would average each other out, so as to produce a similar poverty level in 
many areas of the city. As shown in Map 2, the mapping exercise has, however, pointed to differing 
levels of poverty in the city, with a pattern of poorer populations in surrounding areas.  
 
That differing levels of poverty/wealth in Ouagadougou exist is noted in the ICEA/SOGREAH:- 
 
“The capital, despite concentrating wealth, is itself characterised by major income 
inequalities and the proportion of very poor people is significant” (ICEA/SOGREAH 2008, 
p.15, emphasis added).  
 
As its source for this information, ICEA/SOGREAH cites the same body to which the present 
research project had recourse for authoritative data, namely the INSD.       
 
Map 2 is proposed as a simple tool on which to base a discussion between sector stakeholders on 
geographical targeting strategy - to which other actors can bring/add their own analysis83. 
 
An example of potential of geographical targeting as considered in relation to an IDA-funded project 
in West Africa is given in Box 3.8, citing from the ICR in 2009 of the water project in Dakar (World 
Bank 2009c). 
 
In Ouagadougou, Map 2 should be seen as a first step84. Further study, including development of this 
poverty mapping tool85, would be useful to advance knowledge and improve the level of insight into 
methods of targeting of poor areas and households in Ouagadougou and other cities in Burkina.  
ONEA has employed, across all areas, richer and poorer, and to all households, a „social connection‟ 
strategy of reduction of the cost of connection to the water supply network. House connection (when 
functioning) eliminates time/labour of water collection from standpipes, but connection, to be 
preferable to households, has to be affordable. The reduction was made in stages, first from 100,000 
FCFA to 50,000 FCFA; then, later in the ZIGA project, to 30,000/25,000 FCFA (World Bank, 2008, 
page 7). The further reduction, down to FCFA 30,000, was made in the penultimate year of the ZIGA 
project (the first years of ZIGA were devoted to constructing the primary main to bring the bulk 
supply to the city, with the works on the distribution network within the city beginning in 2006). 
 
The ICR comments that the lower connection price helped to reach the target for connections (and 
surpass it, by 11,000), but (as elsewhere in the document) the ICR makes no comment on the socio-
economic status of connected households.  
                                                 
83 The University of Ouagadougou could usefully, for example, develop discussion with the Water and Sanitation 
Program (WSP) in Burkina on the findings of the present study, thereby benefitting from WSP‟s activities in Burkina 
and its accumulated knowledge of UWSS in the SSA region. 
84 A dialogue between the University of Ouagadougou, the INSD and ONEA has continued in 2010 and 2011.  
85 Including adjustments and refinements which can be added over time. The exercise could be linked to reflection on 
other targeting approaches, e.g. by household characteristics.               
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  Box  3.8  Geographical targeting - as considered in Dakar, Senegal 
The objective of this long-term Water Sector Project was “to assist the Borrower in achieving sustainable 
improvements in the delivery of urban water and sanitation services in un-served and low-income areas of 
Dakar” (source: PAD for the project).  
 
“Poverty impact: the project replicated the experience of the PSE (Projet Sectoriel Eau) Water Sector 
Project, which demonstrated that providing low-cost connections was critical for increasing direct access to 
piped water by low income families. Through the social connection program financed under the project, 
qualifying households obtained a connection free of charge against the payment of a refundable deposit 
equivalent to US$38 representing less than 20 percent of the connection cost, on a first-come first-served 
basis. The only criterion used for assessing eligibility is the geographical location [Note 5] but areas 
planned for network densification get priority. Households located in Dakar‟s low-income neighbourhoods 
and all households located in secondary urban centres were eligible for a social connection. Between 2001 
and 2008, about 98,000 household connections have been constructed under the project in peri-urban areas 
of Dakar and secondary centres” (from section 3.5 on page 13 on „Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes 
and Impacts, (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development‟). 
 
Note 5 (on p.13): “Eligibility criteria to ensure better targeting of the poor were thoroughly debated in the 
design of the social connections program, which concluded that the current country conditions could not 
warrant the use of individual household criteria and that a poverty ranking of urban neighbourhoods would 
be an acceptable proxy. A specific study of the targeting of the programs was carried out at the end of the 
project to check whether the approach was valid and whether other criteria might be adopted in the future. 
The study concluded that the approach was realistic: the water connection rate in the targeted 
neighbourhoods was at the end of the project, much closer to the city average. The study also proposed 
individual criteria for future programs (particularly to consider the monthly electricity bill as a revenue 
indicator). SONES-Société Nationale des Eaux du Senegal and SDE-Sénégalaise des Eaux (the water utility 
and contractor) are reviewing the recommendations that they intend to discuss with representatives of the 
civil society”. 
 
Source: World Bank 2009c - the ICR for the Senegal project, December 2009 (emphasis added) 
 
 
The responses from the focus groups conducted by the present study in surrounding areas (far from 
the city centre) suggest that the reduced price of FCFA 30,000 needs reviewing, that it is still not 
affordable by poor households (in both urbanised and unurbanised areas). For many households in 
those areas, public standpipes, are, and will continue to be in the short and medium term, a key source 
of water. The decision to focus a larger proportion (compared with the ZIGA project) of investment of 
the water component under the new project on new household connections, instead of standpipes, is, 
from an inclusion perspective, a move in the wrong direction.  
 
The responses from the focus groups in the five areas studied in Ouagadougou - Yamtenga, Bissighin 
and Toukin, and Nioko 2 and Tabtenga - indicate that, in the (first) three urbanised areas, the water 
supply situation has seen improvements from the installation of standpipes. However, in the un-
urbanised areas, beyond the limits of the formal city, few standpipes are installed, with serious 
implications for households in those areas. For those without a nearby standpipe, or without the means 
to buy a 220 litre barrel on wheels (barrique) to collect water, a serious problem arises, due to the 
price charged by vendors which varies, but is high (at best, 3 times, and, at worst, 10 times the rate at 
the standpipes, depending on the season). Meanwhile, the focus groups indicate that rates of 
functionality of standpipes in some sites are low (e.g. Nioko 2 and Tabtenga).  
 
  
 
 
 
It has been seen that the ICR comments (section 3.4.1) that the financial model is a “powerful tool” 
for reaching financial equilibrium and socially acceptable tariffs. As to how far it will be possible, 
through ONEA‟s financial model, both to reach poor households with an affordable service and 
balance ONEA‟s books, with a positive balance of revenues over the costs of ONEA - doubts were  
raised by the report on “African Water Utilities: Regional Comparative Utility Creditworthiness 
Assessment”, commissioned by the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP 2008). 
 
This WSP-commissioned report applauds the “substantial” turn-around in financial management 
which ONEA has achieved, through “strong leadership”, whilst at the same time commenting on 
ONEA‟s debt serviceability (coverage of interest payments) in 2006/07 which it notes is negative, as 
well as ONEA‟s gearing (debt relative to earnings before interest, tax and depreciation) which, it 
notes, is high. The issue of debt service is also referred to in the PAD for the new project. One of the 
„Critical Risks‟ (World Bank 2009b, page 14) is that:- 
 
“The financial equilibrium that was achieved in 2006 may be jeopardized by the increasing 
debt service requirements and to a lesser extent by the payment arrears from public [sector] 
customers”.  
 
In the course of 2011, the first repayment of capital under the loan element of the IDA funding to the 
ZIGA project will presumably become due (due to expiry of the 10 year grace period). This is a 
question mark relating to the consistency of the financial and social goals of the new project, as 
designed. 
 
What is striking, as compared with the attention to ONEA‟s financial model in the 2009 PAD, is that, 
there is no comparable attention in that document to a social „model‟. As noted above, the section on 
„Social‟ aspects is short and a gap exists in terms of analysis by ONEA of the distribution or income 
levels of the poor. The ICEA/SOGREAH study carried out in 2007 (ICEA/SOGREAH, 2008) 
provided information on income levels and the „socio-economic profile‟ of a sample of urban 
households (as described in section 3.3.2.1), but ONEA did not make use of these data to design a 
strategy to target low-income customers. As seen in section 3.3.2.1, the grant element of the funding 
for the new project does not appear to be destined for a particular category of households.  
 
Who, then, is assuming responsibility for ensuring that poor populations receive services? It has 
been seen that ONEA‟s contract with the MAHRH does not include a relevant performance indicator. 
Nor do the KPIs of the new IDA-supported project. The prevailing impression is that the focus of the 
new project is to increase the number of connections86 and the surrounding areas are seen as 
comprising a source of new clients of the utility irrespective of differing levels of income - rather than 
(or more than) a focus on provision of affordable services for a large number of poor water users. 
Where the subsidy to household connection benefits relatively wealthy customers, ONEA is 
missing out on revenue. 
 
The priority under the new project seems to be that ONEA stays a well-performing utility: while this 
is a necessary condition of sustainable UWSS services to surrounding areas of Ouagadougou, for 
inclusion of poor areas/households within affordable and sustainable service improvements it is not a 
sufficient condition.   
 
                                                 
86 World Bank, 2009b, page 1: in Ouagadougou, “only 50 percent of the total urban population has access to water 
services through household connections, compared to 61 percent in C6te d‟Ivoire and 76 percent in Senegal”.                       
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3.6 The significance of IDA support - to the projects in Burkina 
We have seen, in section 3.3.2, that the „inclusion gap‟ begins with the GoB: despite its own 
statements of principles relating to equity and “target groups” set out in national policy, based on law 
(as described in section 3.2. of the present report), the national planning and programming relating to 
UWSS does not specify the means by which low-income areas and households are to be targeted or 
establish the parameters within which ONEA is to develop a strategy to accomplish that.  
Further, a key finding of the analysis above is that involvement of World Bank did not take effect to 
address that design issue, at least not so as to remedy the design flaw which exists in the two UWSS 
projects assessed by this research project. As discussed in section 1.6, either, then, the World Bank 
personnel who worked with (in this case) the GoB on design of the projects: (a) did not see the 
inclusion gap; or (b) did not consider it was a flaw in design; or (c) saw the gap and tried to remedy it, 
but were not able to do so.    
 
As for determining which of the above scenarios applied, the researchers were not privy to 
discussions between the GoB and the World Bank. Civil servants and Bank staff supplied information 
to this study, without generally making comments on the conduct of recent meetings and other 
exchanges between the Bank and GoB. As noted in section 1.6, without published information on the 
tenor of project design discussions, any debate which occurred on inclusion issues - among team 
members and with the GoB - including any differences of view, is not visible. The PAD records the 
position arrived at the conclusion of any such debate.  
 
It is, nevertheless, clear from the written comments of the World Bank on the preliminary (July 2010) 
draft of this report that the Bank did not consider the lack of a strategy for targeting of low-income 
areas/households to be a design flaw: the view taken by Bank staff was that all the residents of the 
districts outside the centre of Ouagadougou were poor, so that there was no need to make specific 
provision for pro-poor targeting. In the written comments, it is stated that:-    
 
“Pro-poor obligations are not required, as the entire population in the service territory is 
poor”. The “overall setting of the project” is that “Burkina is a low income country with 
about 60% of its population living below the poverty level. In urban towns, most of the poor 
live in peri-urban areas in difficult social conditions including the lack of access to 
improved water supply and sanitation services”.  
  
This suggestion that poverty exists in the „service territory‟ of the project in a homogeneous 
form is surprising and misleading. The mapping exercise described in section 3.4.2.1 clearly 
shows that it is possible to identify levels of relative wealth and poverty, district by district, in 
Ouagadougou, using existing data (from the 2006 census) and this is echoed by ICEA/SOGREAH 
in its 2008 report. Despite the extent of poverty in Burkina as a low-income country, it is not true 
- or at least not analytically useful - to say that the entire population of the peri-urban areas in 
sectors 14-30 of Ouagadougou (the service territory referred to in the above quote from the 
Bank‟s written comments) is „poor‟.  Those seventeen sectors cover a large part of the territory 
occupied by Ouagadougou, as the maps in Annex 5 and 7 to the present report indicate (if those maps 
are to scale, then more than half the geographical extension of the city). A substantial part of east 
Ouagadougou, for example, is very poor; at the same time, not all districts beyond the central area are 
poor: two surrounding districts (sectors 18 and 24) are relatively well-off, and two other outlying 
areas (sectors 21 and 14) are in the intermediate category, while the remaining thirteen districts which 
received standpipes are poor or very poor - all as shown in the different colours on the map in Annex 
5. 
  
  
 
 
 
The outcome of the sweeping characterisation by ONEA that the service territory of the  
Ouagadougou  project was, in some way, uniformly poor - a view which was evidently not challenged 
by the World Bank - is very unsatisfactory. Based on the design of the new project as set out in the 
2009 PAD, a key lesson of the ZIGA project has not been learnt. The focus of the new project, 2009-
2015, is to increase the number of connections, and the surrounding areas are seen as comprising a 
source of new clients of the utility irrespective of differing levels of income - rather than (or more 
than) a focus on provision of affordable services for low-income households. Like the ZIGA project, 
the design of the new project assessed by this research study is skewed towards financial objectives, 
to the detriment of social aspects. The challenge of finding a balance between the goals of utility 
performance and „inclusion‟ is skated over, as opposed to being elaborated, in the PAD. And, the 
PAD incorporates in its text the inconsistency that a social goal which is stated to be a “primary” goal 
of the project (World Bank 2009b, p.20) is not reflected in the key performance indicators in the 
Results Framework (ibid, pages 37-38).  
 
The question arises how the social goal of the new project will be monitored, without disaggregated 
figures specified in the Results Framework? The implications of this have been seen in the evaluation 
of the ZIGA project in June 2008: after a similar omission from the KPIs of the ZIGA project, no 
assessment was conducted of how households of differing socio-economic status benefitted. Will the 
ICR of the new project, following its completion in 2015, include an un-quantified assertion of the 
kind seen in the ICR for the ZIGA project („mostly‟ in paragraph 3.5)? It seems it will, unless 
concerted action is taken by the GoB and the Bank during the course of the new project.    
As discussed in section 3.3.2.1, a key issue is how to deliver subsidies close to the people who need 
them - given that it is reasonable, and desirable, to subsidise UWSS (in order to ensure water supply, 
and sanitation, to low-income households, and because of externalities affecting the city as a whole, 
such as threats to public health. Under the new project, the World Bank is making the funds for the 
new project available to the GoB as a grant, and (according to the PAD) the IDA funds are to be on-
granted as well as on-lent to ONEA, which means that IDA funds are available to finance subsidies 
for water and sanitation users. The 2009 PAD does envisage subsidies for the water (and sanitation) 
component (like that for the ZIGA project), but those subsidies are not targeted to a particular 
category of water or sanitation users (as far as is indicated by the information supplied to the 
researchers). An opportunity has been missed by GoB and Bank staff to direct IDA grant monies to 
financing the standpipe part of ONEA‟s customer portfolio which is lower revenue-earning. 
 
As for the stance adopted by the World Bank in relation to the social policy of ONEA, the written 
comments of the Bank to the earlier draft of this report state (on page 1):  
 
“The social connections and standpipes programs introduced in Burkina Faso under the 
[ZIGA project] is a well known practice in the sub-region (Cote d‟Ivoire, Senegal and 
recently in Niger) to facilitate access to piped water to poor populations in peri-urban areas. 
Burkina Faso decided to replicate this experience which demonstrated that providing low-
cost connections was critical for extending direct and affordable access to piped water by 
low-income families.  
 
Bank staff appeared to be satisfied with ONEA‟s social policy on the basis that it is similar to that 
which had been adopted in other West African countries such as Senegal and Côte d‟Ivoire, without 
considering how this model might be further developed and refined. Yet, as noted in section 3.5.2, 
the potential of geographical targeting using a “poverty ranking of urban neighbourhoods” in 
Dakar, was explored in the water sector project in Senegal which was completed in 2009 (see Box 
3.8).   
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3.6 Conclusion and recommendations - arising from the Burkina case study 
3.6.1  Conclusions 
 The laws and policies in Burkina relating to urban water and sanitation (UWSS) include 
recognition of equity as a guiding principle in relation to water supply, and refer to poor 
populations as a target of sanitation services. In those documents, however, no strategy for 
achieving equitable inclusion of poor areas or households is stated, or process envisaged for 
creating one. 
 
 The plans of ONEA, the UWSS utility in Burkina Faso, include activities to extend water and 
sanitation services to areas of Ouagadougou surrounding the city centre, but those plans do not 
include articulation of a targeting strategy, with a defined set of criteria for targeting of low-
income areas/households. Currently, ONEA is capable of characterising the socio-economic 
characteristics of these surrounding areas (seventeen districts of the city in „sectors‟ 14-30) in a 
„broad brush‟ and unsystematic manner only. 
 
 The sweeping characterisation that the population of the „service territory‟ of the ZIGA project 
was uniformly poor was not challenged by the World Bank (as discussed in section 3.6). 
 
 The project appraisal documents setting out the design of the two projects studied, namely the 
„ZIGA‟ project (2001-2007) and the new project approved in 2009, state the intent to include 
low-income households. They do not, however, fix this aim in the key performance indicators of 
the projects. According to the PAD of the new project, the „primary goal‟ of the project is to 
improve access in “poor fringe areas” of Ouagadougou and the project will “seek to reduce the 
access bias between formal and informal areas”. But that primary goal is not reflected in the 
project KPIs. 
 
 The evaluation of the ZIGA project in June 2008 (as recorded in the Implementation Completion 
and Results Report of the World Bank) noted that the key indicators for that project which 
related to utility performance, including financial aspects, were “relevant, unambiguous, 
quantifiable and measurable” (World Bank, 2008, page 8). As discussed in section 3.3.1 of the 
present report (and evident from Box 3.3 which reproduced the „ZIGA‟ KPIs), in relation to 
social aspects of the project, the same cannot be said of the ZIGA KPIs. 
 
 ONEA‟s stated intention of implementing a „social‟ policy was not realised by the ZIGA project, 
or at least not demonstrably realised because there was no disaggregated information available 
and utilised - equity may have be done, but it was not done transparently - and in some 
areas/sectors, it seems (subject to ONEA‟s explanations in each case) that equity was not done 
(e.g. the sectors which received less than 10 standpipes in 2003-2009, namely sector 15 (poor), 
20 (poor), 26 (poor), 28 (very poor) and 29 (very poor). 
 
 The improved water services provided by ONEA under the ZIGA project until 2007 and, later, 
up to 2009, benefited hundreds of thousands of people, affording them improved access - a 
significant achievement - and thereby contributing towards the MDG water target. But the lack 
of disaggregated information means that ONEA is unable to show clearly how its objective of 
providing improved services to low-income households has been fulfilled - nor is it able to report 
on the extent to which there are errors of inclusion of relatively wealthy areas/ households within 
its existing social policy. 
 
  
 
 
 
 Until this equity gap is addressed, it risks undermining MAHRH‟s and ONEA‟s record of 
substantial performance in tackling the challenge of extending improved water services to peri-
urban areas of Ouagadougou, both urbanised and un-urbanised. 
 
 Information on poverty levels in Ouagadougou, from the 2006 census, has been applied by this 
research study to carry out a preliminary mapping exercise (discussed in section 3.4.2.1) to 
review the locations of extension of water infrastructure, and particularly standpipes, to 
surrounding areas of Ouagadougou. That has yielded a first water poverty map which suggests 
that extension of standpipes to surrounding areas of Ouagadougou exhibits „patchy‟ inclusion of 
poor areas in the city. 
 
 To-date, ONEAs‟ approach to reaching poor households is by reductions in the price of 
household connection, plus a subsidy to improved latrine construction - and the „social tranche‟ 
of the water tariff. 
 
 Responses from the focus group discussions conducted by this study suggest (at least in the five 
peri-urban areas where this study carried out FGDs87) that the cost of connection is too high for 
low-income households in poor areas even allowing for the substantial reductions in price 
offered by ONEA (at least in those areas where conditions are equivalent to those five areas). 
 
 The design of the new project favours (private) household connection over (public) standpipes 
(at a ratio of 14:1). Whilst alternative means of making available connections are being tested, 
and until they are proven (simplified networks and local neighbourhood operators), the 
populations in those five peri-urban areas88 will continue to demand access from functioning 
standpipes, sited within their nearby areas. 
 
 ONEA has supplied information to this research study recording the substantial increase in 
household connections after the reduction of the price of connection below FCFA 50,000; a key 
question, however, is which type of households have constituted the new connected clientele of 
ONEA (including remaining connected). 
 
 In the design of both projects studied by this research study, the overall impression is that the 
engineering/infrastructure perspectives and utility capacity-strengthening have prevailed over the 
social. ONEA‟s efforts are, it seems, principally motivated by maximisation of household 
connections, irrespective of for whom - the key question is for whom has the progress in laying 
out water infrastructure (undeniably achieved by the ZIGA project) been afforded? 
 
 The project design has effectively resolved tension between the utility capacity-building 
objectives, including „financial equilibrium‟ of ONEA, on the one hand, and the social objectives 
of the projects on the other hand by making the social aspirations (inclusion) subordinate to the 
former objective - the system of subsidy as currently designed in its universal application is too 
blunt an instrument of social policy. 
 
 As noted in section 3.6, a key issue is how to deliver subsidies to the water users who need them 
it. A system of targeting households of different income/socio-economic categories (at least two) 
with different connection prices would be more geared to equity. An opportunity has also been 
missed to direct IDA grant monies to financing the lower revenue-earning, standpipe part of 
ONEA‟s customer portfolio. 
                                                 
87 As noted in section 3.4.2.2, these five areas were three urbanised districts (quartiers lotis) - Yamtenga, Bissighin and 
Toukin - and two un-urbanised areas (quartiers non-lotis) - Nioko 2 and Tabtenga. 
88 Yamtenga, Bissighin, Toukin, Nioko 2 and Tabtenga. 
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 Standpipes have been installed in such areas, or on the outer boundaries of neighbouring 
„urbanised‟ districts. Despite the benefits of connection for households able to bear the cost, as 
well as for ONEA in terms of increasing its connected customer base, the FGDs provide a key 
lesson in terms of Burkina‟s social policy – that of the remaining importance of standpipes in 
peri-urban districts as a medium-term solution to meeting the needs of low-income households. 
 
 As to sanitation, under the new project (the ZIGA project did not fund sanitation) the intention 
is to propose a menu of on-site sanitation options. Sector actors present at the mid-term review 
of this research study questioned whether the level of subsidy to be provided by ONEA for 
construction of improved household latrines would be sufficient for poor households. 
 
 
3.6.2 Recommendations 
 
For the Government of Burkina Faso, and ONEA as UWSS utility:- 
 More attention to levels of affordability of low-income households is needed; it seems that 
ONEA did not make use of the information on the socio-economic profiles of households which 
exists in the report of the study by the international consultants ICEA/SOGREAH 
commissioned by ONEA in 2007, as well as the data in the hands of the National Institute of 
Statistics (INSD).  
 
 The household survey to be carried out in the third year of the new project (as referred to on 
page 38 of the PAD) will need to be formulated by ONEA so as to collect information which 
allows comparison of levels of satisfaction expressed by households of different income levels, 
and so as to specifically question households in the surrounding areas of Ouagadougou (both 
urbanised and un-urbanised areas) as to how the policy of ONEA is operating, in relation to 
connections (including subsidy of the connection price) and standpipes.

 As noted above, the IDA funds are both on-lent and „on-granted‟ to ONEA. While the loan 
element is regarded as an instrument of financial rigour for the utility, the grant element of IDA 
under the new project provides a means to finance subsidies to UWSS. In order to deliver a 
subsidy to the poor households in the surrounding areas of Ouagadougou who need it, one 
option would be for the GoB, via the Ministry of Finance, to compensate ONEA for all (or a 2/3 
proportion) of water sold through standpipes (e.g. the Treasury paying for that water in 
retrospective payments at agreed intervals) 89. This would remedy the current disincentive which 
operates to discourage ONEA from installing standpipes - the number of standpipes to be 
installed under the new project could be reviewed upwards. This compensation system could be 
seen as a transitional measure to help ONEA bridge the gap between the lower-paying, lower 
revenue-earning water economy on the one hand and the connected water economy on the other.
 
 As regards review of the social connection policy, a possibility to explore is a system which 
offers free connection, targeted to households in the (very) poor areas of the city, based on 
poverty mapping, i.e. geographical targeting. Or, alternatively, offering a reduction of the 
connection price to FCFA 10,000 (or even FCFA 5,000) plus a contribution by households in 
kind, since the focus groups indicate that households in both the urbanised and un-urbanised 
                                                 
89 As noted, this would be limited to the grant element of the funds from the IDA. It would be an exception to the 
current principle, interpreted as a rigid rule, that ONEA should be self-sustaining financially - supportive of ONEA‟s 
financial equilibrium.       
  
 
 
 
areas are ready to contribute their labour, and basic materials (such as sand/gravel when these 
can be acquired). Another possible course would be to consider subsidies for purchase of the 
200 litre barrels (barriques), although the implications for the future of water vendors (their 
legitimate livelihoods) would need to be taken carefully into account.  
 
 The possibility of carrying out targeting by household characteristics (proxy means testing) 
may be explored; Box 3.4 in this chapter gives examples of the type of household characteristics 
which could be used to devise a set of criteria for testing as possible proxy indicators for 
identifying wealthy households.  

 In relation to sanitation services, given the widely recognised need to stimulate demand for 
sanitation, communication for behaviour change (referred to in the National Sanitation Strategy, 
page 22) needs to be stepped up by ONEA. The focus groups indicate that information has to-
date not reached surrounding areas, or not consistently (not to the five areas where FGDs have 
been conducted).   
 
For the Government of Burkina, ONEA and the World Bank, in collaboration:-   
 The design of the new project provides (PAD, World Bank 2009b, page 8) for institutional 
support to ONEA including to “review the impact and sustainability of access options proposed 
to households” (e.g. in mid-term surveys). It is recommended that ONEA, with the support of 
MAHRH, engage in open discussion with key sector stakeholders in a process of drawing up - 
with the guidance of the World Bank/WSP - a strategy for targeting of poor areas and 
households, to apply to Ouagadougou and the other urban centres within the scope of the new 
project, articulated in unambiguous, quantifiable and measurable indicators. 
 
 In line with the Accra Agenda, both the World Bank and the GoB should work to strengthen the 
management of results under the new project, through disaggregation of data on water users, 
duly reflected in project monitoring and evaluation. This research study has stimulated a 
dialogue between the University of Ouagadougou and ONEA including with the INSD, based 
on the preliminary mapping exercise, which can usefully be pursued. Such collaborations, as 
part of broader policy communities - beyond just government representatives, Bank 
staff/consultants and ONEA executives - allow access to a broader pool of skills.
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4 Tanzania case study 
 
This section has been written by Josephine Tucker, Research Officer, ODI, Paula Tibandebage 
and Festo Maro,  both of the Economic and Social Research Foundation, Dar es Salaam. It draws 
heavily on the report from Tanzania written by Paula Tibandebage and Festo Maro. 
 
Research for this case study was conducted in Dar es Salaam between September and December 
2009, and involved key informant interviews, focus group discussions with water users, and 
analysis of available documents. In September – November 2011 a rapid follow-up assessment was 
conducted by Festo Maro and Josephine Tucker, using further key informant interviews to (a) 
pursue specific new information provided by the World Bank following review of the original 
report in 2010-11, and (b) provide an update on any important sector developments, such as new 
policies, strategies or pro-poor programmes, which had been adopted since the time of the main 
research. Newly available documents, such as the project Implementation Completion Report, were 
also reviewed through a follow-up desk study.  
 
The follow-up review was limited in scope, however, so unless more recent sources are indicated, 
most findings relate to the situation in 2009.  
 
 
 
Update at December 2011: Inclusion in policy and strategy  
Since the time of the original research there have been no new water policies or strategies issued at 
national or agency level or for serving low-income populations. A new National Sanitation Policy 
has been developed but has not yet been approved by the Cabinet so is not yet publically available; 
it reportedly focuses largely on rural sanitation. However, there have been some developments, and 
some progress has been made on actions which were newly initiated at the time of the original 
study:  
 The pro-poor unit at DAWASCO is now active with three staff members. Its main activity to 
date has been to start an inventory of kiosks across the city in order to understand the need for 
kiosks better. However, the unit‟s activities are said to be constrained by lack of funds; 
 DAWASA has adopted a new pro-poor management system for boreholes and kiosks in non-
networked areas, which centres on the establishment of water committees`. 
 The GIZ-supported baseline study of low-income areas of Dar es Salaam has been completed in 
October 2011, and geo-referenced data is now available for use. 
 The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) is in the final stages of 
developing guidelines for the formalisation of informal water providers, viewed as a temporary 
measure until networked water services improve.  
 DAWASCO is also working on new regulations for supply and distribution by water tankers.  
 
  
 
 
 
4.1  Background and context  
This case study focuses on the Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project (DWSSP), 
supported by the International Development Association (IDA), African Development Bank (AfDB) 
and European Investment Bank (EIB). The project ran from 2003 until November 2010 (following 
several time extensions from the originally programmed end date of  December 2008)  It aimed to 
“provide a reliable, affordable and sustainable water supply service and improve the sewerage and 
sanitation in the “Service Area” of the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA)” 
(Project Appraisal Document, World Bank 2003a, hereafter referred to as the PAD). The principal 
components of the project were rehabilitation of infrastructure and institutional reforms, and it also 
included a number of specific measures intended to benefit poor populations. The institutional 
reforms involved the delegation of water and sewerage operations in Dar es Salaam (DSM) to a 
private operator (CityWater) under a lease-affermage contract. This contract was terminated in 2005 
following failure of the operator to meet its commitments. Since then, water and sewerage operations 
have been leased to the publicly owned Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Corporation 
(DAWASCO) under a similar contract. 
The project has been much publicised as a failed privatisation attempt. Past research has identified a 
number of reasons for the failure of the CityWater contract, including: unrealistic expectations about 
the commercial viability of water operations in DSM by CityWater; poor data on the customer and 
service base in DAWASA; lack of information-sharing and trust among all parties; ineffective 
regulation; failure by government to tackle non-payment of water bills; and failure by donors to 
adequately assess the state of the utility and its suitability for private sector participation (see 
WaterAid Tanzania 2008).  
The present study did not seek to revisit these issues or debate the wisdom of the decision to privatise, 
rather it focused on the specific question of how well the DWSSP has served poor households and the 
success of its „pro-poor‟ components. However, the failure of the contract with CityWater is 
important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it highlights the serious underlying weaknesses in the 
sector when the DWSSP commenced in 2003, and the challenges the project faced in terms of the 
state of infrastructure, low revenue collection, lack of basic information and the low capacity of sector 
institutions. Secondly, as acknowledged in the World Bank‟s own Implementation Completion Report 
(ICR) for the DWSSP (World Bank, 2011c), it indicates a failure in the project design phase to pay 
sufficient attention to these serious risks and an undue optimism about the turnaround that could be 
achieved in the sector under the new institutional arrangement. The knock-on effects of the failure of 
the CityWater contract are still felt in terms of delays in project implementation and an unclear 
institutional relationship between DAWASA and DAWASCO (see section 4.6 including 4.6.2).  
As mentioned above, the DWSSP included components for sewerage and sanitation, but, since  the 
majority of elements targeted to poor populations were for water supply rather than sanitation 
provision, water supply is given more focus in the present study. 
 
4.1.1 City context 
Dar es Salaam is the largest city and the chief industrial and commercial centre of Tanzania. Since 
2000, the city has been administratively divided into three municipalities: Ilala, Kinondoni and 
Temeke). All of these include a mixture of formally and informally developed areas. The population 
of Dar es Salaam has grown rapidly in the last thirty years, =from 843,000 in 1978 (DCC, 2004a) to 
an estimated 2.9 million in 2007 (URT, 2009a), i.e. over three times in as many decades. Available 
socio-economic data at the time of research was sometimes several years old, but reflects the situation 
around the start of the DWSSP in 2003. A summary of this information is given in Box 4.1. 
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4.1.2 Water supply services 
At the time of project initiation, Dar es Salaam‟s piped water supply was from two main sources – the 
upper and lower Ruvu river schemes – as shown in the map in Figure 4.2, and a small surface scheme 
on the Kizinga river [(as marked on the map in Figure 4.1)], with additional supply from over 30 
boreholes. The Lower Ruvu treatment plant supplied 70% of the water in the network. Average water 
production at the time of the study was about 260,000m
3
/day and fell far short of demand, which was 
estimated at  450,000m
3
/day in 2007 (DAWASA, 2009b). Water rationing was therefore standard 
practice, services were intermittent, and pipes in some areas were completely dry at the time of the 
present research. Even those with a network connection were thus not receiving adequate service (see 
below).  
 
According to DAWASA (2009b) water supply coverage of its service area (which includes the city of 
Dar es Salaam, Kibaha and Bagamoyo towns in the Coast region, and settlements within a corridor of 
5km either side of the two transmission mains of Upper and Lower Ruvu - see Figure 4.2) is about 
85%, of which only 78% currently receive water and only 58% have reliable and regular water 
supply. Most of these households receive water for less than six hours a day. The figures include 45% 
of households which do not have their own connection, but buy re-sold DAWASA water from 
neighbours, tanker trucks or vendors. 
Box 4.1 Socio-economic data for Dar es Salaam, 2000 – 2007 
National data show that in 2000/01 the incidence of basic needs poverty in Dar es Salaam was 17.6% 
(URT, 2002a). In 2007 it decreased slightly to 16.4%, however, due to population growth, the number 
of people living in poverty in fact rose from around 325,000 in 2000/01 to around 474,000 in 2007 
(URT, 2009a). Of the three municipalities, Temeke in the south-east has the highest poverty incidence 
at around 28% (URT, 2005a).  
In 2002, an estimated 70% of Dar es Salaam‟s residents and the majority of low-income households 
lived in unplanned areas, which are typically congested and underserved with basic infrastructure 
(World Bank 2002). However, unplanned areas are also occupied by middle-income households and 
are considered by many to be „mixed-wealth communities‟. 
According to the 2004/5 Demographic and Health Survey, of the approximately 200,000 households 
living in Temeke, 195,000 relied on traditional pit latrines for sanitation, 139,000 had no electricity, 
almost 80,000 had homes made of mud or sun-dried brick, and less than 50,000 had more than two 
sleeping rooms. The average household size was just over four people (URT, 2005a).  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: DAWASA Service Area 
Source: image provided by DAWASA 
 
In 2008, DAWASCO had only 140,000 connections on its books for a population of around 3.5 
million in the service area (DAWASCO, 2008). Many households in DSM accessed water from their 
neighbours‟ household or yard connections, from drilled private boreholes, from public kiosks and 
from vendors of various kinds; according to the World Bank, in 2006 9.9% of the population of DSM 
relied on buying water from vendors (World Bank, 2011c). 
At national level, the 2007 Household Budget Survey showed that 63% of the wealthiest quintile had 
access to water, compared with 42% of the poorest. Furthermore, while the wealthiest quintile spent 
3.0% of their income on water, the poorest quintile spent 9.8% (URT 2009b). 
 
4.1.3 Sanitation 
Few of Dar es Salaam‟s residents (7% of the population) were connected to the sewer network with 
the remainder relying on septic tanks or, in the majority, pit latrines (DAWASA 2009b). As noted 
above, the focus of this study is on water supply.  
 
4.1.4 Institutional arrangements in the water sector 
The water policy and institutional framework in Tanzania was reformed during the 1990s. 
Responsibility for service provision was devolved to lower levels, and space opened up for private 
sector participation, while the role of central government changed from that of sole investor, regulator 
and service provider to policy maker, facilitator of investment, and regulator. Service provision in 
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urban areas is the responsibility of Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Authorities (UWSAs) which 
are supposed to work on a cost recovery basis as far as possible, or move in that direction. 
At the national level, the Ministry of Water (MoW), previously the Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation (MoWI) sets the overall policy direction and monitors services. Through its Urban Water 
Supply and Sewerage Services Division, the Ministry is responsible for overseeing and supporting the 
activities of the UWSAs. It holds a development contract with DAWASA for services in Dar es 
Salaam. 
DAWASA, established in 1997, owns and is responsible for investment in water and sewerage 
infrastructure in the DAWASA service area. This area includes the city of DSM, two townships in the 
nearby Coast region, and corridors along the two main transmission lines from the Upper and Lower 
Ruvu Water Works (see Figure 4.1). According to its Development Contract with the MoWI, 
DAWASA is supposed to finance its own operating costs and debt servicing, and also contribute to 
the capital costs of infrastructure construction. Within DAWASA a Community Liaison Unit was 
established under the DWSSP, to manage non-networked services to peri-urban communities under 
the Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (see below). 
DAWASCO is in charge of all water and sewerage operations, including installing new connections, 
but not investment, under a lease agreement with DAWASA. According to the terms of its lease, 
DAWASCO pays DAWASA a monthly rental fee and a portion of the revenue from every unit of 
water sold (the “lessor tariff”), and retains a further portion to finance its own operations (“the 
operator tariff”). An Informal Settlements Department had just been established within DAWASCO at 
the time of research. Its role was not yet clear in 2009, and its capacity seemed to be limited, but it has 
since begun to review certain pro-poor strategies (see section 4.6.3 for more details).  
Urban water supply and sewerage is regulated by the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory 
Authority (EWURA). EWURA was set up in 2002 with a vision of “quality, affordable and 
sustainable energy and water services for all”. EWURA is responsible for technical and economic 
regulation including reviewing and setting tariffs, which includes public consultation. As of 2008, 
EWURA was regulating 124 UWSAs across the country. 
 
4.1.5 Donor support in the sector 
The World Bank is one of the main donors in the water sector in Tanzania, and provides support to 
the sector under the Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP) Basket Fund, under a Sector 
Wide Approach (SWAp) which was established in 2006, as well as a number of standalone projects. 
As the single largest donor supporting the WSDP and a major player in its design, the World Bank is 
an important actor in the sector. 
4.2 Inclusion in policies and strategies 
The National Water Policy (NAWAPO) characterises access to water and sanitation as a right: “water 
and sanitation are critical components of development, thus access to UWSS [urban water supply and 
sanitation] is a right of every Tanzanian” (URT 2002b).  
UWSS entities are to ensure that “appropriate social equity considerations are made and a basic 
level of water supply and sanitation services is provided to the poor at affordable cost” (ibid, p.40).  
One of the stated goals of the policy is “To improve water and sanitation in low income and peri-
urban areas” and, to achieve this it is stated that, among other provisions, “low-income groups will 
be identified and plans and programmes to provide water supply and sewerage services to peri urban 
[areas] shall be drawn by utilities” (ibid, p.44). Other measures recommended to improve access to 
  
 
 
 
services by urban low-income households include: awareness-raising on safe water use in peri-urban 
areas; use of small bore and shallow sewerage systems in peri-urban areas; the negotiation of pro-poor 
dimensions in any public-private partnerships; and encouragement of NGOs and CBOs to engage in 
service provision in low income areas; and more affordable sewerage and water connections.  
The policy requires “full cost recovery” from utilities but gives no specific guidance on how to 
achieve this goal while simultaneously providing low cost services to the urban poor (for example 
providing “more affordable” connections). There is no discussion of possibilities for cross-subsidy, 
for example. Full cost recovery is not defined in the policy (the implication is that it should cover 
operations, maintenance and upgrading of infrastructure, but it is unclear whether capital investment 
costs are also included). In the case of DAWASA, as mentioned above, the performance contract 
specifies that it is should finance its own operations and debt servicing and contribute to the capital 
costs of infrastructure. 
The 2005-15 National Water Sector Development Strategy (URT 2006), in a similar vein, states that 
“Low-income groups will be identified and provided with appropriate water supply and sanitation 
services. However, these groups will be expected to contribute to the cost of the provision of these 
services in line with their ability to pay” (ibid, p.50), i.e. not free, but affordable water. The steps 
required of utilities are slightly more detailed than those in the NAWAPO:- 
 “establish criteria to define low income groups; 
 promote the use of appropriate and cost-effective solutions to the provision of water supply and 
sanitation services in the relevant areas, including promotion of the protection of traditional 
sources; 
 determine affordability criteria in order to establish subsidy requirements and 
mechanisms”(ibid, p.50) 
But, again, no guidance is given in this strategy document on what the criteria should be, on  how to 
assess affordability, or on suitable strategies for achieving both commercial and social goals. These 
are left to utilities to determine, though the strategy notes that in the past “improving the services to 
low income earners has been constrained by difficulties in defining and identifying low income 
groups” (ibid, p.50).  
During interviews with informants from the MoWI, it was explained that all water authorities were 
supposed to work with local leaders to identify low-income households, and are required to ensure 
that those households identified as poor receive eight buckets of 20 litres of water per day for free 90. 
However no mention of this policy was found in the policy or strategy documents described above. 
There are said to be around 2,000 beneficiaries so far, but none yet in DSM; it is not clear how this 
would be organised in such a large city. No further details were made available to the researchers of 
any guidelines in place to support UWSAs in reaching poor populations.  
Looking beyond sector policies, at the time of project implementation the 2005 – 2010 National 
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) in place at the time of research (the second-
generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, also known by its Kiswahili acronym MKUKUTA) 
identified the urban poor as a priority group for targeted interventions to reduce poverty and promote 
social well-being, including access to basic services (URT 2005b). One of its operational targets was 
to achieve 90% water coverage by 2009/10, with strategies proposed to achieve this including: a 
lifeline tariff for vulnerable households; rights awareness programmes; and monitoring of water 
supply organisations on, among other things, approaches to supplying water to vulnerable people. The 
                                                 
90 At the time of the present research this free water service had not been applied in Dar - it did not feature in design of 
the DWSSP.   
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third-generation PRSP (MKUKUTA II) was issued in 2010. This sets out a revised target to increase 
urban water coverage from 84% in 2010 to 95% in 2015. For DSM, it notes that access remained at 
68% from 2005 to 2010, as population grew at a rate of 8% per year and bulk water supply did not 
increase sufficiently to meet demand. A target of 75% access by 2015 is set for DSM, and strategies 
to achieve this focus on increasing bulk water supply and reducing losses from the network. In 
comparison with MKUKUTA I, MKUKTA II does not propose specific measures for the water sector 
to ensure access for low-income populations, but does set out a target for public services and 
infrastructure in general to introduce „mechanisms for targeting the poor and vulnerable groups‟, and 
to „cover 65% of the poor and vulnerable groups currently excluded from public service delivery‟ 
(URT, 2010, p.87). 
In summary, both national and sector policies at the time of research treated access to adequate and 
affordable water supply as a right. They recognise that the urban poor are a priority group for 
interventions and show an understanding of the serious impact of a lack of services on their lives and 
livelihoods. A strategy for inclusion is outlined (but not elaborated) in terms of the need to identify 
poor populations, assess affordability, and target low cost services and subsidies accordingly. 
However, the design and implementation of these assessments, and the subsequent development of 
appropriate strategies for serving low-income households, are left entirely to utilities. For the 
principles expressed to be converted into practice, they would need to be developed in more detail in 
the governing documents and plans of the utilities.  
DAWASA‟s draft 2009-2012 Rolling Plan sets out its mission: “To provide timely and appropriate 
investments and strategic support and guidance to [the] Operator in an efficient and cost effective 
manner for the provision of affordable, reliable and sustainable water supply and sewerage services” 
(DAWASA 2009b). “Equity in provision of services” is listed as a core value of DAWASA, while 
one of eight corporate goals is to “ensure that services are provided to all categories of the 
population”. However, there is no elaboration in this document of how low income groups are to be 
targeted.  DAWASCO‟s stated mission is „to provide quality and affordable water and sewerage 
services exceeding customers [sic] expectations through well motivated staffs‟ (DAWASCO website, 
accessed February 2012, emphasis added), but its lease contract is focused on general service 
standards and lacks specific pro-poor commitments (see below).  
Furthermore, although regulation is supposed to specifically assess the provision of water to 
vulnerable groups according to the NSGRP, an informant at EWURA reported that they do not 
currently collect disaggregated information on services to poor populations. They only collect the 
number receiving the eight free buckets. It appears that utilities are not being given either strong 
regulatory incentives or strategic support from government to improve services for low-income 
households. (Comments received from the World Bank referred to the existence of „UWSS 
guidelines‟, however these could not be accessed and their status and content remain unclear‟.)  
 
4.3  Inclusion in the design and implementation of the DWSSP 
4.3.1 Project aims and components 
The principal goal of the DWSSP, as stated in the PAD, was to “provide a reliable, affordable and 
sustainable water supply service”. The project‟s major components were rehabilitation of 
infrastructure and institutional reform, both intended to improve the quality, reliability and 
sustainability of services. Table 4.1 shows the project components and (indicative) budget.  
These include, among others, a set of stated measures aimed at providing more affordable water to 
low-income households: 
  
 
 
 
 a low-cost “lifeline” volume of water for domestic networked customers; 
 free connections for low-income households, financed by a levy on water bills; 
 construction of water kiosks, for those in networked areas without a connection (part of 
Component 1); 
 standalone community-managed schemes in areas far from the network (Component 3, the 
Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme). 
 
The CWSSP was, as the name suggested, intended to provide both water and sanitation facilities in 
non-networked areas. However, according to DAWASA staff very few of the communities 
expressed a demand for sanitation services, and in practice the investments have been almost 
entirely in water supply. The main sanitation component of the DWSSP centred on rehabilitation 
and extension of sewerage, which did not involve explicit pro-poor goals. Furthermore, at the time 
of the research it was reported that implementation of the sewerage component was lagging behind 
implementation of the water components of the project. For these reasons, this assessment has 
focused largely on water supply rather than sanitation. 
 
Table 4.1 Project Components and Indicative Costs (US$ million)  
Component (with contingencies) Source of 
finance 
Indicative 
Costs 
% of 
total 
1. Rehabilitation and Extension of Water Supply 
This was to involve rehabilitation of production facilities, rehabilitation of 
transmission mains and services, rehabilitation of primary distribution mains, and 
rehabilitation of secondary and tertiary distribution mains.   
ADB, IDA, 
EIB 
106.05 64 
2. Rehabilitation and Extension of Sewerage and Waste Water 
This component was to involve rehabilitation of existing sewers and construction 
of new ones, rehabilitation of waste water pumping stations, stabilisation plants, 
and an existing ocean outfall. 
EIB, AFDB 22.40 13.60 
3. Community Water Supply and Sanitation 
This was to involve the support in terms of grants by DAWASA to 50 beneficiary 
communities for water projects based on point source or bulk supply from the 
main network. The objective is to provide a minimum service to low income 
communities that may not immediately be served by piped water network. The 
project was also to support on-site sanitation facilities. DAWASA was to 
implement this component with assistance of specialized NGOs in supporting 
communities in formulating grant requests, implementing WSS projects and 
building capacity for post construction management. 
AFDB, IDA 3.85 2.30 
4. Institutional Strengthening 
The institutional strengthening program: This was to includes (a) an assistance to 
the Operator to help finance its initial operating costs; (b) technical assistance to 
DAWASA: engineering, financial, legal, assets revaluation, audits, 
communication, environmental monitoring, independent assessments of the 
institutional framework and activities aimed at the prevention of HIV/AIDS; (c) 
training of DAWASA and MoWI staff, (d) operational equipment and repairs of 
emergency nature to be financed by DAWASA under the Lease Contract; and (e) 
technical assistance to the Wami/Ruvu Basin Office. DAWASA was to 
implement all components; MoWI was to supervise component (e). 
IDA 25.00 15.20 
5. Preparation of a Medium Term WSS development program 
This component was to support a series of studies aimed at preparing the medium 
term capital works programme. 
IDA 6.15 3.70 
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Total Project Costs 
Refinancing of Project Preparation Fund 
 163.45 
1.15 
 
0.70 
Total Financing Required  164.60 100 
                           Source: World Bank (2003a) DWSSP Project Appraisal Document 
 
The total approved cost of the project was US$ 164.6 million, with IDA as the largest donor 
contributing US$ 61.5 million. Table 4.1 below shows the breakdown of costs of the different 
components as set out in the PAD. It is not possible to determine exactly the amount to be spent on 
the pro-poor initiatives, as some of them form part of much larger components. However, 
Component 3 for Community Water Supply and Sanitation (CWSSP), was probably the most 
significant (in monetary terms) of the pro-poor components due to the infrastructure construction 
involved although it only was to receive 2.3% of the total project budget. Investments in network 
rehabilitation and institutional strengthening (which included the preparation for privatisation) are 
the core project activities, between them receiving almost 95% of the budget. Investment in 
increasing bulk water supply and reducing losses was urgently needed to improve supply for the 
whole city, in order to meet existing demand and extend access, and so was a necessary, though not 
sufficient, investment in terms of ensuring better access to services for the city‟s poor residents. The 
institutional strengthening programme was intended to improve operational performance, efficiency 
and revenue collection from a low base. 
 
 
4.3.2 Financial arrangements 
Financing from IDA was disbursed to the Ministry of Finance of the Government of Tanzania (GoT) 
on a concessional lending basis91, and in turn to DAWASA, who were the designated Implementing 
Agency responsible for project implementation. Finance for consulting services and for 60% of the 
infrastructure components was provided by GoT to DAWASA on a grant basis (totally US$ 40 
million), and the remaining 40% of infrastructure financing was in the form of an on-loan from GoT 
to DAWASA (US$21.5 million). (PAD, World Bank 2003a: P.10). IDA funds were to be on-lent in 
local currency with a 15 year term, a 5 year grace period and an interest rate of 11.5% (PAD, World 
Bank, 2003a). According to World Bank staff interviewed, the basis of the split between on-lending 
and on-granting was that finance for activities which were not expected to generate income for 
DAWASA (technical assistance, investments in sanitation and the CWSSP) was on-granted, while 
finance for investment in networked water supply, which was expected to generate revenue, was on-
lent.  
An on-loan of US$ 5.5million of IDA funds was also made from DAWASA to CityWater, to finance 
its start-up costs, to be repaid over 15 years at a rate of 11.5%, with a 5-year grace period (the same 
conditions as for the on-lending from GoT to DAWASA). This loan is unlikely to be recovered from 
the now-bankrupt CityWater, partly because – as noted in the the project ICR - a performance 
guarantee from its parent company was not included in the final agreement, in spite of the high-risk 
context and initial recommendations from both DAWASA‟s financial advisor and the World Bank 
team which reviewed the bid, that such a guarantee should be put in place (World Bank, 2011c). The 
decision to on-lend a portion of the finance reflects the priority given to cost recovery in national 
policies and DAWASA‟s development contract. According to World Bank informants, the conditions 
                                                 
91 On standard IDA terms: 40 year term with a 10 year grace period (it has not been possible for the researchers to 
ascertain what concessionary interest rate applied).  
  
 
 
 
of on-lending were assessed to ensure that it would not unduly affect the financial situation of the 
utility or drive tariffs up to unaffordable levels. On-lending terms were set at the start of the project 
based on projections of the financial performance of CityWater and DAWASA, and “set at levels 
deemed affordable by the Customer Tariff as specified in the Development Contract” (Project 
Information Document, World Bank, 2003b). 
According to these projections, as documented in the PAD, collection efficiency (% value of billed 
issued which is paid by customers) was expected to reach 90% by Year 5, increases in billing rates 
(the proportion of water supplied which is billed) were expected, and the number of household water 
connections was expected to rise from 92,000 in 2004 to 146,000 in 2009. Together with reducing 
losses in transmission and distribution, this was expected to enable cash flow from operations for 
DAWASA to increase more than four-fold from around 1bn Tsh in 2004 to over 4 bn Tsh in 2009. 
Overall, in or around 2013, DAWASA was expected to become profitable. The PAD repeatedly 
underscores the importance of the capital investment programme being delivered on schedule to the 
achievement of these projections (see World Bank 2003a, p.41-47). 
It will be seen below that these projections proved vastly too optimistic, for various reasons, with the 
result that DAWASA will be unable to meet its debt repayment obligations to the GoT in the 
foreseeable future (see further in section 4.7.2). 
 
4.3.3 Social and affordability analysis in the project design 
The “Summary Project Analysis” chapter of the PAD describes the process which informed project 
design. This includes an analysis of “key social issues relevant to the project objectives” (ibid, p.16-
17). The depth of this review is limited, and there is a considerable gap in terms of any analysis of the 
distribution or income levels of poor households, appropriate targeting methods, or of how the 
project‟s resources could be best deployed to serve the maximum number of poor households across 
the city.  
A basic affordability analysis was conducted, which is set out in Annex 4 (ibid, p..33-34), but its 
conclusions raise some concerns. It observes that households reliant on vendors were spending 2-4% 
of their income on water, which could be reduced to 1.3% if they took up a household connection and 
did not change their consumption level. If, however, they were to use the full 5m
3
 per month available 
at the lifeline tariff (termed “lifeline” because this is considered a minimum volume), it is noted that 
they would still spend 3.4% of their income on water, because consumption from vendors is assumed 
to be very low.  
The analysis is contradictory in its discussion of kiosks and standposts. At one point, these are 
presented as a means to improve affordability (ibid, p.2) but elsewhere in the PAD (ibid, p.34) it is 
stated that charges from kiosks will be higher than those of piped water because of the need to cover 
the costs of the caretaker. For this reason, the PAD notes that “a low income household will have an 
interest in requesting an individual connection” (ibid, p.34). Indeed, from the start the PAD notes that 
a “commercial policy that will favor connections of households” will be implemented (ibid, p.2). 
There is no analysis of the affordability of the deposit payable for a free connection subsidy which, at 
TSh 20,000, is equivalent to almost half the minimum urban monthly wage of TSh 48,000. There is 
no affordability analysis at all in relation to the CWSSP.  
This cursory review of affordability, taking up one paragraph, is in contrast to the detailed financial 
analysis and forecasting which was undertaken and which occupies an annex of eight pages. Greater 
priority seems to have been given to ensuring that the project would be a success in terms of financial 
balance and utility performance than to ensuring that its social objectives would be achieved. 
It is possible that analysis was conducted which is not captured in the PAD, but no details of other 
social analysis conducted during the design phase (either collection of new data or analysis of existing 
data from national surveys, census data or similar) e were made available to the researchers. 
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The rationale for the set of pro-poor components was described by World Bank staff as an attempt to 
do something for four broad „segments‟ of low-income populations: those already connected (lifeline 
tariff); those seeking a household connection and living in networked areas but for whom connection 
was prohibitively expensive (subsidised connections); those living in networked areas but unable or 
unwilling to obtain a household connection (kiosks); and those living outside the networked area 
(CWSSP). However, it is not clear what data, if any, was used to assess the priorities, needs, existing 
modes of access or willingness/ability to pay of these different groups, other than in the analysis 
described above. 
4.3.4 Project monitoring and evaluation 
The PAD sets out performance indicators by which the project will be monitored and evaluated. The 
DWSSP has 5 performance indicators for outcomes/impact and 31 for outputs, of which the key 
performance indicators are shown in Box 4.2.  
One of the five outcome/impact indicators and three of the 12 key output indicators relate to the pro-
poor elements of the project:  
 A life-line tariff for domestic customers is fully implemented; 
 At least 80% of new domestic water supply connections installed under the project are financed 
from the Connection Fund by year 2008; 
 About 250 new water kiosks built by 2008; 
 About 50 community WSS schemes built and operating by year 2008 
 
This suggests that some priority is attached to the successful completion of the pro-poor aspects. 
However, these indicators focus only on the installation of schemes or connections and not on where 
they are located, who or how many people they serve, or whether they provide an affordable and good 
quality service to users. There is thus no clear requirement for evaluations of the project to investigate 
the effectiveness of targeting of the benefits to poor people. This view is supported by the project ICR 
itself, which notes that rigorous beneficiary surveys to assess project impact were “foreseen” but were 
not carried out, and suggests that completion of such surveys should have been included in the PAD 
and in output indicators (World Bank, 2011c). 
As the DWSSP included institutional restructuring and a change in DAWASA‟s role from service 
provider to asset-holder, DAWASA‟s key performance indicators (KPIs) closely mirror those in the 
PAD. There is no further elaboration of pro-poor indicators in DAWASA‟s development contract. 
DAWASCO‟s Lease Contract does not include any pro-poor targets, but focuses on service standards 
(both technical and customer service) and financial performance. DAWASCO‟s KPIs are given in 
Annex 9. It is clear that the priority was to build DAWASCO into a well-performing, efficient utility. 
This is understandable given the poor state of operations when it was established in 2005, and 
ultimately such improvements will underpin more sustainable service delivery, but it leaves an 
accountability gap in terms of ensuring that the pro-poor components for which DAWASCO was 
responsible – the First Time Connection Fund and kiosks – were well-managed and implementation 
targets met. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
4.4 Progress on main project components  
According to the DWSSP task team leader from the World Bank, project expenditure was almost at 
planned levels at the time of the research, and expected to be complete by June 2010 (the extended 
end date of the project). The ICR concludes that “most of the major construction works were achieved 
by project closing”. 
 
4.4.5 Rehabilitation and extension of water supply facilities 
This component includes the rehabilitation of treatment works, transmission mains and primary 
distribution network. It also includes the “Delegated Works”, under which contractors were employed 
Box 4.2  DWSSP Key Performance Indicators  
Outcome / Impact Indicators 
 70% of customers obtain 24 hour water supply service under adequate pressure 
 100% of water samples taken meet the water quality standards specified in the Lease contract 
 80% of sewage collected is treated and 95% of effluent samples meet specified standards 
 A life-line tariff for domestic customers is fully implemented 
 Revenues from water and sewerage services cover all operations and maintenance and allow for a 10% 
contribution to the construction costs of the project. 
 
Output Key Indicators 
Component 1. Water supply facilities rehabilitated and extended 
 Production capacity guaranteed at 9,000 m3/d (Mtoni); 82,000 m3/d (Upper Ruvu) and 180,000 m3/d 
(Lower Ruvu) by year 2008; 
 About 1,040 km of distribution pipes installed by year 2008; 
 At least 80% of new domestic water supply connections installed under the project are financed from the 
Connection Fund by year 2008; 
 About 250 new water kiosks built by 2008. 
 
Component 2. Sewerage and wastewater facilities rehabilitated and extended 
 26,000 m3/day of collected sewage is treated to specified standards before discharge into environment by 
year 2008; 
 
Component 3. Community water supply and sanitation programme operational 
 About 50 community WSS schemes built and operating by year 2008; 
 
Component 4. Technical, commercial and financial capacity of institutions strengthened 
 Combined collection ratio of private and public water supply and sewerage bills increased to 90% by year 
2008; 
 
Component 5. Future WSS projects prepared 
 Water resource management and corresponding environmental assessment carried out by year 2007; 
study and preliminary design completed by year 2007: 
 Water supply feasibility study and preliminary design completed by year 2007: 
 Strategic sanitation plan completed by year 2006; 
 Sanitation feasibility study and preliminary design completed by year 2007; 
 Urban WSS sector development strategy prepared by 2005. 
 
Source: World Bank (2003a) DWSSP Project Appraisal Document 
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by DAWASCO to rehabilitate, replace and install household connections in designated area work 
packages as well as install zonal bulk meters in the network. Against a target of 170,000 connections 
(135,000 to be rehabilitated and 35,000 to be newly installed) the ICR gives a figure of 112,329 
connections achieved by June 2010. Disaggregated information on rehabilitated versus new 
connections was not available, but according to DAWASA (2009b), 25,000 new domestic connections 
(serving new customers) had been installed by June 2008.  
As for bulk water production, the achieved increase in volume of water produced has been 96% of the 
target figure, though this represents a relatively small increase from 224,000 to 268,252m
3
 per day 
from 2003/4 to 2008/9.  In terms of the quality of water produced, rehabilitation of treatment works 
has led to marked improvements in water quality leaving the plants, with water quality compliance at 
95% in 2008/9. Under Component 5 of the DWSSP, studies have been undertaken for future capital 
investment planning. In particular, plans have been developed for significant new groundwater 
development and the expansion of the Lower Ruvu water treatment plant, to help alleviate the 
ongoing bulk water shortage in DSM (DAWASA, 2009a).  
 Less progress has been seen, however, in reducing unaccounted-for-water. This stood at at 65% in 
2003/4, and fell to 55% by 2008/9 against a target of 35% (DAWASA, 2009b), while the ICR reports 
non-revenue water levels of 53% (World Bank, 2011c). The ICR also notes that critical infrastructure 
improvements which would permit better leakage management (including network rehabilitation, 
installation of bulk meters and delineation of distribution zones) were only completed in mid-2010 
due to overall delays in project implementation (ibid).  
 
4.4.6 Rehabilitation and extension of wastewater facilities 
The investments in wastewater and sewerage under the DWSSP are limited compared with those in 
water supply, being budgeted around 13% of project costs compared with 64% (see Table 4.1 above). 
The focus was on rehabilitating sewage treatment works and existing sewers, with 10km of new 
sewers to be constructed; according to the latest progress report at the time of the research these works 
were in large part complete (DAWASA, 2009a). Although this additional pipework will facilitate 
household connections to sewerage, there is no target among the project key performance indicators 
for new connections to sewerage, only on volumes treated (World Bank, 2003a). A Strategic 
Sanitation Improvement Plan has been developed by a consultant under Component 5 (DAWASA, 
2009a) which centres on sewerage extensions into unserved areas. During follow-up interviews in 
2011, DAWASCO staff commented that areas home to poor households were prioritised for 
extension, but it was not possible to review the plan in more depth and verify this.   
 
4.4.7 Institutional strengthening 
It was widely agreed by stakeholders interviewed that DAWASA had undergone considerable 
improvements in management, efficiency and staff capacity under the DWSSP. However, 
improvements have been slower in DAWASCO according to both DAWASA and World Bank staff. 
This assessment is borne out by the DWSSP ICR (World Bank, 2011c).  
 
4.5 Pro-poor project elements: design and implementation 
As mentioned in section 1.3.3, the project includes a set of measures aimed at providing more 
affordable water for low-income households, by: a low-cost “lifeline" tariff/tranche, free connections 
  
 
 
 
for low-income households, water kiosks in networked areas, and standalone community-managed 
schemes in areas far from the network.   
 
4.5.1 The “Lifeline” tariff design 
As part of the institutional redesign under the DWSSP, a new tariff structure was adopted for piped 
water customers. The tariff comprises three components: the “operator tariff” retained by DAWASCO 
to finance its activities; the “lessor tariff” which is passed on to DAWASA; and a “social connection 
tariff” used to subsidise connections for low-income households through the First Time Connection 
Fund (see below). As a measure to promote affordability, domestic customers pay only the operator 
tariff for the first 5m
3
 of water consumed each month. Table 4.2 gives the tariff breakdown at the 
time of project initiation, and following increases in 2006 and 2009. These increases were built into 
the project design with the aim of gradually working towards a cost recovery tariff. 
While the consumption subsidy built into the tariff structure would benefit poor households with a 
connection by reducing the cost of water, the subsidy is a universal one, provided to all households 
with a private network connection regardless of wealth, and would only disproportionately benefit 
poor households if they consume little water. It is benefiting relatively few people, however; 
according to the ICR, only 17% of households had an individual piped water connection in 2009 
(World Bank, 2011c). Many poor households access resold water by buying from neighbours or 
vendors, and most of this water would be charged at the full tariff as consumption would quickly rise 
above 5m
3
 from a shared connection. Informants from DAWASCO, among others, also observed that 
when poor households obtained their own household connection, they often struggled to control 
consumption and still found bills unaffordable. Further attention may therefore be needed to the 
affordability of piped water for poor households, including through shared connections, as well as to 
methods of billing, especially given the health benefits of higher levels of consumption. Finally, any 
volume-based tariff such as this requires metering, which is not universal in DSM. Under the DWSSP 
135,000 rehabilitated connections and 35,000 new connections were to have meters installed. 
According to the most recent available progress report at the time of research, around 75,000 meters 
had been installed by June 2009 (DAWASA, 2009a, p.22).  
Table  4.2  Domestic tariff structure from 2003 to 2009  
Tariff components (TSh per m
3
) 2003 2006 2009 
Operator Tariff   337 488 637 
Lessor Tariff 89 137 176 
Social Connection Tariff 
(levy on consumption which finances the FTCF) 
25 29 37 
Customer tariff (first 5m
3
) 337 488 637 
Customer tariff (over 5m
3
) 451 654 850 
Mean per capita monthly income in Dar es Salaam, 2007, 
for comparison (NBS 2009)  
 
80,144 
Minimum urban wage in Dar es Salaam quoted in the 
PAD (World Bank 2003a) 
 
48,000 
Source: DAWASA (2009b) 3-year Rolling Plan 2009-2012 
(Exchange rate at time of research US$ 1 = c. TSh 1338) 
4.5.2 First Time Connection Fund design 
Revenue raised from the social connection tariff was to be deposited in to a “first time domestic water 
supply connection fund”, also known as the First Time Connection Fund (FTCF), to be managed by 
DAWASCO and used to subsidise new connections for low-income households. According to 
performance targets in the PAD, 35,000 new connections were to be installed under the DWSSP and 
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80% of these (28,000) should be funded by the FTCF. Box 4.3 sets out the criteria for eligibility for 
the FTCF. 
 
Box  4.3  The First Time Connection Fund    
In order to qualify for a subsidised connection under the First Time Connection Fund, households had to 
meet the following two criteria: 
 No more than three water points or taps within the dwelling 
 Maximum 20 metre distance from the mains pipe. 
 
Eligible households would receive a free connection, subject to making a deposit of TSh 20,000 (approx 
US$ 14.50)  on future water consumption. The cost of a connection without subsidy was TSh 145,000 
(approx US$ 105).  
 
Source: World Bank (2003a) Project Appraisal Document 
 
The Fund was designed to be targeted in that specific criteria were drawn up for the use of the fund, 
which are relatively practical in terms of ease of assessments (although an informant from 
DAWASCO observed that in the case of new buildings, it was hard to assess the eventual number of 
taps and there might be deception). However, as will be seen below, the criteria did not, in practice, 
function well for targeting of low-income households. An informant from an NGO commented:  
“The criterion of three water points or less is not well targeted to the poor and is likely to 
benefit the middle class. Often the poor have no taps at all. Landlords may be the main 
beneficiaries as after they get a free connection they can increase rent and the poor tenants 
are forced out”. 
When interviewed, utility staff suggested that it was not important to target the criteria tightly to the 
poorest households because the fund would be used in areas with an existing network, where they 
assumed that any household lacking a connection was too poor (without subsidy) to afford it, and 
should receive the subsidy. Once network extension takes place into unserved areas, however, this 
argument will no longer apply. It was also said during interviews that the fund would be big enough to 
pay for all households with three taps or fewer, so there was no need to target it narrowly. It therefore 
appears that fund was partly intended to maximise connections in general, rather than purely to 
improve affordability for the poorest households. If this is the case, there is a need for greater clarity 
and transparency around the purposes for which subsidies are to be used. Given the emphasis that the 
DWSSP and sector policies place on achieving cost recovery, income which could be collected from 
wealthier households by their paying the full connection cost would be a means of enabling the utility 
to achieve greater cost recovery. In other words, the pro-poor focus in practice of the FTCF is in 
doubt.  Furthermore, many areas of the city, and in particular informal areas, lie more than 20 metres 
from the existing distribution mains. Until a major network expansion programme is undertaken, this 
will limit the number of beneficiaries. 
4.5.3 Implementation of household connections and the FTCF 
At the time of research, the FTCF had never been applied. A key informant from DAWASCO 
explained that the design of the fund was problematic in practice as very few potential beneficiaries 
could be found who lived less than 20m from an existing water supply. Demand for new connections 
from households meeting the criterion of having fewer than three taps was said to be only high in non-
networked areas. While there were low-income households in networked areas, many of these 
  
 
 
 
reportedly (source: key informant interview) did not want a household connection because they felt 
unable to pay a monthly bill. 
However, the main reason for non-utilisation of the fund was the decision, taken early on in 
implementation, to make all new connections under the delegated works component free. According 
to an informant from DAWASCO, this approach was taken in order to ensure that connections targets 
were met and reduce the risk of illegal connections, because fewer households came forward to apply 
for connections in these areas than was expected. While it is quite possible that some low-income 
households benefited from these free connections, this approach raises questions about whether, in the 
use of subsidies, the priority was to benefit the poorest households. Rather subsidies seem to have 
been employed, here, to rapidly increase the number of connections, irrespective of for whom, and to 
reduce losses to the utility through illegal connections. These goals are understandable in terms of 
improving DAWASCO‟s revenue stream and financial sustainability, but they do not represent a 
channelling of the subsidy element to low-income households.  
Since the FTCF has not been used, it is difficult to say how many low income households have 
benefited from connections. The data on connections provided under the project are not disaggregated 
by household income levels or any other socio-economic criteria. According to an informant from 
DAWASCO, the criteria for selecting the delegated works packages were: areas where adequate water 
could be supplied; areas where there was high demand and willingness and ability to pay („good 
business prospects„); and areas with illegal connections.  
 
4.5.4 Water kiosks: design  
Under the DWSSP, 250 kiosks were to be constructed to supply water in poorer areas of the city 
which have a water supply network, but where many people do not have household connections, 
under the Delegated Works programme of the project.  
The kiosk component was governed by an MoU between CityWater (later replaced by DAWASCO), 
DAWASA and the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC). DCC was simultaneously implementing the 
Community Infrastructure Upgrading Program (CIUP), a subcomponent of the World Bank-supported 
Local Government Support Project (LGSP), which aimed to upgrade infrastructure and services in 
unplanned areas. This project included drainage, sanitation, solid waste collection and street lighting, 
but not water supply. The MoU indicates that communities had all identified water supply as of their 
highest priority needs, so it was decided to integrate construction of kiosks financed under the 
DWSSP with the implementation of the CIUP programme (DCC, 2004b).  
The CIUP had previously identified 31 priority project areas within the city in need of improved 
infrastructure, and under the MoU water kiosks were to be constructed within these areas using „a 
similar community based approach and communication channels as established for CIUP but on the 
basis of criteria established by CityWater aimed at ensuring commercial sustainability of each and 
every kiosk‟ (DCC, 2004b). Operation of kiosks was to be licensed by CityWater to individuals 
nominated by beneficiary communities. The detailed process by which CIUP implementation areas 
were selected could not be ascertained, but according to the LGSP Project Appraisal Document 
(World Bank, 2004f) the intention was to identify areas where the greatest benefit could be achieved 
for the budget available.  
Within the 31 CIUP zones, DAWASCO, DAWASA and the municipal authorities reportedly worked 
together to identify priority streets where kiosks should be sited, based on three main criteria: severity 
of water unavailability; accessibility of the street from other nearby streets; and the frequency of 
outbreaks of water-related disease. DAWASCO and the DCC then worked with the local government 
authority at street level to agree exact locations for construction of kiosks, with local government 
responsible for convening a residents‟ meeting at which final location was agreed. It was difficult to 
establish clearly what criteria were applied by DAWASCO for ensuring commercial sustainability 
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and how this was incorporated into the CIUP targeting process, but an informant from DAWASCO 
explained that contractors surveyed households across each work package (zones to receive 
connections and kiosks were divided into work packages for contracting purposes) to establish which 
would receive a connection and which would not, and used this information to site kiosks. It is not 
clear what questions were asked during the survey, although researchers asked for details of both 
survey formats and findings, or how the results were incorporated into the CIUP targeting process.  
This informant also said that in practice contractors did not always adopt the exact locations proposed, 
but simply constructed kiosks where convenient land was available, as it was the number of kiosks to 
be constructed - rather than the location –that was specified in their contracts (though the researchers 
were unable to view these contracts to confirm this): 
“Contractors were not given specific places for placing kiosks. Whatever space was found, 
kiosks were set up, including on private land regardless of whether there was adequate water 
supply or not”. 
There is evidence that when this happened, however, both DAWASA and the World Bank exerted 
positive pressure to ensure that land problems were resolved and kiosks were built in their original 
proposed locations (letter from DAWASA to Construction Supervisor, Feb 21
st
 2007, provided by the 
World Bank in May 2011). 
Other informants reported that the location of kiosks was determined by DAWASCO using aerial 
maps to identify suitable patches of land.  
It was impossible to resolve these conflicting accounts and determine exactly how final decisions 
about the location of kiosks were made in practice. Especially within DAWASCO, there was a great 
lack of clarity over the process and no documentation was made available to the researchers.  
On the positive side, an effort was made to target kiosks to areas of need using a combination of 
geographic and community-based approaches, and the integration of kiosk provision with wider 
programmes of urban upgrading was a progressive feature of design. However, these methods do not 
seem to have been systematised or incorporated into DAWASCO‟s standard procedures, and few staff  
in DAWASCO seem to be aware of them. .. This suggests that limited priority was attached to the 
design of the kiosk programme within DAWASCO, and that opportunities for capacity building of 
staff  in pro-poor approaches and perhaps developing a broader approach to jointplanning of pro-poor 
services with the DCC, for example, were missed.  
4.5.5 Kiosks: implementation 
It was difficult to obtain a consistent figure for the number of kiosks constructed out of the planned 
250. A 2009 survey conducted jointly by DAWASCO and WaterAid found that 184 had been 
constructed; however a key informant from DAWASCO stated that the number was about 255, whilst 
a list of kiosks provided by DAWASCO listed only 177. It is in itself concerning that there appears to 
be no accurate record in DAWASCO of the kiosks constructed.  
The WaterAid/DAWASCO survey data, as well as the researchers‟ own experience during fieldwork, 
indicate that the majority of the water kiosks are not functioning. Out of 177 kiosks on the list 
obtained from DAWASA, only 43 (24%) were indicated as operating. The survey paints an even 
worse picture, having found that only 79 out of 184 kiosks were receiving water supply at all, and of 
those only 26 were operating. Of this 26, only 12 (less than 7%) were receiving water at high enough 
pressure to function reliably. (WaterAid Tanzania, 2009). During fieldwork, it was found that some of 
the kiosks listed by DAWASCO as functional were not actually in operation at the time of the visit. 
As mentioned above, according to the survey, the main reason for the non-functionality of so many 
kiosks is that the network lacks water. Many of them are in areas with no water, or intermittent water: 
according to the survey 49% are in areas where the main supply lines are not functioning (ibid). In 
  
 
 
 
spite of the priority given to source rehabilitation to increase bulk water supply to the city under the 
DWSSP, this problem remains severe, but the development of new sources is planned (see section 
4.4.1). An informant from an NGO stated that the areas to receive kiosks were originally determined 
on the basis of planned extensions to the network, but even though these extensions had not been 
made, kiosk construction went ahead in the same areas. Delays and bureaucratic hurdles from 
DAWASCO‟s side have also reportedly meant that two-thirds of kiosks that could have been 
operational (where there is water in the mains) are not functioning because operators have not been 
commissioned (ibid). Problems have also been encountered with the management of some kiosks, 
particularly where they were located on private land; according to an informant at an NGO, the 
landowners often insisted on becoming kiosk operators, and then could not easily be replaced if they 
performed badly.  
Since this comprehensive survey of functionality had recently taken place in 2010, interviews and 
focus groups conducted by the present study did not revisit the functionality question in detail, but 
focused on (a) the targeting and location of kiosks in terms of reaching low-income households, and 
(b) whether the kiosks which are functioning are providing a good service for poor users on the 
ground. Although there are currently very few functioning kiosks, according to the 
WaterAid/DAWASCO survey, a further 14 partly functioning kiosks and 68 non-functioning kiosks 
have the potential to become operational “in the foreseeable future” (ibid). This means that the 
findings on services provided by the few existing functional kiosks will have wider relevance and 
could offer lessons for the management of these other kiosks, if and when they become operational.  
FGDs revealed that access to water at functioning kiosks has been constrained by a number of factors, 
with consequences for low-income households:  
 Sourcing and cost of water: a number of kiosks were being operated privately using water 
supplied by tankers, because of inadequate public water supply. Due to the cost of tankered 
water, the operators explained that they had to sell water at TSh 50-100 per 20 litre bucket to 
make a profit, while kiosks receiving piped water can charge just TSh 30 (the latter price was 
confirmed at a kiosk receiving bulk water in Mnazi Mmoja sub-ward). At the time of the 
interview this operator was in fact not supplying water at all, because even at Tsh 100 he was 
not making a profit, yet his view was that if he charged a higher price he would have no 
customers – even TSh 100 is not affordable to all, he said. The price of water from tankers was 
reported to vary from Tsh 22,000 to 45,000 per 10,000 litres. At times of water shortage in 
particular, it becomes very expensive. Operators do not appear to be raising prices in order to 
make large profits; at these prices, they would break even charging Tsh 44-90 per 20 litres. 
 Waiting times/queues: in two of the three sub-wards, each of which had only one functioning 
kiosk, heavy congestion was observed at the functioning kiosks. The lack of geographically- 
adequate coverage of functioning kiosks is causing queuing and delays at those which do 
function (see Figure 4.3). FGD participants from a ward with a functioning kiosk receiving bulk 
supply and selling at TSh 30 per bucket said that they sometimes had to queue for four hours, 
especially on days when water pressure in the system was low and buckets take a long time to 
fill, because the kiosk was the most affordable source of water in the area. Due to non-
functionality of other kiosks, people travelled from up to half an hour away to buy water at this 
kiosk.  
 Financial management of kiosks: there also appeared to be problems in the financial 
management of some of the kiosks operated by WUAs. In two of the subwards visited, it was 
reported that WUAs did not provide financial reports to members. This was attributed by FGD 
participants to a lack of capacity in the WUA to prepare reports, but the reported refusal, in one 
case, of outgoing committee members to provide any records of revenue collection or to hand 
over bank details to new committee members could have been a sign of misuse of funds. 
Whether or not misuse occurred, it appears that current training and monitoring arrangements 
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for WUAs are inadequate. According to DAWASCO, some WUAs are functioning well and 
benefit from a formal constitution, while others are rather weak. Complaints made by some 
WUA leaders to DAWASCO are evidence that these associations are effectively performing the 
function of representing community concerns. All WUAs are said to have received training 
courses on managerial, financial and technical aspects of their work from the DCC and to have 
been supplied with written guidelines and reporting formats.  
It is clear from the above situation that the majority of residents in neighbourhoods with kiosks have 
not benefited substantially from improved water services and remain reliant on alternatives such as 
vendors. According to the DWSSP ICR, the percentage of the population of DSM reliant on water 
vendors has fallen slightly from 9.9% to 8.4% between 2006 and 2009 (World Bank, 2011c). 
Furthermore, the problems experienced may have had a serious effect on the attitude to kiosks among 
utility staff. An NGO informant expressed this concern: 
 “Kiosks are a good way to target the poor because they target geographically and by service 
level. A sad thing with the kiosks in Dar es Salaam is that now many people say kiosks do not 
work, whereas in fact it is just that badly planned kiosks do not work”. 
This fear seems to be justified, as several utility staff said during interviews that they did not think 
that kiosks were an effective approach, and preferred to focus on household connections. Some made 
the argument that kiosks were now redundant because free connections were given under the 
delegated works. While this could be true in some areas, and while many households access water 
from neighbours‟ connections which may be more convenient than using kiosks, such blanket 
statements suggest that better understanding of the situation and needs of low-income households 
is required to inform policy. In the focus group sites, there was clear demand for water from kiosks, 
illustrated by both the frustration of users at the non-functionality of so many kiosks and the large 
queues at those which were functioning.  
Although kiosks seemed to be low on the agenda at the time of the original study, it has since been 
reported that the Informal Settlements Department is undertaking an inventory of kiosks in Dar to 
reach a better understanding of needs, and that EWURA has stipulated a new, lower tariff for water 
sold at kiosks, with funds collected to be used to increase the density of kiosks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Queue at the only functioning kiosk in Mnazi Mmoja sub-ward 
 
 
Credit: Paula Tibandebage 
 
4.5.6 Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (CWSSP): design  
Under the CWSSP, WSS projects were to be designed and implemented, in partnership with NGOs, 
for low-income communities in areas outside the main network (in each of the three municipalities 
and along the transmission mains corridors) which could not rapidly benefit from the extension of 
WSS services. 50 schemes were planned, to serve communities of on average 2,500 people. A two-
stage process was used to select communities, which is set out in Box 4.4. In the end schemes were 
implemented in the three municipalities only, not along the transmission mains corridors, because an 
NGO could not be successfully engaged there. It was said in interviews that NGOs were engaged to 
benefit from their experience in implementing community projects, which was a new area for 
DAWASA.   
There is a clearly designed targeting method for the CWSSP which aims to select low-income 
communities particularly in need of improved WSS services, where there is high demand and 
willingness to pay for improvements. The shortlisting process, working with a university professor 
and local councils who know their communities well, to select low-income areas with a high need for 
services, is a reasonable approach to targeting where hard data on income and access is not available, 
although there is a risk that the selection could be captured and fail to represent the most 
marginalised. The second stage, of mobilisation by NGOs, is more problematic, as there is a risk that 
the poorest communities would have struggled to raise the 5% contribution as quickly as better off 
areas. DAWASA said that this had not happened and the amount was affordable to all communities, 
but this could not be verified. In addition, a significant proportion of the shortlisted communities (25 
out of 66)  were mobilised and started to raise funds with an expectation of improved services, but in 
the end were not selected. 
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4.5.7 CWSSP: implementation 
A dedicated Community Liaison Unit (CLU) was established in DAWASA to manage the 
implementation of the CWSSP. The CLU now also manages other community WSS projects for 
which DAWASA has obtained funding from other donors.  The CLU receives technical support from 
the Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP) to develop its approaches to managing community 
schemes.  
Following mobilisation and selection of the selected communities, the three supervising NGOs 
continued to support the process, under contract to DAWASA: supporting communities to form and 
register WUAs; training WUA members in scheme management, operation and maintenance; 
assisting the design of schemes; and supervising construction of boreholes and distribution systems. 
Although 50 projects were originally planned, a total of 41 communities were in fact selected and 
schemes implemented. According to DAWASA‟s most recent progress report at the time of the 
research, the target population to be served by CWSSP was 120,000 but it was already serving 
406,000 (DAWASA 2009a). This seems high given that only 25 schemes were then operational (ibid). 
It is not known how DAWASA reached this figure, but it may reflect population growth and high 
demand for water in the served communities. Some schemes have extended the number of distribution 
points beyond their design. Supervising NGOs reported that a further six schemes listed by DAWASA 
as operational were not yet in operation. The reasons why schemes were not functioning include lack 
of power supply, faulty pumps, theft of pumps, unavailability of meters, and inadequate water supply 
(DAWASA, 2009b and interviews with supervising NGOs).  
The schemes which are functioning have improved water access considerably for their users, 
according to focus groups in three sites (selected to be among the poorest CWSSP sites, one in each 
municipality). Water users felt that the rate charged of Tsh 30 for a 20 litre bucket was affordable, 
especially considering that water from other sources was much more expensive (see Table 4.3). In all 
three schemes the initial charge when the schemes started was Tsh 20 for a 20 litre bucket, but this 
had been increased to Tsh 30 in order to meet operating costs. The water was also said to be safe in 
terms of quality. 
Box  4.4 Selection of communities under the CWSSP    
First, 22 communities were shortlisted from each of the three municipalities in Dar es Salaam (66 in 
total) by DAWASA working with a university professor, in conjunction with City, Municipal and 
District Councils, according to the following criteria: 
 Low income households with inadequate access to services 
 Cholera-prone areas 
 Hazard-free land 
 Areas seriously deficient in water supply 
 Areas distant from existing/proposed water sources. 
 
Following the shortlisting, three NGOs were contracted, one in each of the three municipalities, to 
„mobilise‟ the shortlisted communities: Plan International in Ilala, Care International in Kinondoni 
and WaterAid in Temeke. The NGOs mobilised the communities to raise 5% of the construction costs 
of a scheme.  In each of the municipalities, approximately the first twelve communities to raise these 
funds (the number depending on community size) were selected for construction of a water or 
sanitation scheme. As a key informant from one of the contracted NGOs observed, the second stage 
of selection was “first come, first served”.  
 
Source: DAWASA (2004) DWSSP Operation Manual Part F (Community Water Supply and Sanitation) 
  
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Water charges for a 20 litre bucket by source in three communities 
 Charges for a 20 litre bucket (Tsh) 
Scheme location CWSSP borehole Private boreholes Water vendors 
Majumba sita (Mogo 
sub-ward) 
30 50 100 - 200 
Kongowe sub-ward 
(Toangoma) 
30 (not indicated) 250 
Ngilangwa (Kisiwani 
sub-ward) 
30 150 - 200 300 – 1,000* 
*Depending on water availability and distance. 
 
However, none of these schemes were without problems. In all three sites there was much higher 
demand for water than supply. In two sites, participants said water from the boreholes was not 
sufficient, whilst in the third there had been a rapid increase in population in the area. All schemes 
were pumping water only twice per day, so water was not available continuously to users. In two of 
the communities, participants also noted that the two storage tanks provided, of 10,000 litres capacity 
each, were not sufficient. In a fourth scheme visited, at Yombo Reli in Temeke, low water pressure 
meant that out of eight distribution points only four were working at all and only two could be used at 
a time. Households living near the defunct distribution points were said to be angry because they 
contributed to the scheme but have not benefited, and instances of vandalism have been reported. 
These households preferred to buy water from local vendors than walk the distance to the functioning 
distribution points.  
Other problems encountered include a lack of sufficient revenue generated by WUAs to pay for major 
costs, such as replacing faulty or stolen pumps, and a lack of good financial management and 
reporting practices by WUAs. As with the kiosks, arrangements for financial accountability by WUAs 
do not seem to be strong. In some schemes lack of adequate water supply means that WUAs are 
struggling to cover their costs.  
DAWASA has been quite responsive to these problems, although it has to contend with a lack of 
resources. A new borehole is promised in Yombo Reli to improve supply, and DAWASA has 
replaced pumps in some cases and in others acted as a guarantor for WUAs to obtain credit. However, 
there was a perception among WUAs that more support should have been provided, particularly in 
terms of faster construction/contracting and more training for WUAs – especially as there was 
sometimes a long delay between initial training of the WUA and scheme construction, or turnover of 
members.  
DAWASA‟s response to the management problems has been to introduce a new management system, 
developed with support from the Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP) under which WUAs will 
hire a professional operator to manage the scheme. The transition to the new model was underway at 
the time of the research, but had not yet been completed in any of the schemes visited, though in some 
cases training had been provided on both approaches, causing some confusion among WUA members. 
It is too early to test the effectiveness of the new model; it might well serve to improve financial 
accountability and management, but it is not clear how WUAs, some of which are already struggling 
financially, will pay the salary of the operator and what effect that will have on water prices to 
consumers. DAWASA also exercise control over a share of the WUA‟s funds in a joint bank account, 
from which both parties must authorise withdrawals.  
In spite of some ongoing management problems, it is to DAWASA‟s credit that they have sought to 
learn and identify appropriate arrangements, and have also commissioned a census to better 
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understand the impact of the CWSSP. The CLU showed ownership of the programme and have even 
started to extend the model.  
The CWSSP was in one sense very “inclusive” as services were managed by community Water User 
Associations (WUAs). However, one NGO informant questioned whether the communities had real 
ownership as DAWASA retained ownership of the infrastructure. In fact, according to key informants 
in DAWASA‟s Community Liaison Unit, the 5% upfront contribution was not to be used to pay for 
infrastructure, but as a starting fund for the WUAs to perform necessary maintenance and payment of 
kiosk/standpipe operators before funds were built up from user payments. 
DAWASA informants explained that the CWSSP is an interim solution, as they envisage that piped 
water services will eventually be extended to the entire city. The technology used in the CWSSP 
networks was, therefore, designed to be easily integrated into the main water supply network in the 
future. However, it is accepted that this expansion will require major future investments and will not 
happen in the short to medium term. The fact that DAWASA have engaged in providing this kind of 
decentralised service to peri-urban areas rather than focusing solely on improving and extending the 
main network is a very positive step, as such approaches will be necessary to ensure that urban 
residents outside the main networked areas receive services within a reasonable timeframe.  
Update - Autumn 2011: CWSSP 
Since the completion of the research in 2009, an in-depth review of the CWSSP was released by WSP 
(Kimwaga, 2010). The World Bank‟s Implementation Completion Report for the DWSSP (World Bank, 
2011c) also gives a view on the effectiveness of the CWSSP.  
These two reports support many of the findings of the present study. The WSP review confirms that the 
CWSSP has raised the proportion of households with access to safe water, with subsequent benefits in 
terms of health and reduced drudgery. It also confirms the price charged for water, and that this is 
considered to be affordable by users.  
It is difficult to find agreement on the exact number of people served by the CWSSP. The WSP study 
gives an estimate of 165,000 while the ICR cites a figure of 275,000 from a survey (termed „census‟) 
conducted by DAWASA at the end of the project. Both are lower than the previous DAWASA figure of 
406,000 but still represent a substantial achievement. The WSP review found that 32 schemes were fully 
functional rather than the 25 listed by DAWASA in 2009. If this is accurate, it suggests considerable 
progress in bringing schemes into functionality in the few months between these studies. 
The WSP review notes many of the challenges for the CWSSP which were identified in the present study, 
in particular the low levels of revenue collection by WUAs (only slightly higher than expenses, with little 
being set aside for major repairs or other large costs) and ongoing weaknesses in financial management. It 
recommends that bridging finance may be needed for O&M over the first years of operation. The new 
management teams, where introduced, are also said to be facing capacity gaps in many cases. The ICR, in 
contrast, concludes that the CWSSP schemes appear to be financially sustainable because revenues are 
currently sufficient to cover operations, maintenance and expansion (some WUAs have reinvested in 
construction of sanitation facilities). It therefore seems that some schemes are performing well financially, 
while others may require additional support.  
Finally, in spite of some problems identified, the WSP review notes that the involvement of many 
stakeholders in the CWSSP design and implementation, including NGOs in project management and 
municipal councils in community selection, was instrumental to the success of the programme. 
 
Source: Kimwaga, 2010; World Bank, 2011c. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
4.6 Assessment: how far have low-income households been served by the DWSSP and 
what lessons can be learned?  
Some elements of the DWSSP have been effective in reaching poor households.  For example, as seen 
in section 4.4, the CWSSP has improved access to water services, in terms of both quality and 
affordability, to a significant number of poor urban residents in non-networked areas92. In spite of 
some problems, the CWSSP has improved the situation of poor residents in areas where there was 
clear need and, as mentioned above, the move into such decentralised modes of provision is a very 
positive step.  
Meanwhile, as another measure, the kiosks were targeted to areas of need and the link with broader 
programmes of urban upgrading is to be commended. However, limited priority has been given to 
tackling serious levels of non-functionality, which are only partly the result of ongoing shortages of 
bulk water. Poor functionality rates mean that the real benefits for poor populations have been limited. 
The support and monitoring needed by WUAs for both kiosks, and CWSSP also, seems to have been 
somewhat underestimated, although considerable efforts were made under the CWSSP in partnership 
with both local NGOs and WSP. It should be recognised that this is not a traditional area of expertise 
for utilities, and DAWASA has shown willingness to learn and refine its approaches, commissioning 
a number of studies and piloting different management approaches. 
In Dar es Salaam, some informants argued that it is not straightforward to identify and target poor 
households because they often live in mixed neighbourhoods, while proxy indicators relating to the 
type of housing are of limited use because many of them rent rooms in larger houses. However, there 
are areas which are, broadly speaking, considered poorer than others These areas are generally 
unplanned and are characterised by narrow streets, congested layout, poorer quality housing, and poor 
drainage and infrastructure. This situation – though poverty levels could be more scientifically 
verified, e.g. using census data - suggests that in fact the combination of the geographic targeting and 
self-targeting adopted under the DWSSP design (with a mixture of household connections and kiosks 
provided in identified CIUP and CWSSP areas) is quite appropriate, with connection subsidies 
available plus kiosks in poorer and mixed areas. Modifications would be needed, to some of the 
targeting criteria envisaged, in particular for the first-time connection fund, but the DWSSP‟s 
problems lay more in the overall implementation than in the design of pro-poor components per se.   
The various targeting approaches (for the CWSSP, kiosks and FTCF), as well as the 
identification of priority zones under the CIUP, could provide a basis for developing a citywide 
strategy for pro-poor service delivery. However, there is as yet no evidence that this is occurring or 
that the information generated by the CIUP zoning exercise is being used for planning purposes by 
DAWASA. Furthermore, implementation of targeting did not always follow design, and detailed 
targeting processes have not always been documented or systematised. This means that opportunities 
to scale up, learn from and strengthen existing approaches are probably being missed. The ICR further 
notes that although DAWASA commissioned the National Bureau of Statistics to conduct surveys of 
water access and socio-economic indicators in 2006 (baseline) and 2009 (follow-up), with a view to 
understanding impacts of the DWSSP, these surveys did not provide key information which could 
have been used to tailor services more closely to the needs of customers, (for example affordability of 
water from different sources, time spent in water collection or volumes used – confirmed by viewing 
survey findings annexed) and there is no evidence that the results have been used for strategy 
development or regulatory purposes (World Bank, 2011c, to which the report of the 2009 survey is 
annexed (annex 5)).  
In terms of affordability, the tariff design means that water obtained from a household connection 
remains the cheapest option as shown in Table 4.4. While kiosks and CWSSP schemes offer water at 
considerably lower prices than vendors or private boreholes, they are more expensive than piped 
                                                 
92 It is difficult to estimate the exact figure but DAWASA figures of over 400,000 seem high as discussed above. 
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water – even piped water at the higher price band outside the lifeline tariff - even though piped water 
users are almost certainly better-off.  
 
Table 4.4 Prices of water from different sources (at time of research in 2009) 
Source of water  Price per m3 
(TSh)  
Remarks  
Household connection  
 - first 5m
3
 per month  
6371  Cheapest volumetric rate.  
Even so, it was said that many poor HHs struggle to pay 
bills once connected because it is harder to control 
consumption than with buckets (but higher consumption 
is probably good for health) 
Household connection 
 - over 5m
3
 per month  
8501  Still cheaper than water from kiosks or CWSSP.  
Includes lessor fee, regulator fee and FTCF subsidy.  
CWSSP schemes  1,000 – 
1,5002  
Price set by WUAs. Considered reasonable by FGDs.  
Some give free water to elderly and widows - discretion 
Still more expensive than network tariff.  
Kiosks receiving bulk 
water 
1,5003
 
More expensive than network tariff because of need to 
pay operator. 
Private operators reportedly charge more.  
Kiosks using tankered 
water 
2,500 – 
5,0003
 
Due to low pressure in the water network, kiosks often 
rely on tankered water, driving up the price. 
Private borehole  2,500 – 
10,0004  
Cheaper than vendors but quality not trusted.  
Water vendor  5,000 – 
50,0004  
Most expensive option.  
Vendors said to raise prices when other sources fail 
(when others function, they lower prices to compete)  
Sources:  
1 = Key informant interview with DAWASCO Chief Operations Officer, confirmed by documents viewed  
2 = Focus group discussions with users and managers   
3 = Focus group discussions with kiosk users and managers, confirmed by WaterAid/DAWASCO survey (WaterAid 
Tanzania, 2009)  
4 = Focus group discussions with users of both CWSSP and kiosks 
 
As for bulk water, the project‟s investment in improving water supply in the piped network and 
strengthening overall utility performance was much needed. There was, and remains, an urgent need 
for increased bulk water supply to the city and rehabilitation of the network. DAWASA and 
DAWASCO have also improved their performance in a number of areas which will underpin future 
improvements in services, although severe problems remain particularly in terms of bulk water 
supply, non-revenue water and hours of supply (see Box 4.5). Progress in developing institutional 
  
 
 
 
capacity has been held back by the failed public-private partnership attempt, which caused significant 
delay in the implementation of project components (including establishment of new connections 
needed to generate revenue) and led to the creation of an unsatisfactory institutional model which 
stakeholders feel limits the incentives for DAWASCO to improve performance (see section 4.6.2 on 
accountability and voice).  
There is not a contradiction per se between investing in the main network and utility capacity and 
improving services to low-income households. However, in themselves these investments have not 
yet provided better access to many poor residents of DSM. This is in spite of the upfront statement in 
the PAD that “affordability of the WSS service by lower income groups” is one of the DWSSP‟s three 
core objectives (World Bank 2003a). The other two objectives, reliability and sustainability, appear to 
have been given precedence.  
 
Box  4.5: Comparing DAWASCO’s performance in 2005 and 2009  
This box compares DAWASCO‟s performance against selected indicators in May 2005 and August 
2009. Some achievements are noted in the table below. Set against these are the facts that non-
revenue water remains extremely high at 53%, and the number of customers receiving 24 hour service 
has in fact fallen from 40 to 30% since the start of the project (World Bank, 2011c). 
 
Performance Indicator May 2005 August 2009 
Water production (m3) 6,717,930 8,139,584 
Days receivable ratio (months)**
 
27 12 
Bill distribution efficiency (%) 80 100 
Total number of customers billed on 
actual meter readings 
4,935 52,324 
Average response time to customer 
complaints (hours) 
24 7 
 
*  % of bills paid 
** Average time for a bill to be paid 
 
Source: DAWASA (2009a) DWSSP Quarterly Progress Report No. 25 (July to September 2009)  
 
The project showed a clear prioritisation of private connections over kiosks in both design and 
practice. The appropriate balance of private and community infrastructure is location-specific, but it is 
not clear that a thorough analysis of the right balance was conducted here during project design. 
Affordability was only fully analysed for piped household connections, while affordability problems 
with kiosks were predicted, but apparently not addressed in project design.  
It is also apparent that subsidies have not been used for the most pro-poor purposes. The „universal‟ 
subsidy embedded in the lifeline tariff in fact benefits only the minority of residents of DSM who 
have an individual household or yard connection (17% according to the ICR), who are likely to be 
disproportionately better-off than households without a connection of their own. The cross-subsidy in 
the water tariff was to be used only for connections, not standpipes or network expansion to poor 
areas, even though utility staff believed that there would be enough money available in the fund to 
spend on providing free connections to middle class households, suggesting that the subsidy was 
intended to increase the number of connections as much as benefit the poorest households. 
Meanwhile, available subsidies were used in part to increase connections (and hence revenue) by 
providing free connections to all under the delegated works rather than being channelled into pro-poor 
components (another case of „universal‟ rather than targeted allocation of subsidies).  The emphasis 
on connections makes sense in the context of a drive to increase revenue flows and improve the 
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financial footing of DAWASCO and DAWASA. This may be a justifiable strategy, but there is a need 
for greater transparency around the use of subsidies, especially given the rhetoric in the sector around 
cost recovery, and for such measures to be accompanied by the development of suitable strategies to 
meet the needs of low-income residents. 
 
4.6.1 Financial incentives for utilities to serve low-income households 
The fact that poor households currently pay more for their water, on a unit basis, than those with a 
household connection, suggests that the networked tariff would be affordable to these households and 
that low-income households would be viable customers for the utility from a commercial perspective. 
This is recognised by DAWASCO, as the Chief Operations Officer commented, “The poor are not 
lost money; they are paying”. 
As discussed earlier, however, some poor households have struggled to pay their bills once connected 
because they started to consume higher volumes of water. Flexible payment mechanisms allowing 
more regular payments (e.g. weekly instead of monthly) might help somewhat, but if poor households 
control their consumption to keep costs down and consume less water than better-off households they 
will still represent a less commercially promising prospect to a utility than a high-volume user, 
especially when the additional costs of serving them are considered (for example more frequent 
billing, and the need to extend infrastructure into unplanned areas lacking other infrastructure and 
where losses from illegal connections might be higher).  
This said, the utilities in Dar es Salaam could learn lessons from cities such as Kampala, where 
services to poor households have been extended through both household connections and pre-paid 
water meters, or from towns in Tanzania such as Lindi, where the utility reportedly set aside 1% of its 
income to spend on establishing a network of kiosks and saw its income rise 16% (according to an 
interview with GTZ staff). There is already some interest in pre-payment meters in DAWASCO.  
 
4.6.2 Accountability and voice  
There is a strong view among sector stakeholders that accountability for the performance of 
DAWASCO is undermined by the current institutional arrangements, which derived from the 
CityWater lease and are not well suited to a contract between two public bodies. In particular they do 
not allow DAWASA to effectively hold DAWASCO to account for its performance against 
commitments in the lease; chief executive officers (CEOs) of both organisations are ministerial 
appointments, while DAWASCO is not subject to penalties in the case of non-performance. A 
stakeholder workshop was held to discuss possible changes to the current arrangement (see Annex 6 
to the ICR, World Bank, 2011c), but the text of the ICR notes that the GoT has not yet taken steps to 
implement change. 
Accountability mechanisms to ensure that low-income households in particular receive services are 
rather weak in DSM. In theory, pro-poor services should be monitored by EWURA. EWURA attaches 
conditions to tariff increases, and has the power to refuse tariff increases if utilities are not meeting 
targets, or in serious cases to revoke utility licences and take senior managers to court. EWURA staff 
expressed interest in promoting better services for poor households, and EWURA has recently worked  
with GIZ to collect baseline information which will support better monitoring of pro-poor services, 
but, at the time of research in 2009, it was apparent that EWURA had its hands full regulating over 
100 utilities on existing performance indicators. Further supervision and support is likely to be 
needed to make regulation of pro-poor aspects a reality. The collection of disaggregated 
information on services for low-income households is also a prerequisite for greater accountability. 
Currently, information held on customers and services appears to be weak, illustrated by the fact that 
  
 
 
 
it was difficult for the researchers to obtain consistent data on numbers served by the project. Capacity 
strengthening and a clear requirement to collect, and report information against a few key indicators is 
likely to be necessary. 
EWURA regulates tariffs in a process which includes consultation through public meetings. If areas 
are identified as underserved at public meetings, EWURA staff said that they would then often insist 
that the utility construct kiosks in these areas. As far as the researchers understand, the consumer 
consultative council, which includes representatives of business, domestic customers and NGOs, is 
responsible for communication with customers and representing their concerns to EWURA as part of 
the tariff review. It is not clear how far the consumer consultative council represents low-income 
households, although EWURA stated that any customer was free to stand for a place on the council. 
EWURA also regulates connection charges, but the priority here is cost recovery in line with national 
policy and because, in the view expressed by EWURA staff, utilities cannot afford much in the way of 
subsidies or even cross-subsidies in their current financial position.  
In terms of consultation of users before implementation of the DWSSP components, the picture is 
mixed. Officials reported that residents were involved in decisions about the location of kiosks, but 
some kiosk users said during FGDs that very little consultation had been done and that the 
construction of the kiosks was discussed only with street authorities and the owners of private land 
where kiosks were to be constructed. The CWSSP implementation had a higher level of community 
involvement and consultation, although a few FGD participants still said that they were not aware of 
how the schemes were designed and financed. The DWSSP did not have an explicit focus on 
strengthening accountability and voice for poor water users. DAWASCO staff reported, however, that 
WUAs managing kiosks are in some cases raising user complaints to DAWASCO. 
 
4.6.3 Prospects for sustainability of services for low-income households 
In this section conclusions are drawn about the likely sustainability of services for low-income 
households achieved under the DWSSP, considering the approaches taken by the project and 
experience so far, as well as current developments in the sector. It should be noted that this is a time 
of some flux. A change in institutional arrangements is being considered, as discussed above. At the 
same time an Informal Settlements Department (ISD), widely referred to by informants as a “pro-poor 
unit” has recently been established within DAWASCO. Its mandate and its relationship with other 
sector institutions (including in particular the Community Liaison Unit within DAWASA) are not yet 
clear. 
Pro-poor services are more likely to be sustainable if: they have a clear and adequate future source of 
financing, and are “owned” and prioritised by a responsible sector institution; they form part of sector 
monitoring, review and lesson-learning processes; and the sector dedicates adequate resources and 
skilled staff to support them. Prospects in DSM currently seem mixed, with some positive signs and a 
number of reasons for concern. 
Some aspects of the DWSSP design offer good prospects for sustainability. The FTCF, based on a 
cross-subsidy from water tariffs, will be continuously renewed and grow as DAWASCO‟s customer 
base increases, offering a sustainable source of financing for new connections for poor households 
into the future without dependence on donors or government. The technical design of the CWSSP, 
which can reportedly be easily integrated into the main network, is another example of attention to 
long-term sustainaibility. 
In general, all informants agreed that over the course of the DWSSP, DAWASA, and to some extent, 
DAWASCO, have  made significant improvements in management, efficiency and staff capacity. 
This is an important achievement and means that the sector is in a better position to deliver and 
sustain pro-poor services in DSM than previously, though there is still a long way to go to 
overcome severe constraints relating to bulk water supply, losses from the network, tariffs set 
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below cost recovery levels, inadequate revenue collection and rising costs (see ICR, World Bank 
2011c). 
The establishment of the ISD in DAWASCO offers an opportunity to institutionalise pro-poor 
services. It will manage the FTCF and at the time of research was reportedly discussing whether the 
FTCF targeting criteria could be improved and whether the fund could be used to subsidise a wider 
range of approaches, not just household connections, in order to serve poor households more flexibly. 
In 2011, it was said that the ISD is undertaking an inventory of kiosks to assess needs. The ISD has 
high-level support within DAWASCO from both the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief 
Operations Officer, by whom is directly managed. Finally, the baseline survey recently undertaken by 
EWURA/GIZ offers an opportunity to improve monitoring, regulation and lesson-learning on services 
for poor households. 
However, the relatively low priority given to services for low-income households in terms of 
implementation to date, and the lack of systematic  thinking on how utilities can meet the needs of 
poor households, is a concern for sustainability. It is not yet clear whether the ISD will have the 
necessary capacity or clout to act strategically and change mindsets in the sector. The department is 
also likely to need considerable support, technically and possibly financially, building on guidance it 
is currently receiving from WSP. Developing new approaches to meet the needs of poor households 
and incorporating these into the technical and financial models by which utilities are governed is a 
very challenging task and one the ISD with its few staff will not be able to achieve alone.  
The problems encountered in management of both kiosks and CWSSP schemes by WUAs also do not 
bode well, particularly as several are struggling to cover their costs while selling water at an 
affordable rate. It may be necessary to reconsider the financial model and to examine what additional 
support is needed for these schemes to function on a sustainable basis. The high demand on 
functioning kiosks and schemes, which in some cases are being used beyond their design capacity, 
also increases the risk of scheme failure. However, if bulk supply to the network is increased, some of 
these problems should be alleviated for kiosks.  
Finally, the effectiveness and sustainability of pro-poor services will be constrained as long as 
DAWASCO and DAWASA continue to struggle with inadequate water supply and financial 
resources. The implementation of steps already identified to help alleviate these problems would 
therefore contribute to extending and sustaining services for low-income into the future, if 
accompanied by specific pro-poor measures with a clear allocation of resources. 
 
4.7 The significance of IDA support to the project in Tanzania 
The following is an analysis of the roles of the World Bank and the GoT in relation to the DWSSP, so 
far as it has been possible to capture this from analysis of documentation and the key informant 
interviews. As in Burkina Faso (as discussed in Section 2), the researchers were not privy to 
discussions between the World Bank and GoT or DAWASA. The financing arrangements for the 
DWSSP are then considered. 
 
4.7.1 Influencing, guidance and support 
The strong influence of the World Bank on project design, in terms of making privatisation a 
condition for debt relief and providing technical assistance and advice geared towards privatisation, 
has been previously documented  (e.g. ActionAid, 2004) and  the strong support provided to the 
privatisation policy by the World Bank is acknowledged in the project ICR which states that „The 
  
 
 
 
Bank‟s policy favored PPP [public-private partnership] as the most promising approach for improving 
the performance of services‟ (World Bank 2011c, p.6). 
A DAWASA official saw the Bank as authoritative and influential in the sector, saying: “whatever 
the World Bank discusses, we tend to go along with them”. It is not clear to what extent this reflects 
active efforts by the World Bank to push policy in particular directions, as opposed to perceptions 
among DAWASA/government staff that the World Bank is an authoritative voice whose suggestions 
should be given weight. Either way, the World Bank clearly holds an influential position. 
The same official observed that this influencing capacity had been used to push for more attention to 
pro-poor issues: 
“In discussions they enquire as to what is being done to ensure the poor have access to clean and 
safe water”. 
 
An informant from the World Bank also expressed the view that before the Bank became involved in 
DWSSP design (which was already under discussion by GoT and the other donors), there was no 
mention of serving the poor. Certainly the AFDB (a co-financer) seems to place less emphasis on the 
DWSSP‟s pro-poor dimensions of the project, stating in its ICR that the “primary target of project 
design [was] upgrading commercial operations and enhancing the financial situation of the Utility” 
(highlights of the AfDB Project Completion Report, annex 8 to the World Bank ICR, World Bank 
2011c), although a detailed review of AFDB project documents was not conducted. 
 
These comments suggest that incorporation of „pro-poor‟ elements into the project design was the 
result of influencing by the World Bank - an example of active support to „inclusion‟. 
 
However follow-through in terms of detailed design, implementation and in particular monitoring has 
been less strong. As described in section 4.3, the PAD is underpinned by detailed financial, economic 
and technical analyses, but very limited social analysis (and no evidence of further social analysis was 
made available to the researchers). The project performance indicators in the PAD, which are part of 
the contractual agreement between the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance, also reflect the lesser 
priority attached to social impacts compared with financial and technical performance, as discussed 
above. The indicators include only the number of kiosks and CWSSP schemes constructed, with no 
measure of whether these have been well targeted or provide a good service and no requirement for 
impact assessment 
 
4.7.2 Financing arrangements  
As to the financial projections of the project, key informants of GoT and the World Bank agreed that 
these were too ambitious. This is borne out by figures available at the time of research. DAWASA‟s 
cash flow from operations was projected to be over 4bn Tsh in 2009 according to the PAD (World 
Bank, 2003a), yet in reality stood at -2bn in this year (DAWASA, 2009b).  It was projected that 
DAWASA would continue to operate at a loss until around 2013, yet the loss for 2009 was expected 
to have come down to around 3.25bn Tsh and in reality was over 14bn Tsh (ibid). 
DAWASA‟s reports and plans explain that both DAWASA and DAWASCO face serious revenue 
constraints and are currently not even covering DAWASCO‟s operating costs (DAWASA, 2009a, 
2009b). As a result, DAWASA‟s draft 2009-2012 plan (the final document was not available at the 
time of research) points to a perceived problem in relation to debt service. It notes that: 
“Starting 2009/10 DAWASA will start serving principal and interest due on its loans from the 
Ministry of Finance,” and then “It is for this reason the cash balances are lesser in the years 2009 
and 2010 and negative cash balances are projected for the FY [financial year] 2011”.  
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According to financial projections in the plan, DAWASA will pay TSh 18.278bn in loan repayments 
in 2010-11, and slightly less each year over the following three years. This figure is equivalent to 
roughly 20% of DAWASA‟s projected cash flows from government and donors, and more than 150% 
of its projected revenue from operations in 2010-11 (DAWASA 2009b). The huge discrepancy 
between projection and reality is made clear in the ICR, which observes that “there is simply no 
possibility of the debt being successfully serviced under current conditions... and the government will 
have to take on the debt service until the utility is able to generate sufficient revenues”.  
It appears that the projections for turnaround in the sector which informed the decision to approve an 
on-loan to DAWASA with an interest rate of 11.5% and a relatively short grace period of five years 
were far too optimistic. In reality, connection of new customers, reduction of non-revenue water and 
tariff increases have lagged behind what was projected, and as a result DAWASA continues to 
operate with heavy losses. 
This also raises a related issue: has the particular financing model adopted by the World Bank (a 
concessional loan of which part was on-granted and part was on-lent with more stringent repayment 
conditions) had adverse implications for how far the project could support pro-poor approaches.? It 
has already been noted that a project receiving loan funding from the World Bank has to be 
“bankable”, according to informants from WSP, i.e. it must make money back so that the government 
can repay the loan, even on concessional terms. A counter argument is that the on-lending 
arrangement is in line with the national policy of cost recovery, and that if the utilities had improved 
their performance to expected levels, repayments would not have posed a problem. From this 
perspective, on-lending is an instrument to promote financial rigour.  
A lengthy examination of DAWASA‟s financial model to determine the impact of loan repayments on 
service provision could not be conducted as part of this study. It is also plausible that these impacts 
would come into play not when DAWASA is already operating at a substantial loss (and is de facto 
subsidised by government), but once revenues have increased to a level where repayment of debts is 
actually possible. What is clear, according to the documents cited above, is that the level of debt 
service is a concern for the utilities.  
The on-lending agreement was made between the Ministry of Finance and DAWASA, but was 
approved by the World Bank at the start of the project. The World Bank reported that they were 
concerned that debt repayments should not pose a risk to DAWASA‟s financial sustainability, and 
have therefore urged the Ministry of Finance to reduce the interest rate on the on-lent funds. However, 
according to the ICR this request has been rejected. 
 
4.8 Conclusions and recommendations from Tanzania 
4.8.1 Conclusions 
 Policies and strategies in Tanzania state that  poor urban populations are a priority group for 
interventions to improve access to water and sanitation, and they mandate utilities to develop 
approaches to targeting and serving them. However, these policy statements are not translated 
into a documented strategy for achieving inclusion of poor households in Dar es Salaam, either 
in DAWASA‟s development contract or its current plans. The intention expressed in the 2005 – 
2010 National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP or MKUKUTA, URTb) 
for monitoring of pro-poor water supply was also not fully applied. 
 In general, documentation of pro-poor services is weak. There is a lack of information on what 
investments have been made and who has benefited. It was not possible to get accurate up-to-
date lists from DAWASCO or DAWASA of kiosks or CWSSP schemes. Nor were connections 
  
 
 
 
under the delegated works broken down into existing and new. This reflects a wider lack of 
good monitoring and information systems for water and sanitation services in Dar es Salaam. 
 There is a lack of accountability arrangements for services for low-income households. 
DAWASA‟s and DAWASCO‟s contracts focus on general performance, financial and technical 
indicators, reflecting the priority given to improving utility performance and achieving financial 
stability during the DWSSP years. EWURA is not currently monitoring service levels to poor 
households, though it is building an information baseline that could support this. Meanwhile the 
current institutional arrangement does not provide adequate accountability or positive incentives 
for DAWASCO to improve its performance.  
 The DWSSP included a dedicated pro-poor component– the Community Water Supply and 
Sanitation Program (CWSSP) – with a well-developed targeting system. This has been fairly 
successful and has provided improved and affordable services to up to 400,000 people (though 
some estimates are lower) in low income areas. It is a very positive development that 
DAWASA has moved into providing decentralised services outside the main networked area. 
However, the financial sustainability of CWSSP schemes remains to be seen; external funds 
may be needed for major repairs or infrastructure replacement. 
 The CWSSP benefited from the involvement of NGOs experienced in community projects, the 
inclusion of municipalities in the community selection process, and from a dedicated fund and 
management team in DAWASA who have shown commitment to improving the management of 
CWSSP schemes.  
 However, the CWSSP is relatively small and the bulk of the project (over 95% of the budget) 
focuses on improvements to the piped network and utility performance in relation to networked 
customers. Here the pro-poor elements have had much less impact. The lifeline tariff, first-time 
connection fund and kiosk construction are designed to help poor households access water. 
However, in practice it seems that low priority has been given to these. The first time 
connection fund has never been applied, in part due to design weaknesses. Kiosks have been 
constructed, but only 7% of them were functioning reliably and providing a good service at the 
time of the research. This was due in part to insufficient bulk water in the system and high 
losses, which the DWSSP has taken some early steps to address, but also to various 
management issues which are awaiting resolution.  
 Although most kiosks do not yet provide a good service, the principle of constructing kiosks in 
priority zones identified by a parallel project (the LGSP) shows responsiveness to community 
demands and an integrated approach which could form the basis of a strong pro-poor targeting 
strategy in future. 
 Social analysis informing the project was very limited in comparison with technical and 
financial aspects.  
 Subsidies have been used to provide universal free connections in project areas and subsidise 
consumption by all households, in spite of policy statements about cost recovery accompanied 
by specific pro-poor measures. 
 The design of project key performance indicators is weak in terms of ensuring pro-poor goals 
are met. The KPIs refer only to construction of kiosks and installation of connections, not who 
has benefited or any measure of the impact on low-income households. Of the stated goals of 
the DWSSP, “affordability” is neglected in terms of translation into KPIs. There is no formal 
requirement for an assessment of project impacts for beneficiaries.  
 The World Bank played a positive influencing role in pushing for the inclusion of pro-poor 
elements in the DWSSP. In particular, the incorporation of the CWSSP is commendable and the 
combination of targeting approaches selected for use across DSM is broadly logical. However, 
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this initial positive influence was not adequately followed up by translation of the pro-poor 
elements into monitoring arrangements and utility contracts; these prioritise technical 
performance, service standards and financial sustainability over pro-poor goals. 
 Utility revenues remain far below expected levels due to highly ambitious projections of 
performance, in a context of poor information and high risks, and due to delays in implementing 
infrastructure components because of the failed privatisation early in the project. In this context, 
utilities are concerned about the effect of loan repayments with high interest rates on their 
financial position. 
 
4.8.2 Recommendations 
 
For the Government of Tanzania, DAWASA and DAWASCO: 
 It is recommended that DAWASA and DAWASCO (possibly led by the new Informal 
Settlements Department of DAWASCO, depending on its eventually agreed role), with the 
support of MoWI, convene a discussion with key sector stakeholders to draw up a city-wide 
strategy for targeting of poor areas and households. The discussion should bring together 
relevant available data, e.g. the GIZ-supported baseline study, CIUP zoning data and perhaps 
census data (such as has been used for poverty mapping in Burkina Faso, see Chapter 2), and 
consider how it could be used to develop targeting methods. It should also bring in actors 
outside the water sector such as the planning departments of the three municipal councils and 
DCC, and experts in poverty, social planning and economics from universities and research 
institutes.  
 Support should be given to the utilities to translate the pro-poor ambitions expressed in policies 
and strategies into concrete plans, in the context of developing an overall city plan for serving 
low-income households. At the same time, EWURA should be resourced and empowered to 
regulate utilities against pro-poor objectives.   
 DAWASCO‟s Informal Settlements Department should be adequately staffed and resourced to 
provide strategic thinking on how services to low-income households could be improved in Dar 
es Salaam. Its work should be mainstreamed into the activities of DAWASCO and the sector as 
a whole. This is a long-term process and utility incentive structures should be designed to 
reward long-term support to such a unit, even if it is not revenue-generating (providing water to 
poor households will, of course, be revenue generating). 
 Poor households could be viable connected customers for DAWASCO, and flexible payment 
systems should be developed, for example weekly rather than monthly billing, to help overcome 
problems of non-payment faced in the past. Consideration should also be given to the fact that 
many households access water from neighbours‟ connections.  At the same time, however, the 
costs associated with serving poor households are often higher than for commercial or wealthier 
customers and the returns lower, so targeted action to incentivise the operator and utility 
remains critical to ensure that the poor are not the last to be served. 
 DAWASA and DAWASCO could learn lessons from cities such as Kampala, where services to 
poor households have been extended through both household connections and pre-paid water 
meters, or from towns in Tanzania such as Lindi, where the utility reportedly set aside 1% of its 
income to spend on establishing a network of kiosks and saw its income rise 16% (according to 
an interview with GTZ staff).  
  
 
 
 
 DAWASCO should make a concerted effort to bring as many kiosks as possible into operation, 
particularly where the delay is due to management issues or delays in construction rather than 
lack of bulk water, which can be resolved quickly if given priority.  
 Possibilities to target the first time connection fund more effectively should be explored, for 
example: free connections for all in the poorest areas, and in mixed/better-off areas, free 
connections for households meeting one or more of a set of proxy indicators for poverty level 
(e.g. number of taps, housing quality, or number of families sharing a dwelling). 
 If limited funds to subsidise services are available, these should be channelled to services which 
benefit low-income users (connections, kiosks and community-managed supplies) rather than to 
consumption of water through the main network, especially not to consumption above the 
lifeline tariff.  
 From an equity perspective, affordable services for poor households should be given immediate 
attention even if this means developing „interim‟ solutions on a large scale – such as the 
CWSSP or kiosks with tankered water – while necessary investments are made in the main 
network.  
 
 Scaling up of the CWSSP should be coordinated with municipal governments and NGOs to 
ensure that the siting of schemes implemented under different programmes is complementary 
and equitable. It is recommended that a dedicated team be retained to manage this programme, 
as it requires expertise which is currently being built up in the CLU. Efforts to learn from the 
CWSSP programme, such as studies by WSP, are a positive sign and should be continued. 
 Further support should be given to the development of the young Consumer Consultative 
Council, in particular to ensure that it reflects the priorities of low-income households by 
including representation from low-income groups (e.g. kiosk users, not just networked 
customers) and publicising public meetings appropriately. 
 
For the World Bank: 
 There should be full consistency between the stated goals of World Bank support (or the 
projects/programmes it supports), the detailed project design and key performance indicators of 
projects . If a pro-poor goal is stated as a project priority, this should be fully reflected in the 
project design and performance indicators. 
 The World Bank should encourage and support sector institutions to develop strategic and 
systematic approaches to serving low-income households across cities (i.e. going beyond the 
design of individual project components or specific approaches with limited application without 
being integrated in a city-wide system). This is an opportunity for positive influencing and 
guidance. Project design should be informed by a systematic analysis of the needs of low-
income households and levels of affordability. 
 The World Bank should support data collection activities by utilities and regulators, including 
collection of socio-economically disaggregated data on service levels, as the current poor 
information base is a constraint on effective targeting and pro-poor regulation. In line with the 
Accra Agenda, the World Bank should work with the Government of Tanzania to collect and 
monitor dissaggregated data on water users under the WSDP (see Box 1.3).  
 A good option for further capacity building of DAWASA and DAWASCO, particularly pro-
poor aspects, is to support further partnership with Uganda‟s NWSC, perhaps by financing 
NWSC‟s costs. This partnership has so far proved successful in improving the performance of 
DAWASA and DAWASCO, and there is scope for more learning in particular on how services 
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have been extended to low-income households in Kampala through both household connections 
and pre-paid water meters, without damage to the utility‟s financial position. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
5 Synthesis 
 
This section summarises the findings of the case studies in the three countries.  
 
Sections 5.1 to 5.4 review progress of the projects93  against the following common issues:- 
 Water policy, and particularly equity aspects; 
 Water Infrastructure;  
 Water Services, and particularly social and „inclusion‟ aspects; and 
 Utility capacity and performance, including financial aspects. 
 Section 5.5, on „Policy principles to project implementation‟, considers how social aspects, 
in particular „inclusion‟ of low-income areas and households, have been lost or disregarded in 
the translation of policy statements into utility plans and contracts, project design and  
implementation. 
 
Further sections then discuss:- 
 Sustainability: prospects for sustainability of services for low-income households;  
 Accountability issues; 
 IDA role: the role of the World Bank in negotiations with government; the terms of on-
lending and on-granting. 
 
The Table in Annex 10 provides, for ease of reference and comparison, an overview of information 
relating to the four projects. 
 
5.1    Water Policy  
In the three countries, laws and/or policies include a commitment to universal access to potable 
water supply and either recognition of the requirement for „equity‟ or the needs of poor populations, 
as follows. 
Under the laws of the three counties, access to drinking water is recognised as a right. National 
water policies state that, in relation for water for drinking, different categories of population must 
be treated “equitably” (Burkina) and according to “appropriate social equity considerations” 
(Tanzania), so as to “satisfy sustainably, in quantity and quality, the water needs of a growing 
population and an economy in development” (Burkina) and so that “a basic level of water supply is 
provided to the poor at affordable cost” (Tanzania), and as key to poverty reduction (Ghana). 
 
5.2    Water Infrastructure  
Population growth rates in Accra, Ouagadougou and Dar es Salaam have doubled each city‟s 
population in the two decades prior to the beginning of the studied project, beyond the capacity of 
existing water collection and treatment infrastructure94. The consequence, in each case, was a piped 
network delivering an intermittent service to a minority of residents.  
The ZIGA project (2001-2007) succeeded in increasing water production in Ouagadougou 
threefold. “The production and storage capacity installed is sufficient for the time being” (World 
                                                 
93 In the case of Burkina, since the new project was only recently approved, only the achievements and weaknesses of 
the ZIGA project are considered. 
94 As described in each of Sections 2, 3 and 4. As noted in Section 4.1.1 in three decades from 1978 to 2007, the 
population of Dar more than tripled.  
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Bank 2009b, page 6). The distribution network within Ouagadougou was also substantially 
extended, serving more residents - see Box 5.1.   
 
 Box  5.1    Water Infrastructure - progress status 
Ghana (Urban Water Project, 2004-2010) 
 - The UWP offers the possibility of substantial, much-needed investment in infrastructure which is 
necessary to support future expansion/connections.  
- Investments are to be allocated between and within regions across the country (see section 5.3.2). 
 
Burkina („ZIGA‟ project, 2002-2007) 
- An earth dam and reservoir were duly constructed at the ZIGA river site, and a 50 kilometre long 
„primary‟ water main (of 1 metre in diameter) was laid in order to bring the bulk water supply to the city. At 
the entry to the city, a storage facility and pumping station was built, with eight water towers and other 
ground-level tanks within the city, as well as 171 kilometres and 1,437 kilometres of „secondary‟ and 
„tertiary‟ distribution networks respectively. Thereby, water production and delivery for Ouagadougou was 
increased threefold, from 40,800 cubic metres per day in 2001 (World Bank, 2001, p.5) to 122,000 cubic 
metres per day in 2007 (World Bank, 2009b, page 1). This meant that, from an intermittent service prior to 
ZIGA, the city was provided with a continuous water supply (including in the dry season) (World Bank, 
2008, p.vi). According to the key informant interviews conducted by this study, the water supply produced 
by the ZIGA project is sufficient to meet current demand.    
- Water access in urbanised areas of Ouagadougou beyond the city centre has improved through household 
connections and standpipes. The project evaluation in June 2008 (World Bank, 2008), recorded 56,000 
inhabitants connected and 400 standpipes installed.   
 
Tanzania (Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project, 2003-2010)  
- The DWSSP brings substantial investment in infrastructure to increase bulk water production and 
rehabilitate the network. Over 112,000 connections installed (mixture of new, reinstated and rehabilitated) 
and at least 184 water kiosks constructed in networked areas. 
- Infrastructure improvements were delayed, in turn delaying expected improvements in NRW and hours of 
service, largely due to the failed privatisation at the start of the project (the project end date was revised 
twice from 2008 to 2010). However these works are now largely complete. CWSSP schemes were to be 
completed in 2007, but in late 2009 only 25 out of 41 were yet in operation, due to a mixture of 
procurement and management issues. The number has since risen. 
- Lack of water in the network has deprived some kiosks of a reliable service (12 out of 184, 7% only). 
 
 
In Dar, the DWSSP has improved water access for tens of thousands of urban residents - in the case 
of the Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (CWSSP), hundreds of thousands. 
Meanwhile, the UWP project in Ghana is designed to extend the national piped supply network 
with investment in each of the country‟s ten regions; progress has, however, been extensively 
delayed, in part due to slow procurement procedures. Five years into the project, baseline studies 
have not been done. Delays in implementation of the main project components have also occurred 
in Tanzania: capital works originally scheduled for completion in 2008 are still ongoing.  
 
All the projects financed, or will finance, new connections, including standpipes/kiosks as well as 
household connections.  
 
In Accra and Dar es Salaam, the main barrier to access is not cost, but a lack of bulk water in the 
system which means that significant areas of each city are not covered by the piped network, 
including low-income communities. This contrasts with the situation in Ouagadougou where the 
construction of the dam at the ZIGA site and the installation of 50 kms of water main from the river 
  
 
 
 
water source to the city has resolved the problem of bulk supply, at least in the short and medium 
term. In the context in Accra and Dar, what matters are investments in bulk water supply and 
production  so as to be able viably to extend services, both network expansion and stand-alone 
schemes in areas (far) outside the network, which should be targeted according to need. Until those 
investments have been put in place, subsidies which focus on connections to the network alone are 
irrelevant to a large number of poor households. 
5.3 Water Services  
5.3.1 Status of water services  
 
As regards the status of water services under the three projects95, Box 5.2 notes the key findings of 
this research.  
 
 
Box  5.2    Water Services - status  
 Ghana (Urban Water Project, 2004-2010) 
- The project has had a positive impact in highlighting the importance of pro-poor service provision.  
- The project provided financial support for fledgling pro-poor initiatives led by the regulator, PURC, 
including piloting of community-managed schemes in three low-income areas of Accra; these pilot 
schemes look set to bring significant benefits for poor households. 
- Allocation criteria for regional investments fail to take into account  the distribution of water and income 
within regions (they rely on overall income and coverage figures), the availability of alternative water 
sources or acceleration in urban population growth (they are based on 2000 population figures). This has 
resulted in some wastage of resources through ineffective targeting.  
- Pro-poor elements of the project represent a very small proportion of project funds.  
 
Burkina („ZIGA‟ project, 2002-2007) 
- In Ouagadougou, the spatial coverage of standpipes has been significantly increased, and most have been 
located in areas surrounding the centre of the city which are generally poorer (as verified by the mapping 
exercise conducted by this research study). 
- The ZIGA project introduced a social connection policy to reduce the cost of connections by 50% and 
later 75%. This substantially increased demand for household connections. 
- In the extension of standpipes, some poor areas were missed and some better-off areas included. 
- Few standpipes were installed in informal, „un-urbanised‟ areas, and rates of functionality in some 
locations are low. 
- The evaluation of the ZIGA project did not distinguish benefit or impact on households of different 
income level.   
-The socio-economic data gathered from the ICEA/SOGREH questionnaire employed by 
ICEA/SOGREAH (set out in the annex to the report ICEA-SOGREAH, 2008) for its survey in July 2007 
among households in the largest cities in Burkina was not utilised in the project design - at least, not 
visibly in the PAD. 
/cont…    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 As noted above, not including the new project in Burkina. 
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Box  5.2    Water Services - status (continued) 
 Tanzania (Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project, 2003-2010)  
- Pro-poor issues were brought on to the agenda, reportedly due to World Bank influence. A Community 
Liaison Unit has been established within DAWASA to manage the Community Water Supply and 
Sanitation Programme-CWSSP. 
- Improved, affordable water supply was provided to around 200,000 peri-urban residents outside the main 
network through the CWSSP (figures disagree – see section 4). 
- Kiosks were constructed in networked areas. Those which function and receive bulk water from the 
network provide affordable water to users (though this is a very small percentage of kiosks). 
- Social connection fund collected (levy on water bills). 
- The new connections were mostly free to consumers. 
- Bureaucratic delays by DAWASCO in connecting kiosks and hiring operators has also hindered the 
provision of a reliable service. 
- The First Time Connection Fund (FTCF) for low-income households has not been used, due in part to 
inappropriate design of criteria for targeting of poor households. 
- Pro-poor elements of the project represented a very small proportion of project funds. 
 
The projects in Ghana and Tanzania each include a dedicated pro-poor component (the CWSSP in 
Dar es Salaam and the pro-poor pilots in Ghana). The CWSSP has made significant achievements 
in terms of inclusion and impact on the poor, and the pilots in Ghana look set to do the same, in 
both cases since they are employing workable targeting methods and have been led by specific 
teams (the Community Liaison Unit in DAWASA in Tanzania, and the regulator, PURC, in 
Ghana). In Ghana and Tanzania in particular, the projects have played an important role in bringing 
pro-poor issues on to the policy agenda. In all countries, the projects introduced or developed new 
approaches for serving the poor: subsidies (of 50-75%) for water connections and household 
sanitation in Burkina, and community managed schemes outside the main network in Ghana and 
Tanzania.  
 
The targeting methods used to achieve inclusion of poor areas and households (discussed in greater 
depth in section 5.3.2 below) were variable. For some specific components, targeting approaches 
have been developed which are fairly effective (e.g. CWSSP). As for more mainstream project 
elements, relating to the central activities of utilities - network extension, new connections and even 
the installation of standpipes/kiosks - in all three countries there were noticeable gaps in targeting. 
In particular, there were no clear criteria for siting standpipes.  Neither Accra, Ouagadougou nor 
Dar es Salaam had a city-wide strategy for inclusion, in spite of the fact that in all three countries, 
sector policies clearly express the principle of provision of affordable services to low-income urban 
communities. In Ghana, there was an effort to target investments across the country according to a 
defined formula for allocation of investment between and within regions, but this does not appear to 
have targeted the areas of greatest water poverty most effectively. 
 
The projects have also had mixed results in terms of ensuring affordability for low-income 
households. In Ouagadougou, standpipes provide water at an affordable rate, but households in the  
peri-urban areas studied by this research (through focus group discussions) consider household 
connections to be too expensive, even with a substantial connection subsidy. In Dar es Salaam, 
water from both CWSSP schemes and kiosks (those that receive adequate bulk water supply) is 
much cheaper than that sold by vendors and is considered reasonably affordable by users, but it is 
still more expensive than even the higher band tariff for piped water, and more than twice the price 
of water sold at the lifeline tariff.  
 
  
 
 
 
This may reflect the fact that, in the three countries, pro-poor approaches are not based on detailed 
analyses of the needs and capacities of low-income communities. None of the projects has as its 
starting point an assessment of the needs of poor households, and the project appraisal documents 
(PADs) cite very limited social analysis in comparison with the depth of analysis of financial and 
technical aspects.  
 
In the new project in Burkina (approved in May 2009), and also in the DWSSP in Tanzania, project 
design gives clear priority to household connections over standpipes/kiosks. In Ghana, the type of 
connection is not specified. This pro-connections approach appears to be driven at least in part by 
financial considerations, with connections prioritised a priori, rather than a balance of approaches 
based on assessment of how to best serve the greatest number of poor urban residents. In both 
Ouagadougou and Dar, it was found that there is still demand for standpipes. The decision to 
channel subsidies away from standpipes to household connections does not have a clear basis from 
a perspective of inclusion.   
 
The social goals of the projects have not been fully translated into the performance indicators by 
which the projects‟ success will be judged. The existing project performance indicators clearly 
prioritise financial and technical/service quality aspects. Social indicators, where they do exist, are 
restricted to the number of connections or standpipes/kiosks installed - with no measure of where 
these are located or who is to benefit. It has been difficult for researchers to assess how effectively 
connections have reached low income households, precisely because no disaggregated data is 
collected in any of the three countries.  
 
This downgrading of the status of social elements of the projects is further reflected in how they 
have been implemented. In Ghana and Tanzania, significant delays in implementation of the main 
project components have occurred, and in both cases the objectives of pro-poor elements seem to 
have been neglected in order to save time and meet project targets (e.g. timing was such that lessons 
from pilots could not be incorporated into planning of the capital investment programme, and the 
first-time connection fund was never applied in Dar). This may explain the low priority that seems 
to have been given to restoring the non-functioning kiosks in Dar es Salaam.  
 
Overall, the projects have raised the profile of pro-poor issues and supported some positive 
initiatives aimed at achieving inclusion of poor households. However, with the exception of some 
specific components, receiving a very small share of project budgets, the social elements of the 
projects have not been adequately developed and/or prioritised to meet the difficult challenge of 
achieving inclusion of the poor in these cities. 
 
5.3.2 Targeting of infrastructure investments  
Table 5.1 summarises the targeting approaches adopted in the three countries, for targeting of both 
infrastructure investments and subsidies to ensure that benefits reach low-income households.  
The use of geographic targeting approaches for infrastructure investment - i.e. prioritising areas 
where households are poor or meet other socio-economic criteria - varies across the three countries. 
In Ghana, this was attempted with the use of formulae to allocate investments across regions based 
on a number of indicators (Box 2.3), although as shown in Table 5.1 these criteria did not reflect 
distribution within regions and water systems and failed to capture fully the extent of deprivation.  
This shows that attention has to be paid to the criteria used for prioritisation of geographic areas, 
and that these should be regularly reviewed. With the exception of the small PURC pilot project, 
within Accra and other towns in Ghana, the utility does not target investments geographically 
according to need, for example establishing standpipes in low-income areas. In Ouagadougou, the 
mapping exercise carried out by this research project suggests that, in terms of inclusion of low-
income areas, extension of standpipes to the city‟s  surrounding districts was „patchy‟. It is not clear 
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why some peri-urban sectors - those noted in section 3.4.2.1, each of which is poor - received many 
fewer standpipes than other sectors.  
 
Targeting of kiosks on a geographical basis occurred in relation to the community-managed 
schemes outside the main network which have been developed in Accra (the pilots led by PURC) 
and in Tanzania (the Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme - CWSSP). In Tanzania 
networked kiosks were constructed in areas identified as priorities for infrastructure upgrading 
under another World Bank-supported project. Although the kiosks have not functioned well in 
practice, this seems to be a good example of coordination between water and other infrastructure 
planning, although awareness of the process in DAWASCO is low. In Burkina, the only 
geographical targeting from a pro-poor perspective was a broad assignation of project funds to 17 
peri-urban districts of Ouagadougou, without taking account of differing levels of poverty or needs 
in those areas. Overall there was a lack of systematic, city-wide targeting.  
 
The preliminary poverty map developed by the researchers in Burkina Faso (see Section 3.4.2.1 and 
Annex 5) shows that, using available census data, it is possible to map city districts according to 
levels of wealth/poverty. Application of such methods could be explored by the other cities with a 
view to improvement of targeting of pro-poor services such as standpipes or subsidies, though as 
shown from the experience of Obuasi in Ghana (where standpipes were not used because safe, 
affordable water from wells was already readily available), it is also important to take into account 
the presence of alternative water supply sources as well as income, to promote equity in access and 
avoid wasted investments. In each country there is some information which could form the basis of 
a targeting strategy, but it is not currently being utilised for this purpose, e.g. the zones identified 
for infrastructure upgrading in Dar. 
5.4 Subsidies  
In all three countries, consumption subsidies are provided for lifeline volumes of water. These are 
intended to benefit low-income households, since it is assumed that poor households will consume 
less water (or can choose to, in order to keep down costs - a form of self-targeting). However, it is 
well established in the literature that such subsidies generally do badly at reaching poor households 
(see for example Boland and Whittington 2003 and with regard to SSA, Foster Briceño-Garmendia 
2010). Many low-income households live in high density housing, share connections or access 
resold water, so consumption quickly exceeds a larger lifeline volume, or their connection is not 
metered. In addition, the subsidy is provided to all consumers on their consumption within the 
lifeline block, including better-off households - a targeting error (also called „leakage‟). In 
Tanzania, DAWASCO staff confirmed that poor households often struggled to control consumption 
when they obtained a household connection, and said that some even prefer to return to paying by 
the bucket because their monthly bills became unaffordable. This suggests that the lifeline tariff is 
not succeeding at making piped water affordable for all, and that other measures are required, such 
as flexible billing mechanisms and continued provision of standpipes.  
 
  
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Targeting approaches adopted for investments and subsidies in the projects studied  
Targeting Method Ghana Burkina Tanzania 
Geographic Targeting 
Areas identified as poor 
are prioritised, and 
either: 
- investments in 
extending services are 
made primarily in these 
areas, or 
- households in those 
areas are considered 
eligible for subsidies on 
the basis of location 
- Criteria were set for 
investment allocation to 10 
regions within Ghana, and 
26 systems in those areas. 
This is the principal 
instrument of targeting 
under the UWP, although 
this was based only on 
Ghana water official 
supplies and did not 
consider alternative access 
mechanisms; thus in Obuasi, 
people preferred to access 
water from boreholes. 
 
- Within the areas served by 
the 26 systems, there was no 
geographical targeting to 
identify low-income zones.  
- One exception is PURC‟s 
pilot projects in Accra 
which are geographically 
targeted. 
- Other than the stated 
objective of bringing  
improved  water services 
to, broadly, the seventeen 
sectors (14-30) outside the 
centre of Ouagadougou, 
no geographic targeting 
strategy of ONEA is 
evident. 
 
- The siting of standpipes 
in areas surrounding the 
centre of Ouagadougou 
appears to have been 
patchy from an inclusion 
perspective, with targeting 
errors. 
Kiosks: 31 priority zones were identified by 
a local government infrastructure project 
and these were adopted for the kiosks. 
Within these 31 areas, DAWASCO, 
DAWASA and the municipal authorities 
reportedly worked together to identify 
priority streets based on three criteria: 
degree of water unavailability; accessibility 
of the street from other nearby streets, and 
frequency of outbreaks of water-related 
disease. The operator DAWASCO also 
conducted surveys to determine commercial 
viability of kiosks and incorporated this 
criterion into decisions about siting.  
 
Communities were short-listed for the 
Community Water Supply and Sanitation 
Programme (CWSSP) according to five 
criteria designed to identify low-income 
communities in need of better water 
services. 
Targeting by household 
characteristics (proxy 
means-testing) 
Households selected by 
characteristics indicating 
poverty. 
X 
Not currently employed by 
GWCL or AVRL. 
X 
Not currently employed 
by ONEA. 
This was tried in the eligibility criteria for 
the First Time Connection Fund: 
households had to have less than 3 taps, and 
be within 20 metres of a distribution main.  
But the FTCF was only briefly used and the 
criteria did not prove workable in practice. 
Income-based means 
testing 
Households selected 
based on income 
                                       X 
                               Not employed by the projects. 
Community-based 
Community leaders 
and/or organisations, or 
CSOs select poor 
areas/households in their 
community. 
  Communities were short-listed for the 
Community Water Supply and Sanitation 
Programme (CWSSP) schemes by 
DAWASA, local authority officials at city, 
municipal and district levels and a 
university professor) - Although not driven 
by community leaders or representatives, 
this selection process did involve district 
governments. 
 
The exact location of kiosks within selected 
streets was also reportedly determined 
through community consultation, though 
this may have been more geared towards 
identifying sites with suitable land rather 
than ensuring convenience for the poorest 
households.  
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Table 5.1: Targeting approaches and subsidies - continued  
Targeting Method Ghana Burkina Tanzania 
Self-targeting 
Households select from a 
range of service levels at 
different prices (e.g. 
household connection, 
shared connection or 
standpipe), according to 
their preferences and ability 
to pay.  
Or the first volumes of 
water used are subsidised 
and households (in theory) 
self-target by consumption 
level.  
 
 
- Standpipes are being 
provided as an alternative 
to household connections. 
But in Obuasi this 
investment was not 
demand-responsive and 
there are water quality 
problems with standpipes, 
leading to low levels of use.  
- The barrier to household 
connections in Ghana is not 
just price but bureaucracy 
and the time taken to install 
a connection.  
- A lifeline volume of water 
(20m3 per month) is 
supplied at a subsidised rate 
to all metered households. 
 
- Standpipes are provided 
as an alternative to 
household connections in 
many areas,  particularly 
low-income areas. 
- Under the new project 
households will be able to 
choose from a range of 
household sanitation 
technologies at different 
prices; but the study 
suggests that even the 
cheapest are unaffordable 
to low-income households.  
- The water tariff includes a 
“social tranche” (lifeline 
volume) at a subsidised rate 
to all metered households. 
- Kiosks have been 
constructed as an 
alternative to household 
connections in several areas 
with water network, and 
also under the CWSSP 
schemes. But water from 
networked kiosks is more 
expensive than piped water 
and functionality rates are 
extremely low.  
- A lifeline volume of water 
(5m3 per month) is supplied 
at a subsidised rate to all 
metered households. 
Universal subsidies 
Universal subsidies are 
provided to all households, 
and are not targeted.  
- No connection subsidies 
offered.  
- PURC, alone, has been 
working to develop a social 
policy including pro-poor 
elements with a very small 
proportion of project funds. 
- GWCL showed (at the 
time of this research) little 
interest in social policy, 
although the UWP was 
making GWCL more aware 
of social policy. 
- Tariff is said to be 
approaching cost recovery 
(see discussion in Section 
2).  
- A lifeline volume of water 
(20m3 per month) is 
supplied at a subsidised rate 
to all metered households. 
 
- Household water 
connections are subsidised 
by 75% and, under the new 
project, construction of 
household sanitation 
facilities will also be 
partially subsidised. 
- These subsidies are made 
available to all households 
at a standard rate, i.e. not 
different levels of subsidy 
for households in differing 
circumstances (the 
subsidised costs still seem 
to be unaffordable to low-
income households). 
- The water tariff includes a 
“social tranche” (lifeline 
volume) at a subsidised rate 
to all metered households. 
- The FTCF was designed 
to offer subsidies for new 
connections for low-income 
households at an effective 
subsidy of c.85%.  
- In practice, the FTCF was 
not applied, which meant 
that the DWSSP offered 
universal connection 
subsidies (within 
designated work areas) in 
order to meet 
implementation targets and 
increase the number of 
paying connections on 
DAWASCO‟s books.  
- A lifeline volume of water 
(5m3 per month) is supplied 
at a subsidised rate to all 
metered households. 
 
Consumption subsidies for water from standpipes or kiosks, in contrast, are much more likely to be 
progressive as standpipes are only generally used by those who cannot access or afford a household 
connection (a form of self-targeting). Consumption from standpipes was subsidised in all three 
countries, although in Ghana, Burkina and Tanzania water from standpipes was still more expensive 
than piped water. In Tanzania, while water was supposed to be sold at the lifeline tariff rate from 
kiosks, the surcharge required to pay kiosk operators pushed up the price. Similarly, in Ghana the 
official standpipe tariff is the same as the lifeline rate (Table 2.3), but evidence from interviews and 
other research (such as Keener et al 2009) indicates that Ghana (along with Tanzania, Sudan and 
Madagascar) is one of few countries in the region where the standpipe rate is higher than that of a 
household connection for water. Elsewhere, it is not clear that subsidised standpipe consumption 
  
 
 
 
reaches end users and are often captured by standpipe operators (Keener et al 2009, p.24). In 
Tanzania, it was projected in the design of the DWSSP that water from household connections 
would be cheaper than from kiosks, in order to incentivise households to obtain connections. 
However, there are many reasons why households might be unable or unwilling to apply for a 
household connection, as noted in section 1.7. In the Dar context, as discussed in Section 4, the 
decision to prioritise subsidies for connections in Tanzania does not seem to be based on any 
assessment of the demands or needs of low-income households. 
Connection subsidies are generally considered more progressive than consumption subsidies 
because they extend access to piped water to new households. In both Burkina and Tanzania, 
connection subsidies were offered. In Ghana, connections are charged at full cost. In Burkina, a 
universal connection subsidy of 75% (previously less) is provided, yet the focus groups conducted 
by the project suggest that a connection was still unaffordable to low-income households. In Dar es 
Salaam, a social connection fund (the First Time Connection Fund) was aimed at providing free 
connections (free, apart from a small deposit on future consumption) to low-income households, 
which was intended to use targeting by household characteristics, designed to correlate with 
lower incomes (three or fewer taps). Key informants reported, however, that households with three 
taps would be middle class rather than poor, while low-income households living in rented homes 
could be asked to leave, once landlords installed a connection, because they could charge more rent. 
Nonetheless, this represents an effort to make access to household connections more affordable for 
poor households, though the broad criteria also seem to reflect a desire to increase connections in 
general as also discussed in Section 3 rather than a channelling of subsidies to the poorest - 
subsidies are geared to increasing the number of household connections irrespective of for whom, 
and there is a lack of incentives for the three utilities to serve low-income households.  
 
In Dar, in any case, the FTCF has not yet been used, following the decision to provide universal 
free connections in the DWSSP work areas, in order to meet connection targets and reduce illegal 
connections.  
 
In terms of network enlargement, the PURC-led pilots in Accra and the CWSSP in Dar es Salaam 
are positive developments, subject to resolution of the bulk water situation, referred to in section 
5.2. Meanwhile, in Ouagadougou, the French Development Agency (AFD) is funding extension 
through schemes for local neighbourhood operators whose overhead is likely to be lower than that 
of ONEA, so it is expected that they will charge a lower margin. 
 
Under the new project in Burkina, ONEA will also offer a universal subsidy for the construction of 
household sanitation facilities. A menu of technological options is to be offered at different prices, 
to allow self-targeting. However, it is feared that cost will still be a barrier for low-income 
households. For self-targeting to be effective, the range of options must include some which are 
affordable to the poorest households. A better approach might be to offer a greater subsidy for 
selected households only, e.g. those in mapped low-income parts of the city or with certain 
household characteristics. 
It is clear that more attention is needed to ensure affordability of services for low-income 
households, for example through enhanced connection subsidies (which could be targeted by 
geographic area if a universal subsidy would place too heavy financing constraints on the utility). 
Subsidies should also be channelled to services which provide particularly for low-income 
households i.e. standpipes/kiosks and standalone schemes in peri-urban areas, particularly if these 
investments are geographically targeted in areas where the majority of users are likely to be poor.  
There is also a need for attention to other barriers to access. In Ghana, research in Obuasi revealed a 
heavily bureaucratic process involved in obtaining a connection and water quality problems, for 
example. 
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As for „community-based selection‟, communities were short-listed for the CWSSP in Dar by 
DAWASA, local authority officials at city, municipal and district levels and a university professor 
(according to five criteria designed to identify low-income communities in need of better water 
services). This selection process was on behalf of the community, although not conducted directly 
by community leaders themselves. Community-based selection has been proposed as a possible 
future approach to determine eligibility for the first-time connection fund in Tanzania. This can be a 
sensible approach where hard data on incomes is lacking, but there are risks of capture and bias. 
As Table 5.1 shows, one targeting method described in Section 1.7 (Table 1.3) which was clearly  
not found to be employed by any of the utilities in the case studies is „Income-based means testing‟. 
Means testing is unlikely to be workable in the three countries studied in the near future, due to the 
costs and complexity of collecting and maintaining accurate information, particularly where there 
are large unplanned/informal settlements, a mobile population and high levels of employment in the 
informal sector.  
 
 
5.4 Utility capacity and performance – including financial aspects  
Alongside the projects‟ infrastructure goal, strengthening the performance and capacity of the utilities 
is central to the purpose of the projects studied, as clearly set out in the PADs. Combined, the 
infrastructure and utility capacity components have been allocated by far the largest share of project 
budgets. 
 
In Burkina Faso, the ZIGA project saw a substantial turn around in the financial and operational 
management of ONEA, in terms of bill collection, reduction of unaccounted-for-water, staff 
productivity, and financial reporting (as described in Section 3.5). In Tanzania and Ghana, 
Key findings: Targeting and subsidies 
The projects adopted partial geographic targeting of investments in new services to varying degrees. 
Stand-alone bulk schemes in Accra and Dar es Salaam were geographically targeted, as were kiosks in 
Dar. In Ghana, there was an attempt to target resources across the country according to need but not 
within towns. In no cities has a geographic targeting method for new investments been systematised or 
incorporated into standard utility practice. 
Self-targeting through subsidy for a lifeline tariff is adopted in all projects, even though this method of 
targeting poor households has been repeatedly shown to be flawed. Indeed in Dar es Salaam, it is clear 
that the lifeline tariff alone is not succeeding in making household connections affordable to the 
poorest households.  
Kiosk/standpipe subsidies are offered in all three countries as an alternative approach to self-targeting, 
but in two of the three countries (Ghana and Tanzania) water from standpipes remains more expensive 
than from a household connection.  
Connection subsidies are offered in two of the three countries, but not in Ghana. In Burkina, these are 
universal. In Tanzania, they are targeted to middle- and low-income households in theory, but in 
practice have been universally applied under the DWSSP. In Burkina, a subsidy for household 
sanitation is also offered, with a menu of options of different prices, but there are concerns that none of 
the options may be affordable for the poorest.  
Targeting of investments and subsidies is only one constraint to access to services by low-income 
households. Others include shortages of bulk water and low level of areal infrastructure coverage; 
without these, targeting will mean little.  
  
 
 
 
institutional reform was part of the project design, as the projects introduced private operators (AVRL 
in Ghana and, initially, CityWater, subsequently DAWASCO, in Tanzania).  
 
It is striking, however, that neither of the management/lease contracts with operators (AVRL in 
Ghana and DAWASCO in Tanzania), nor ONEA‟s performance contract in Burkina from 
2007-2009, includes any „pro-poor‟ obligations. This reflects the designs of all four projects 
assessed by this research study which are skewed towards financial objectives, to the detriment 
of social aspects, as discussed in section 5.5 which follows.   
 
5.5 Policy principles to project implementation: how ‘inclusion’ is being lost or 
disregarded 
Figure 5.1 is a schematic representation of what has been observed in relation to all four projects 
studied by this research project, namely that, in the translation of policy statements into utility 
plans/contracts, project design and ultimately project implementation, social aspects, in particular 
inclusion of low-income areas and households, have been lost or disregarded.  
 
The green and blue arrows in the Figure show how aspects relating to utility capacity and 
performance (including financial matters), as well as infrastructure aspects (engineering and 
technology), are expressed in policy and are followed through into implementation. Progress has 
varied across the projects, but in each case policy goals relating to utility capacity and performance  
and water infrastructure have been reflected in targets in utility contracts and in the key performance 
indicators of the projects.  
 
The same cannot be said of social aspects. The red arrow in the Figure is drawn in hatched form to 
represent the lack of performance targets and indicators on inclusion, in both utility performance 
contracts and project documents.  
 
The exception, as noted in the Figure, is the clearly defined targeting method for the Community 
Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (CWSSP), one component of the project in Dar es Salaam 
(and the eligibility criteria for the First Time Connection Fund also in Dar, though they were not 
applied). The figure also illustrates that, when it comes to implementation, insufficient attention has 
been paid to targeting of low-income households. 
 
In all three countries, social analysis informing project design is weak. Surveys carried out during 
projects did not provide data disaggregated by household income level, or another socio-economic 
criterion. In Burkina, data collected by consultants commissioned by ONEA was available, but was 
not utilised.  
 
These are serious failings which, it is suggested, should be discussed between the utility, the World 
Bank and CSOs, and other sector actors, as part of the dialogue process referred to in section 1.2. 
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Figure 5.1.  Policy principles to project implementation: how „inclusion‟ is being lost or disregarded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance targets 
in utility contracts 
focus on financial 
and infrastructure, in 
the three countries 
Key performance indicators of the projects in 
the three countries focus on infrastructure, and 
in B and G major focus also on utility capacity, 
including financial aspects. 
There is a lack of incentives for the three 
utilities to serve poor. 
National policies and 
sectoral strategies 
Utility plans and 
contracts 
Project design Project implementation 
Strengthen UWSS sector and 
build capacity of utility (B). 
“Financial stability, viability and 
sustainability” (G). Achieve cost 
recovery and build capacity of 
utilities (Tz). 
Substantial progress towards “financial 
equilibrium” achieved by ONEA (B). 
Financial auditor of project in Ghana unable to 
report on progress by AVRL against financial 
targets (baseline data not agreed with GWCL). 
Considerable improvement in utility capacity 
and performance (B); improvements in 
financial situation emerging but slower than 
expected (Tz). 
 
Utility capacity and 
performance, including 
financial aspects 
No performance 
targets on inclusion: 
it is left to the utility 
to determine how to 
reach the poor with 
affordable prices. 
„Social‟ schemes 
proposed in each 
country (e.g. PURC 
in G.)  
Installation of household connections and 
standpipes or kiosks (in 2 or 3 countries) 
without geographical criteria or disaggregation 
of whom they will serve - in all three countries, 
inclusion objectives are not expressed in KPIs.  
The exception is Tz: a clearly defined targeting 
method was used for  the CWSSP, kiosks were 
targeted to CIUP priority areas, and eligibility 
criteria were developed for the first time 
connection fund (though this was not applied).  
Social analysis informing the projects, and 
impact assessment, is weak in all three 
countries. 
Surveys during projects do not provide data 
disaggregated by household income level or 
other socio-economic criterion, and/or the 
utility did not utilise the data collected. 
Subsidies geared to increasing total numbers of 
connections, irrespective of for whom (B and 
Tz). Such subsidies not provided at all in 
Ghana. 
Community-managed CWSSP schemes provide 
improved, affordable services. (Tz) 
Expansion of water distribution 
networks, sewerage and onsite 
sanitation in urban areas (B). 
 
Rehabilitation followed by 
extension of water supply 
infrastructure (Tz). 
 
 
The ZIGA project completed its roll-out of 
water infrastructure (B).  
The UWP has experienced major delays (G).                   
Infrastructure components of the DWSSP are 
now largely complete, but faced severe delays. 
(Tz). Considerable non-functionality of kiosks 
in Dar (Tz); also in Tabtenga (B). 
 
Water infrastructure - 
engineering and technology 
aspects 
Principle of equity and/or goal 
of extending affordable services 
to poor populations stated in 
sector policies of the 3 countries.  
Water Services - social 
aspects, in particular 
„inclusion‟ 
Performance targets 
in utility contracts 
focus on financial 
and infrastructure 
aspects, in the three 
countries 
Key performance indicators of the projects in 
the three countries focus on infrastructure, and 
in B and G major focus also on utility capacity, 
including financial aspects (latter also in Tz). 
There is a lack of incentives for the three 
utilities to serve poor. 
KEY: 
G = Ghana    B = Burkina Faso   Tz = Tanzania  
  
 
 
5.6 Sustainability: prospects for sustainability of services for low-income households   
The research also looked for indications of the prospects for sustainability of pro-poor services in 
the selected projects.  
 
One of the main concerns, from the perspective of sustainability, is the lack of clear ownership by 
utilities of pro-poor services in any of the three cases studied.  
 
In Ghana, it is the regulator which has become a champion of services for the poor, in the absence 
of clear commitment from the utility, Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) (e.g. GWCL is 
often absent from pro-poor policy discussions). The Urban Water Project in Ghana may have made 
an important contribution to sustainability to supporting the social policy developed by PURC.  
 
In Tanzania, there is an unclear split of responsibilities between DAWASA and DAWASCO in 
terms of services to the poor, and while specific pro-poor activities have been implemented, a pro-
poor approach is not mainstreamed into utility practice. The new Informal Settlements Department 
in DAWASCO may help to institutionalise pro-poor approaches, but this will depend upon the 
capacity of the unit (it is not yet fully staffed and its future resourcing is unclear) and the 
commitment of other sector actors. As with the proposed pro-poor unit in Ghana, it is too early to 
tell whether these will succeed in mainstreaming pro-poor services or will be donor-supported “add-
ons”.  
 
In Burkina, the question arises whether the units within ONEA responsible for the new project 
(2009-2015) called „DMOZ‟ (Direction de la Maîtrise d‟Ouvrage de ZIGA) and DASS (Direction 
de l’Assainissement) will show leadership in producing or commissioning production of data on 
social aspects of populations in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, to update the survey conducted 
by OCEA/SOGREAH in 2007 (reported in ICEA/SOGREAH 2008).  
 
The weaknesses already identified across all countries in information collection and utilisation, and 
hence opportunities for learning on pro-poor services, also threaten the sustainability of the projects.  
 
In terms of pro-poor approaches which have been adopted, two of the three projects included the 
establishment of cross-subsidies, for water connections in Tanzania and for household sanitation in 
Burkina Faso. These are funded by a surcharge on water bills, and so could potentially provide a 
sustainable fund to support for low-income households.  
 
However, the prospects for sustainability of the community-managed schemes established in 
Tanzania (and planned in Ghana) are more questionable. Technologically, the CWSSP schemes in 
Tanzania have been designed to be integrated into the main network in future. Questions arise as to 
the financial viability of such schemes, since some are already experiencing management problems 
and shortage of funds. It is possible that they may in future need external subsidies in order to 
continue to provide affordable water, particularly if large maintenance costs arise.  
 
The weaknesses in targeting of kiosks/standpipes and associated problems with the services they 
provide, in all three countries, also raise concerns about sustainability.   
 
In spite of problems encountered, the two projects which are completed or well advanced, the 
ZIGA project in Burkina Faso and the DWSSP project in Tanzania, have contributed to 
general improvements in infrastructure and utility capacity, which should help to ensure the 
sustainability of future services for low-income households. In Ghana, the Urban Water Project 
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aims to do the same. In themselves these improvements are necessary, but they are not sufficient, to 
build sustainable pro-poor services. 
 
 
 
5.7 Accountability issues in the studied projects  
The lack of monitoring arrangements for pro-poor services in all three countries/cities raises 
concerns about accountability, given that, as noted above, there is no overall strategy or plan for 
inclusion in any of the cities studied, no requirement for rigorous impact assessment, and a lack of 
indicators relating to social issues in both project documents and utility contracts. There is, 
therefore, no clear basis on which to hold utilities accountable for services provided to the poor.  
 
The pro-poor approaches adopted by the regulator in Ghana, PURC, are promising in this regard, 
but there is still a need to develop specific pro-poor targets. In Tanzania, while the regulator, the 
Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA), expressed an interest in pro-poor 
dimensions, it does not currently collect any disaggregated information on service levels to poor 
households. If improvements are not monitored or measurable, there is a clear gap in accountability.  
The evaluation report (World Bank, 2008) of the ZIGA project in Burkina Faso (the only project 
which was completed at the time of the research in 2009) reveals weaknesses in the monitoring by 
ONEA of inclusion and social dimensions. It seems no information was available to the evaluators 
as to where in Ouagadougou the new connections and standpipes had been installed by ZIGA.  
The lack of reliable information on services and access for poor households also makes 
accountability difficult, and again this applies to all three countries. Data collected by the utilities 
in the three countries generally does not include any measure of household income or socio-
economic status. This matches the observation by Marin (2009, p.134) that data from utilities are 
rarely organised by customer income category (see further under section 5.8).  
There is also a lack of transparency. Information on where infrastructure and connections have 
been installed, for example, was not publicly available in any of the three countries (and not readily 
supplied to the researchers conducting the present study). The information which was provided by 
Key findings: Prospects for sustainability 
There is a lack of ownership and championing of the pro-poor agenda by utilities in all cases.  
The gap in data collection/use on services for low-income households means that there is currently 
little opportunity for learning on pro-poor approaches. 
Two of the three countries use cross-subsidies to provide a sustainable source of funds for new 
connections to water (Tanzania) and sanitation (Burkina). 
Pro-poor community schemes developed in Tanzania (and planned in Ghana) have been broadly 
successful, but show signs that they may not be financially sustainable over the long term without 
external support or subsidy. 
Weaknesses in the targeting of kiosks and standpipes in Ghana, and implementation problems in 
Tanzania, have led to problems of under-use and inadequate water supply, and hence poor prospects of 
sustainability for many kiosks.     
The more mature projects did, however, make a contribution to improving underlying infrastructure 
and utility capacity which will contribute to overall sustainability of services.  
 
  
 
 
different institutions was sometimes conflicting (in Tanzania), and some details turned out to be 
inaccurate when verified in the field (in Tanzania and Ghana). 
As discussed in section 1.1.3, from the outset of projects, the process of discussion between 
governments and World Bank over project design (including the writing of the PADs) adds another 
dimension to the lack of transparency, as far as other actors and stakeholders are concerned. 
 
 
5.8 IDA role: the significance of IDA support to the studied projects, including the terms 
of lending and on-granting. 
5.8.1 The role of the Bank in negotiations with Government 
All the projects considered in this study were chosen by the World Bank for support - IDA funding 
was approved - and the World Bank put its name to the project appraisal documents, thereby 
„signing off‟ on the design of the projects as described in the PADs. The role of Bank staff in 
relation to project design, including their interactions with representatives of government, is 
discussed below. 
The question arises: how far did Bank staff working on the PADs for the four projects seek to find, 
in practice, a balance between the goals of installing new water infrastructure and strengthening 
utility capacity on the one hand, and „inclusion‟ - equity of access - on the other hand? Equity is 
emphasised in sector policies and strategies in all three countries, so, according to the principle of 
alignment under the Paris principles, Bank staff would have been justified in pursuing equity goals 
as much as goals of cost recovery.  
 
There is some evidence of positive influence in Tanzania, where the incorporation of pro-poor 
components in design of the DWSSP is attributed to the World Bank‟s influence. As seen in Section 
4, however, this support in principle does not seem to have been followed up with adequate 
guidance on how to target the poor most effectively. As noted in section 4.3, two important pro-
poor elements of the DWSSP (kiosk provision and connection subsidies) were given low priority in 
implementation by the utilities.  
 
The findings of the present study point to the need for more attention to be paid to inclusion issues 
in both design and implementation of the projects. Bank staff may usefully apply their authority and 
influence to this, to guide utility staff in selection and application of measures appropriate to each 
context.  
 
Key findings: Accountability 
There are no targets or indicators for pro-poor services in project agreements, utility plans or utility 
contracts. Broad policy statements are not a sufficient basis for monitoring and accountability. 
Neither regulators nor World Bank evaluations have collected disaggregated data on services received 
by households of different wealth level (or other socio-economic characteristic) in the studied cities.  
There is no mechanism for regulators to insist on services for low-income households, or for projects 
to demonstrate who has benefited from their investments. 
There is a lack of transparency around project investments. Details of what investments had taken 
place, and where, was not readily available and information supplied by utilities was often conflicting 
or inaccurate.  
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As noted in Section 3, in relation to the ZIGA project in Burkina, the role of Bank staff seems to 
have been to support the sweeping characterisation by the utility, ONEA, that the service territory 
of the project was uniformly poor.  The mapping exercise carried out by the research team in 
Burkina has refuted this suggestion that poverty in the peri-urban districts of Ouagadougou is, in 
some way, homogeneous,  clearly showing that it is possible to identify levels of relative wealth and 
poverty, district by district, in the peri-urban sectors 14-30 of the city (using data from the 2006 
census). As noted in section 3.6, despite the extent of poverty in Burkina as a low-income 
country, it is not true - or at least not analytically useful - to say that the entire population of 
the peri-urban areas in sectors 14-30 of Ouagadougou (the „service territory‟ referred in the 
above quote from the Bank‟s written comments) is „poor‟. 
   
This misleading picture of Ouagadougou meant that a key lesson of the ZIGA project was not learnt 
in the design of the new project, 2009-2015. Its focus is to increase the number of connections, and 
the surrounding areas are seen as comprising a source of new clients of the utility irrespective of 
differing levels of income - rather than (or more than) a focus on provision of affordable services 
for low-income households. The role of Bank staff in supporting the new project design surely 
extended to pointing out that a social objective which is stated to be a „primary‟ goal of the project 
is reflected in the KPIs.  
 
The present research study has, in particular, noted that, under all four projects, very limited 
analysis has taken place on the needs of low-income households, and there has been no attempt at 
poverty mapping, as far as the researchers could discover. The failure of the projects to collect and 
use disaggregated data has been noted in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of this report. Box 5.3 reproduces 
extracts from the Accra Agenda, by which partner countries and donors commit to improvement of 
results management, including by disaggregation of data.  
 
     
Box 5.3  Management for Results - including disaggregation of data, under Accra agenda 
Delivering and Accounting for Development Results - para 22. We will be judged by the impacts that our 
collective efforts have on the lives of poor people… 
 
We will focus on delivering results - para 23 - “We will improve our management for results by taking the 
following actions: a) developing countries will strengthen the quality of policy design, implementation 
and assessment by improving information systems, including, as appropriate, disaggregating data by sex, 
region and socioeconomic status; b) developing countries and donors will work together to develop cost-
effective results management instruments to assess the impact of development policies and adjust them as 
necessary.  
 
We will better coordinate and link the various sources of information, including national statistical 
systems, budgeting, planning, monitoring and country-led evaluations of policy performance” (emphasis 
added). 
 
Source: Accra Agenda 
 
 
The mapping exercise carried out by this research project in Burkina has applied data in the 
possession of the „national statistical system‟ in Burkina (as referred to in the Box), but ONEA did 
not  make use of that resource, and, as discussed in section 3.6, Bank staff did not guide ONEA 
staff in any analysis of differing levels of poverty in the peri-urban areas of Ouagadougou.     
 
  
 
 
Despite the recommendation in the 2004 Operational Guidance to Bank staff (World Bank 2004b) 
that “diagnosis should form the starting point for formulating policies to address access and equity 
issues in the sector”, as noted in section 5.5 in all three countries, social analysis informing project 
design is weak. The Operational Guidance could have usefully been applied by Bank staff in the 
contexts in Ghana, Burkina and Tanzania - but the case studies suggest that this has not been the 
case. Surveys conducted during projects either do not provide data disaggregated by household 
income level, or another socio-economic criterion, or when they were commissioned - as in Burkina 
and to a limited extent by DAWASA in Tanzania - the data gathered was not utilised. Subsidies are 
geared to increasing the number of household connections irrespective of for whom, and there is a 
lack of incentives for the three utilities to serve low-income households.   
 
This suggests that the World Bank did not provide the necessary strategic guidance or analysis on 
how to design and deliver pro-poor services, and did not adequately translate the pro-poor elements 
into monitoring arrangements and utility contracts. 
 
These are issues which, it is suggested, should be discussed between the utility, the World Bank and 
CSOs, and other sector actors, as part of the dialogue process referred to in section 1.2., in order to 
extend discussion of the challenges of UWSS to a broader policy community.    
 
 
5.8.2 On-lending and on-granting  
The predominantly financial, as compared with social, perspective, in project design - as shown in 
the PADs for the four projects - is illustrated by the descriptions of the terms of transmission of 
IDA funds to the project implementing agencies96.    
 
In all four cases, the IDA funds provided are transmitted by government to the water 
companies/utilities in the form of loan and grant.  
 
The rationale for this is that activities which are not expected to generate income for the utility are 
on-granted, whereas finance for investment in project components which are expected to generate 
revenue, is on-lent. The loan element is regarded as an instrument of financial rigour for utilities, 
which are mandated to operate on commercial principles.  
 
An example of a non-revenue generating element is the sanitation component of the new project in 
Burkina which is to receive a grant of US$ 24.44 million (World Bank 2009b, p.17).  
 
In relation to the ZIGA project in Burkina, the PAD notes (World Bank 2001, p. 11-12):-  
 
“IDA's credit to ONEA will be on lent, partly in the form of a long-term loan and partly as 
contribution to equity capital, in order to maintain the conservative structure of ONEA's 
balance sheet. This will also limit the sector's interest expense and the impact on water 
tariffs. Agreements have been reached during negotiations that the Government will pass on 
to ONEA, on terms and conditions satisfactory to the Bank, an amount of US$42 million, in 
the form of equity contribution, and an amount of US$28 million as a loan with a maturity 
of 20 years, including 10 years of grace period for the principal, and at an annual interest 
rate of 5.4 percent” (emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
96 For this purposes of the discussion below, the researchers carrying out the present study have not had access to the 
the subsidiary agreements between government and water companies/utilities in relation to any of the four projects, 
only the summary information in relation to on-lending/on-granting in the PADs.   
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The above equity contribution was made at a time (in 2000/01) when ONEA‟s financial condition 
was less robust than currently. The logic, however, remains - as applied by the financial experts, 
based on use of ONEA‟s “financial model” to test different scenarios - that the application of 
financial rigour should not over-extend the financial capacities of the utility97. The 2009 PAD notes 
that “the financial equilibrium of ONEA is quite sensitive to the financing conditions of the 
investment program” (World Bank 2009b, page 17).  
 
So, a grant is made to ONEA for the new project, in an amount equivalent to half the IDA funds for 
the water component. Again, the PAD envisages a grant element, for both the water and sanitation 
components, but those subsidies are not targeted to a particular category of water or sanitation users 
(as far as is indicated by the PAD).  
 
The 2009 PAD here could have added that certain elements of the water component (e.g. for 
standpipes) generate lower commercial revenues (than full cost recovery), but it does not. In the 
PADs of the four projects, the sections relating to „on-lending‟ make no reference to different levels 
of revenue generation. 
 
Yet, the grant elements provide opportunities to direct subsidies to „social‟ water components, 
without imposing an extra burden on the government‟s treasury - by applying IDA funds. In order 
to deliver a subsidy to the low-income urban households who need it, one option would be for the 
governments which receive IDA funds to compensate the utility for all (or a specified proportion) of 
water sold through lower revenue-earning project components, e.g. the standpipes. This would 
remedy the current disincentive which operates to discourage utilities from investing in water 
infrastructure to serve lower revenue-earning components of the water economy.  
 
 
5.8.3  Excessive optimism in project design? 
A feature of both the Tanzania and Ghana projects, in different ways, was an excessive optimism in 
project design in relation to what the projects were expected to achieve. In Ghana, this relates in 
particular to the pro-poor ambitions of the UWP. Expectations of how far the project would, in the 
context and timeframe and ear-marked investment, improve pro-poor services were unrealistic, and 
there seems to have been a lack of awareness of the constraints faced. For example, the PAD 
acknowledges a risk that the utility would lack pro-poor awareness, but states that this could be 
overcome by training. However, it was later found that in practice basic training in financial and 
technical skills was required before any pro-poor training could be introduced.  
In both Ghana and Tanzania, projections of utility performance were overrated. In Ghana, the 
economic analysis in the PAD bases the economic rate of return on improvements in revenue 
collection by Ghana Water, which have not materialised. In Tanzania, a comparison of DAWASA‟s 
actual financial position with the projections from the PAD shows that progress has been vastly 
slower than hoped. Staff from both the utilities and the World Bank agreed that the projections were 
too optimistic, and the project ICR confirms that the initial assumptions were not valid. However, it 
was these projections which informed the World Bank‟s decision to approve on-lending conditions 
agreed between the Ministry of Finance and DAWASA - conditions which World Bank staff now 
consider unmanageable for DAWASA. 
                                                 
97 As discussed in Section 3, despite the subsequent turn-around of ONEA‟s finances, the 2009 PAD, page 14, noted 
that ONEA‟s debt service obligations could  jeopardise its “financial equilibrium” and the report on “African Water 
Utilities: Regional Comparative Utility Creditworthiness Assessment” (WSP 2008) commented on ONEA‟s heavy debt 
service obligations. In Ghana, meanwhile, as noted in Section 2, the utility, GWCL, is in a very weak financial 
situation, unable to service debts.          
  
 
 
Both cases suggest a lack of attention to serious underlying constraints in the sector and gaps in 
social analysis during project design, leading to unrealistic expectations in terms of project results. 
This may relate to pressures within the World Bank to process projects quickly through the design 
stage. These internal pressures in the World Bank have not been documented in this study, but the 
problem has previously been identified in the literature. According to Pincus (2001), for example: 
“Given that the task manager wants the project… and the government needs the loan, it does not take 
long for an understanding to develop in which the shortcomings of existing projects are overlooked in 
exchange for a smooth path for new projects in the pipeline”. 
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
This research project has assessed four urban water projects in sub-Saharan Africa which are 
supported by the International Development Association-IDA, from the perspective of „inclusion‟ 
of low-income households, in accordance with principles of equity. One of the projects is just 
beginning and includes a sanitation component.   
The conclusions from each study, carried out by researchers in the three countries - Ghana, Burkina 
Faso and Tanzania, focusing respectively on Accra (and one other urban centre in Ghana, Obuasi),  
Ouagadougou and Dar es Salaam - have been set out in Sections 2, 3 and 4 respectively of this 
report, as well as some recommendations in each case, with also a synthesis in Section 5. 
The following is a summary of the conclusions from the three countries.    
6.1 Conclusions 
6.1.1 Water infrastructure  
 The first priority of the projects in Ghana and Burkina has been to improve water supply 
infrastructure. In Burkina, the „ZIGA‟ project (2001-2007) succeeded in increasing bulk water 
production for Ouagadougou threefold - sufficient to meet demand at current levels. In Ghana, 
five years into the Urban Water Project (UWP) (2004-2010), the bulk supply is fragile with 
frequent interruptions in supply. In Tanzania, the first task of the Dar es Salaam Water Supply 
and Sanitation Project (DWSSP) (2003-2010) was rehabilitation of infrastructure to increase 
water supply and reduce losses. In Dar es Salaam, despite the investments made in rehabilitation 
by the DWSSP, there is still an urgent need to tackle leakages and improve supply.  
 
 As regards distribution networks, these have been extended in Ouagadougou, serving 
substantially more residents with connections and standpipes/kiosks, as well as in Dar es 
Salaam (although in Dar the majority of „new‟ connections are in fact rehabilitated existing 
connections, and the service provided is severely limited in some areas by lack of adequate 
water supply). In Ghana, progress by the UWP in extending the piped supply network in the 
country‟s ten regions has been extensively delayed (in part due to slow procurement 
procedures). Delays have also occurred in Tanzania: capital works scheduled for completion in 
2008 were in the end virtually concluded by an extended completion date of end 2010. 
 
 
6.1.2 Utility capacity and performance, including financial management  
 Alongside infrastructure objectives, strengthening of utility/operator98 capacity and performance 
is central to the purpose of the projects studied, as clearly set out in the project appraisal 
documents-PADs. By far the largest share of project budgets has been allocated to the 
infrastructure and utility capacity components combined. 
 
 In Burkina, the ZIGA project saw a substantial turn-around in the financial and operational 
management of ONEA, in terms of bill collection, reduction of unaccounted-for-water, staff 
productivity, and financial reporting. In Ghana and Tanzania, institutional reform was part of 
the project design - including introduction of private operators: Aqua Vitens Rand Limited 
                                                 
98 The private operator in Ghana.   
  
 
 
(AVRL) in Ghana and initially CityWater in Tanzania before the contract was terminated and 
operations were taken over by the state company, the Dar es Salaam Water Supply and 
Sewerage Corporation-DAWASCO. 
  
 A design feature of all the projects - to different degrees -  was excessive optimism in relation to 
what the utilities/operator could achieve in financial/capacity terms. In Tanzania, a comparison 
of DAWASA‟s actual financial position with the projections from the PAD shows that progress 
has been much slower than hoped, and both utility and Bank staff have now recognised that the 
financial and performance targets were too optimistic. In Burkina, despite the progress made by 
ONEA in strengthening its finances, the 2009 PAD (World Bank 2009b) and a recent 
independent report (commissioned by WSP) (WSP, 2008) nevertheless highlight ONEA‟s debt 
service obligations as a concern.  
 
 
6.1.3 Water Services, including social aspects and particularly „inclusion‟   
 Similarly, while the design of water services under each of the studied projects included goals 
of inclusion of low-income areas, expectations of how far each project would improve „pro-
poor‟ services for low-income households were unrealistic. Inclusion has been more difficult 
than the PADs seemed to anticipate, and sufficient incentives for provision of pro-poor services 
were not developed.  
 
 Despite, in all three countries, national laws and/or policies and sectoral strategies which 
express the principle of provision of affordable services to low-income urban communities, 
neither Accra, nor Ouagadougou, nor Dar es Salaam has a city-wide strategy for inclusion of 
low-income households. 
 
 Close reading of the PADs points to gaps and inconsistencies on social aspects. For example, 
statements of pro-poor goals in the PADs are not translated into quantifiable measures of impact 
for low-income households in the key performance indicators (KPIs). The attention to inclusion 
is, in all cases, weak compared with infrastructure and utility performance issues (particularly 
financial). 
 
 It is left up to the utilities to determine how to reach poor households99. There is little incentive, 
however, for them to target low-income areas. Their contracts (including for the private operator 
in Ghana) focus on improving utility performance and achieving financial stability, measured by 
technical and financial indicators, without (in each case) any performance targets relating to 
social objectives. This confirms the bias towards financial aspects. The PADs present mixed 
messages on promotion of full cost recovery and pro-poor service delivery; the two are treated 
separately when in practice they should be interlinked.  
 
 In Burkina and Tanzania, the projects have prioritised maximisation of new household 
connections, for revenue generation, irrespective of for whom. Under the UWP in Ghana, it 
appears that allocation criteria for regional investments failed to take account of distribution of 
water and income, and some wastage of resources resulted; overall, the funds of the UWP are 
spread thinly across the country. 
 
                                                 
99 Other than, in Burkina under the „ZIGA‟ project, the stated  - but broad - objective of providing new water 
infrastructure and services in the peri-urban areas outside the centre of Ouagadougou which comprises seventeen 
districts (sectors 14-30) .  
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 Of the three projects, targeting was more developed in Tanzania. Here, a social connection fund 
was established to be targeted by household characteristics (although this has been little used to 
date and the criteria were problematic) and the Community Water Supply and Sanitation 
Programme-CWSSP schemes (part of the DWSSP) were targeted geographically in 
collaboration with a university and municipal councils (although this programme was allocated 
only 2.3% of the total project budget). Kiosks in networked areas were targeted to areas already 
identified as priorities for infrastructure upgrading under another World Bank-supported project. 
In Ghana, targeting according to welfare indicators guided the allocation of infrastructure 
investment, but the details of who, in the end, benefits from this infrastructure have not been 
specified. In Ouagadougou, beyond identification of the seventeen peri-urban districts outside 
the city centre (sectors 14-30), there is no evidence of a defined strategy for geographic 
targeting, at least from the perspective of inclusion of low-income households. Connection 
subsidies are offered to all residents in those districts.  
 
 In Ghana and Tanzania, individual - and small - project components are engaging in focused 
efforts on targeting and these have recorded progress in achieving inclusion. In Ghana, pilot 
schemes in low-income communities, led by the regulator, PURC (Public Utilities Regulatory 
Commission), look set to bring significant benefits for poor households. In Dar es Salaam, the 
CWSSP has provided improved, affordable water supply to around 200,000 peri-urban residents 
outside the main network. However, these are not part of a city-wide pro-poor strategy in either 
case. In Burkina, the „ZIGA‟ project extended the piped network and installed standpipes in 
peri-urban areas of the city. Low-income households in Ouagadougou have benefitted, but 
ONEA is not able to say how many. And, from the perspective of inclusion of poor households, 
its „targeting‟ of peri-urban areas is patchy. The poverty mapping exercise conducted by this 
research study has highlighted targeting errors, both exclusion of low-income customers and 
inclusion of better-off households. Making available the connection subsidy to relatively 
wealthy households means unnecessarily lost revenue for ONEA. Where the poverty mapping 
conducted by this research project identified some distributional inequities in the ZIGA 
project‟s allocation of infrastructure/services, that mapping exercise suggests that, in future, 
such techniques can be applied/adapted to improve pro-poor targeting in project design.    
 
 In both Ghana and Tanzania, processes to improve targeting were dropped following delays in 
the project, e.g. socio-economic surveys in Ghana and the application of the First Time 
Connection Fund in Tanzania. 
 
 Network extension seems to be decided from an engineering and financial, rather than a social 
development, perspective; for households in peri-urban areas, standpipes and kiosks are 
important water sources, but in Dar and Ghana generally the price of water from 
standpipes/kiosks is more expensive than the networked tariff (in Ouagadougou also, when 
caretakers‟ margins are taken into account). 
 
 It appears that none of the utilities organise their data by customer income category; in all three 
countries there is an information gap - a reflection of lack of capacity and little attention to 
analysis of the poverty of urban populations as it affects their affordable access to WSS.  
 
 Overall, in the translation of policy statements into utility plans and contracts, project design 
and ultimately project implementation, inclusion of low-income areas and households has been 
lost or disregarded (Figure 5.1 refers). 
 
 
  
 
 
6.1.4 Sustainability 
 The lack of clear ownership by the utilities/operator of pro-poor services in any of the three 
countries threatens the sustainability of the social components of the projects, as do the 
weaknesses already identified across all countries in information and transparency. 
 
 Problems of functionality of standpipes are affecting access in areas where focus groups were 
convened as part of this research study (e.g. Tabtenga, Ouagadougou; Dar es Salaam). 
 
 In spite of problems encountered, the two projects which are completed or well advanced, the 
ZIGA project in Burkina Faso and, to a lesser extent, the DWSSP project in Tanzania, has 
contributed to general improvements in infrastructure and utility capacity, which should help to 
ensure the sustainability of future services for low-income households.  
 
 
6.1.5 Accountability 
 There is a lack of strong ownership of pro-poor services by utilities. In Burkina, the „social‟ 
elements were subsumed into the rest of ONEA‟s activities (the subsidy for household 
connection and the social tariff apply universally to all consumers). In Tanzania, although there 
is a special unit in DAWASCO, this is very new and pro-poor approaches have not been 
mainstreamed into utility practices. In Ghana, the champion of pro-poor issues is the regulator, 
PURC, with little apparent commitment from the utility (Ghana Water Company Limited) itself. 
 
 The lack of monitoring arrangements for pro-poor services in all three countries/cities raises 
concerns about accountability, given that, as noted above, there is no overall strategy or plan for 
inclusion in any of the cities studied and a lack of indicators relating to social issues in either the 
project documents or utility contracts. There is, therefore, no clear basis on which to hold 
utilities accountable for services provided to the poor. 
 
 In Tanzania, the CWSSP (as noted above, a component of the DWSSP) benefited from the 
involvement of municipal councils and NGOs experienced in community projects, and from a 
dedicated fund and management team in DAWASA. However, institutional responsibility for 
pro-poor services generally is much less clear. 
  
 In Ghana, PURC is effectively left championing pro-poor pilots alone. In Burkina, ONEA has 
successfully increased the number of connected customers, without developing a pro-poor 
targeting strategy (beyond its approach which characterises all residents of the peri-urban areas 
as „poor‟, in one homogeneous category). Yet, it is the utility/operator which needs to be the 
service provider, while the regulator (Ghana, Tanzania), or supervising ministry (Burkina), sets 
standards to hold the utility to account.  
 
 
6.1.6 IDA role 
 Without published information on the discussions between the World Bank and 
Government/utilities on project design in the three countries100, the tenor of discussions during 
the writing of the PADs, including on pro-poor issues, was not generally visible to the 
                                                 
100 As alluded to in Section 1.1.3, the researchers understand that, as from mid-2010, the „aide memoires‟ written by 
Bank staff, reporting on missions to country, will be made publicly available.     
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researchers carrying out this study. This study has relied largely101 on the PADs which record 
the position arrived at the conclusion of any such debate - the resulting project design. The 
researchers have additionally taken into account the written comments of the World Bank on the 
preliminary (July 2010) draft of the present report, but this was against the backdrop of the 
overall lack of transparency of the project discussions between the three governments and the 
World Bank (as referred to in section 1.1.3). 
 
 An example of a position adopted in the negotiations between World Bank and Government has 
emerged from the key informant interviews in Tanzania, where incorporation of social 
components in the DWSSP is attributed to Bank staff - an example of influencing in favour of a 
pro-poor agenda. But, it seems this positive support in principle in Tanzania was not followed 
up with adequate guidance or supervision to ensure that low-income households gained real 
benefits. It is also clear that pro-poor goals were not the central ambition of the DWSSP; it 
seems, rather, that the World Bank sought to „do something‟ for poor households as an add-on 
to the project. 
 
 Despite the recommendations in the 2004 Operational Guidance to Bank staff (World Bank 
2004b, in the section on „Extending Services to the Poor‟), the findings of the present study 
point to insufficient attention by Bank staff to inclusion issues in design, including  “diagnosis 
of access and equity issues in the sector” (section 1.5.1 of the present report refers). 
 
 It is clear from the written comments of the World Bank on the preliminary (July 2010) draft of 
this report that the Bank did not consider the lack of a strategy for targeting of low-income 
areas/households in Ouagadougou to be a design flaw. The view taken by Bank staff was that all 
the residents of the districts outside the centre of Ouagadougou were poor, so that there was no 
need to make specific provision for pro-poor targeting.  
 
As discussed in Section 3, this suggestion that poverty existed in the „service territory‟ of the 
ZIGA project in a homogeneous form is surprising and misleading. The mapping exercise 
(referred to in section 6.1.3 above) carried out by the University of Ouagadougou and the 
National Institute of Statistics in Burkina (INSD) clearly shows that it is possible to identify 
levels of relative wealth and poverty, district by district, in Ouagadougou, using existing data 
(from the 2006 census) and this was echoed by the consultants hired by ONEA in 2007 
(ICEA/SOGREAH 2008). Despite the extent of poverty in Burkina as a low-income country, it 
is not true - or at least not analytically useful - to say that the entire population of the peri-urban 
areas in sectors 14-30 of Ouagadougou (the service territory referred to in the Bank‟s written 
comments) is „poor‟.  Those 17 sectors cover a large part of the territory occupied by 
Ouagadougou. A substantial part of east Ouagadougou, for example, is very poor; at the same 
time, not all districts beyond the central area are poor: two surrounding districts are relatively 
well-off, and two other outlying areas are in the intermediate category, while the remaining 
thirteen districts which received standpipes are poor or very poor - all as shown in the different 
colours on the map in Annex 5 (and discussed in section 3.6). 
 
 As discussed in section 5.8.2, the IDA funding to two out of the three Governments (Burkina 
and Ghana) has been made available, in whole or part, as (non-reimbursable) grants. In all three 
countries, the IDA funds are transmitted to the utilities from the finance ministries in a 
                                                 
101 The PADs, plus the Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs) of two projects (in Burkina and Tanzania), as well 
as the Mid-Term Review in Ghana (and two project meetings in Tanzania which stakeholders attended, without, 
however, participation of the World Bank).          
 
  
 
 
combination of loan and grant elements. The loan elements are, it seems, intended as 
instruments of financial rigour - the PADs pay much attention to the financial models of the 
utilities and specify ambitious cost recovery targets for them. The grant elements of IDA funds 
to these projects provide opportunities to direct subsidies to „social‟ water components, without 
imposing an extra burden on the government‟s treasury. This opens the way to design means of 
applying IDA funds, in order to deliver a subsidy to low-income urban households who need it. 
 
 The IDA grant to the new project in Burkina, approved in 2009, will bring much needed 
investment in sanitation in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso; the design of the sanitation 
component aims to offer a menu of in-site sanitation options at an affordable price; the subsidy 
currently envisaged is 60% of the cost of improved latrines. Based on previous ONEA 
experience in relation to subsidies for water supply, the level and targeting of that sanitation 
subsidy will need to be monitored closely (and supported by subsidy of „software‟ elements). In 
each project, who is benefitting from a subsidy needs to be determined, to check for targeting 
errors (where poor households are missed out and/or more wealthy households included).    
 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
Based on the above conclusions, the following are recommendations to Government, utility/operator 
and World Bank in the three countries. 
 
6.2.1 For the Governments and utilities/operators:- 
 Given the key finding of this research study - that Government goals on service of low-income 
areas and households in accordance with principles of equity, as set out in national laws and/or 
policies and sectoral strategies in the three countries, are not being put into effect - ministries 
responsible for urban water and sanitation need to commit to a process of sector review of  
social and „inclusion‟ aspects (inclusion of low-income households) alongside those of utility 
performance and engineering (without the current disconnects between the different aspects) to 
include time-bound, suitably resourced, targets to which the service provider can be held 
accountable. 
 The sector review in each country should bring together the utility/operator, other service 
providers and water user associations, as well as Government and NGOs. Such collaborations, 
as part of broader policy communities - beyond just government representatives, donor 
staff/consultants and utility executives - would allow access to a broader pool of skills.  
 Measures to be determined during this sector review include city-wide strategies for inclusion. 
More attention needs to be given to levels of affordability of low-income households, based on 
understanding of their constraints to access. For that, targeting approaches selected will need to 
be informed, actively, by analysis and collection of existing and new data. In Burkina, for 
example, ONEA has not been making use for inclusion purposes of the data which does exist in 
the hands of the national statistical agency, the INSD, and did not make use (again for inclusion 
purposes) of the socio-economic data produced by consultants commissioned by ONEA (the 
20087 report of ICEA/SOGREAH).  
 Means of incentivising utilities to serve low-income households will also need to be determined. 
To the extent utilities are not able to show that equity and cost recovery objectives are 
consistent within existing financial models, there should be reappraisal of financial targets and 
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design of specific Government-utility subsidies for delivery of targeted utility-customer 
subsidies. 
 Government-utility contracts would need to be re-negotiated accordingly, incorporating targets 
and indicators relating to service of low-income households which are measurable, based on 
collection of data organised by customer income category. These targets in utility contracts 
should be matched, appropriately, in project performance indicators (KPIs). 
  
 As to design of means of applying IDA funds in order to deliver a subsidy to the low-income 
urban households who need it - referred to in section 6.1 - one option would be for government 
to compensate the utility/operator for all (or a proportion) of water sold through lower-revenue 
earning water points, e.g. finance ministries making retrospective payments at agreed intervals. 
This would be a means of remedying the current disincentive which operates to discourage 
utilities from installing, for example, standpipes. 
 
 In Burkina, a revision of the results framework as set out in the PAD of the „new‟ project, 2009-
2015 (World Bank 2009b), will be required to remedy the omission of KPIs for social/inclusion 
elements from monitoring and evaluation of that project. The same principle applies to future 
UWSS projects which may be developed in Ghana and Tanzania.  
 
 Household surveys need to be formulated by utilities so as to collect information which allows 
comparison of levels of satisfaction expressed by households of different income levels - to 
specifically question households on how pricing policy is operating, in relation to connections 
(including subsidy of the connection price) and standpipes. Socio-economic analysis to inform 
pro-poor targeting should cover the aspects described in section 1.3.2. 
 
 Flexible payment systems should be developed, for example weekly rather than monthly billing, 
to help overcome problems of non-payment faced in the past. Poor households can be viable 
customers for the utilities. 
 
 Kiosks and standpipes should remain a central component of pro-poor services. Where they are 
not currently working well (e.g. in Dar es Salaam), they should not be de-prioritised, but rather 
a concerted effort should be made by the utility to, first, understand the real demand and, then, 
to bring as many viable kiosks/standpipes as possible into operation, particularly where the 
delay is due to management issues or delays in construction, rather than lack of bulk water, 
which can be resolved more quickly if given priority. 
 
 Projections of utility performance need to be based on more realistic assessments of potential 
for progress, including detailed analysis of institutional constraints, especially where these are 
linked to the approval of on-lending arrangements. This would avoid a situation where over-
optimism about a utility‟s financial position leads to unmanageable levels of debt when 
repayments of on-lent funds begin. 
 
 In Burkina, given the widely recognised need to stimulate demand for sanitation, more 
information and communication activities need to be conducted by ONEA in peri-urban areas; 
under the new project, the focus will be on bringing this „software‟ support to Ouagadougou and 
Bobo-Dioulasso. 
 
 In Tanzania, further support should be given to the development of the young Consumer 
Consultative Council, in particular to ensure that it reflects the priorities of low-income 
  
 
 
households by including representation from low-income groups (e.g. kiosk users, not just 
networked customers) and publicising public meetings appropriately. 
      
 Further, in Tanzania, DAWASA‟s efforts to extend and learn from the CWSSP, to improve the 
effectiveness and sustainability of future similar community initiatives, should be supported. 
The CWSSP in Dar es Salaam, as well as the PURC-led pro-poor pilots in Ghana, indicate that 
small scale interventions can be effective in reaching target populations. These efforts must be 
carefully monitored, evaluated and scaled up to become mainstream policy. This would require 
coordination with NGOs and municipal authorities already engaged in developing community 
WSS projects, to ensure equitable targeting of investments and lesson-learning from existing 
experience. 
 
 Greater transparency and availability of information on project progress and impacts is required 
so that civil society can hold utilities/service providers and donors to account. 
 
 As alluded in section 6.1, the roles of regulators and service providers will need clarification, so 
as to support the above measures to tackle the challenges of extension of affordable services to 
low-income households. 
 
 
6.2.2 For the World Bank  
 The sector review process in each country (referred to in section 6.2.1) should be supported by 
the World Bank - as well as other development partners contributing to UWSS. 
 
 The World Bank should encourage and support sector institutions to develop strategic and 
systematic approaches to serving low-income households across cities, going beyond the design 
of specific components, in order to incoporate them into city-wide strategies for inclusion. This 
is an opportunity for positive influencing. Bank staff may apply their authority (bestowed on 
them by the institutional standing of the Bank and its financing capacity) to guide utility staff in 
selection and application of measures appropriate to each context. The World Bank is in a 
position to draw on its wide experience in other countries, its convening power, and its access to 
expertise, in order to support governments and utilities in the development of such new 
approaches (although „one-size-fits-all approaches‟ should be avoided, as pro-poor strategies 
need to correspond to local conditions). 
 
 Development of those approaches will require resources to be made available by the World 
Bank for the carrying out of socio-economic analyses to inform pro-poor targeting. The most 
sophisticated targeting methods, such as income-based means testing, are expensive. In these 
cities, the key will be to find indicators of poverty which are as meaningful as possible, but not 
prohibitively costly to apply, e.g. the poverty mapping approach suggested in the Burkina case 
study which may, for example, be combined with targeting by household characteristics. 
Greater levels of sophistication can then be developed in future, as appropriate. 
 
 The World Bank should take the steps necessary to apply its own 2004 Operational Guide 
(World Bank, 2004b) on „Extending Services to the Poor‟, both at the project design stage and 
in relation to project implementation. More support by Bank staff and more resources are 
required to help the utilities/operators to work out how to deliver services to low-income 
households in the circumstances of each city (i.e. not accepting sweeping generalisations by 
utilities to the effect that poverty across broad peri-urban areas of a city is somehow 
homogeneous). 
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 World Bank staff should ensure that statements of pro-poor goals in PADs are expressed in 
quantifiable measures of impact for low-income households in project KPIs, so as to 
mainstream inclusion in project designs (matching, appropriately, inclusion targets in 
Government-Utility contracts).          
 
 The World Bank may usefully review the financial performance targets applied to the 
utilities/operators under these and future IDA-supported projects in the three countries. The 
purpose of this exercise will be to arrive at a better balance between financial and social/pro-
poor goals, so that reaching low-income areas and households is at least as important as cost-
recovery. For this, projections of utility performance need to be based on more realistic 
assessments of potential for progress. 
 
 As for design of means to apply IDA funds for delivery of a subsidy to low-income urban 
households who need it (section 6.2.1 refers), the World Bank can usefully support governments 
in developing the option of compensation of utilities/operators for all (or a proportion) of water 
sold through lower-revenue earning water points, e.g. the scheme referred to above, whereby 
finance ministries would make retrospective payments at agreed intervals, as a means of 
remedying the current disincentive which operates to discourage utilities from installing, for 
example, standpipes. 
 
 In Ghana and Tanzania, a clear finding from this research is the vulnerable financial state of the 
water utilities and the weak state of infrastructure. These two dimensions have been the focus of 
donor efforts to improve services and the extent of support required is extensive. Donors need to 
be prepared to stay for the long haul, but must not neglect provision of services for poor 
populations in the short term on the basis that improvements to overall infrastructure and utility 
performance must come first. 
 
 In line with the Accra Agenda, the World Bank should work with the Governments in the three 
countries to strengthen management for results under the projects, and particularly pro-poor 
impacts, through socio-economically disaggregated data on water users and service levels. 
 
 The need for greater transparency and availability of information relating to project progress 
and project impacts, for accountability purposes, as referred to in section 6.2.1, applies equally 
to the World Bank.    
 
 The above steps would serve to confirm the role of IDA finance in providing support to low-
income countries which achieves extension of UWSS service to low-income areas and 
households.  
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Annexes 
 
 
Annex 1 Water for Life (W4L) 
W4L is a charitable foundation established by Dutch water companies Vitens and Evides where 
customers in the Netherlands can contribute to social projects. They have projects in Vietnam, 
Mozambique, Yemen, Mongolia and Ghana. With the financial support from Water for Life, AVRL 
undertakes social projects in Ghana. AVRL manages the funds in Ghana for projects independent of 
its management contract. By the end of 2008, two W4L projects had been completed, one in the 
Brong-Ahafo Region and one in Central Region (where 11 villages along the major water 
transportation pipeline were connected) for a total amount of almost €200,000 These two projects 
supply water to an estimated 20,000 people. W4L has since 2007 approved seven projects in Ghana 
for a total amount of GHC1.04 million to provide water to about 50,000 people (Water for Life, 
2009).  
In Teshie, a poor district of Accra, W4L has provided €110,000 for the construction of eight water 
kiosks, a dedicated water tanker and establishment and training of a Water Board. About 8,000 
residents in Teshie are benefiting from this intervention. The sustainability of this project is 
threatened by the high operating cost of the water tanker and other operational bottlenecks 
(interview with member of the Teshie Water Board).    This is a serendipitous side effect of the 
UWP but is in no way part of the project itself in terms of inclusion in project design or 
implementation. The speed with which W4L has managed to establish new connections compared 
with the laborious process of the UWP is in large part due to the fact that as an NGO, there are no 
requirements to follow official procedures.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
189 
 
Annex 2 Analysis of Allocation of UWP Funds across regions in Ghana 
 
 
Application of Criterion for Distributing Investments across all Regions 
 
Source: Tahal Consulting Engineering, August 2009.  
  
 
 
  
Annex 3 Survey of Performance by AVRL in Ghana 
 
The table below indicates contrasting findings in relation to the performance of AVRL in 
connection with the targets of the Management Contract, according to presentations at the mid-term 
review in August 2009. 
 
Indicator AVRL  GWCL Position  
New connections (add at 
least 50,000 new 
connections or 
standpipes)  
Annual average growth of 5%; 37, 
532 household connections and 712 
public standpipes had been 
established since June 2006  
GWCL agrees there has been increases 
in connections but this cannot wholly 
be attributed to AVRL‟s intervention   
GWCL operations in the 
5 largest cities meet 
100% of their cash 
obligations from 
collected revenues 
AVRL reported an improving cost to 
income ratio in the 5 largest cities 
GWCL has reservations on the 
computation of operating cost because 
it does not include AVRL‟s 
management fee.   
Water production  
Increased production from 
211.7mm3 in 2006 to 222.6mm3 in 
2008 
GWCL attributes increase in 
production to expansion works in 
Central and Northern regions 
Non-revenue water 
(Target of 45% and 40% 
respectively was set for 
2007 and 2008) 
52.3% in 2007 and 51.7% in 2008 
recorded.  
Non revenue water higher than targets 
set for 2007 and 2008.  
Water sold  
Increased from 100.1mm3 in 2006 to 
107.6mm3 in 2008 
Based on targets for 2007 and 2008, 
there were shortfalls of 13.4% and 
20.2% respectively.  
Revenue collection ratio 
Annual billing and collection ratio 
was 95% in 2006, 89.6% in 2007 
and 90.7% in 2008 
Performance is lower than 100% target. 
The increases in revenue collected 
were significantly influenced by an 
upward adjustment of tariff 
implemented in the 4th quarter of 2007 
Chemical cost 
Despite rising cost of chemicals, 
there has been significant reduction 
in the chemical cost used in treating 
a m3 of water 
GWCL acknowledges this achievement 
Energy consumption 
Energy cost of producing a m3 of 
water has also reduced 
GWCL acknowledges this achievement  
Source: Presentation by AVRL 
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Annex 4.  Spatial distribution of standpipes in Ouagadougou up to 2009  
 
This Map 1. on the „Spatial distribution of standpipes („répartition spatiale des bornes fontaines’) 
in Ouagadougou up to 2009, was supplied to the researchers by ONEA. 
It shows, against the background of the sectors of the city of Ouagadougou (numbered 1-30) and 
named towns around it, the spatial distribution of standpipes („répartition spatiale des bornes 
fontaines’) up to 2009. 
Those standpipes installed before 2003 are marked in red, and those constructed between 2003 and 
2009 are marked in blue.
  
 
Annex 5 Map of Poverty levels in Ouagadougou, and siting of standpipes 
 
Map 2. is based on information on poverty levels in different parts of Ouagadougou, taken  
with the help of the National Institute of Statistics (INSD), from the 2006 census which 
constitutes the most recent available information for calculating the poverty indices of the 
city
102
.  
The sectors of the city of Ouagadougou are numbered and „villages‟ around it named.  
The areas coloured in green and dark green are respectively the poor and poorest areas 
surrounding the central sectors of the city which are coloured in beige to red (the darker the 
more wealthy).  
Areas well covered by water infrastructure (“couverture > 80%”) are marked in wide 
hatching  and areas “not equipped” (“zone non-équippée”) with narrow hatching – according 
to this preliminary mapping exercise which, as noted in Section 3.5, can usefully be 
developed and refined. 
The places where focus groups were conducted as reported in this report are marked with a 
star. 
                                                 
102 The mode of calculation of the poverty index of each sector is simple: the number of poor persons per sector 
is divided by the total population (Wetta and Fofona, 2010). So, in a given sector, if the number of poor is (to 
make the example simple) 20 persons out of a total of 100 persons in the sector, the poverty index is 20 percent. 
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Annex 6.  Standpipes installed in the districts (‘sectors’) of Ouagadougou, and 
its surrounding villages, between 2003 and 2009 - as per information supplied 
by ONEA 
 
Bornes fontaines installées entre 2003 et 2009
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Annex 7 Map of the Water distribution network in Ouagadougou - actual status 
and planned extension 2008-2011  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Annex 8 Components of the Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation 
Project - DWSSP  
 
 Component 1: The rehabilitation and extension of water supply services: This was to 
involve rehabilitation of production facilities, rehabilitation of transmission mains and 
services, rehabilitation of primary distribution mains, and rehabilitation of secondary 
and tertiary distribution mains.   
 
 Component 2: The rehabilitation and extension of wastewater facilities: This 
component was to involve rehabilitation of existing sewers and construction of new 
ones, rehabilitation of waste water pumping stations, stabilisation plants, and an 
existing ocean outfall. 
 
 Component 3: The Community Water Supply and Sanitation Program: This was to 
involve the support in terms of grants by DAWASA to 50 beneficiary communities 
for water projects based on point source or bulk supply from the main network. The 
objective is to provide a minimum service to low income communities that may not 
immediately be served by piped water network. The project was also to support on-
site sanitation facilities. DAWASA was to implement this component with assistance 
of specialized NGOs in supporting communities in formulating grant requests, 
implementing WSS projects and building capacity for post construction management. 
 
  Component 4: The institutional strengthening program: This was to includes (a) an 
assistance to the Operator to help finance its initial operating costs; (b) technical 
assistance to DAWASA: engineering, financial, legal, assets revaluation, audits, 
communication, environmental monitoring, independent assessments of the 
institutional framework and activities aimed at the prevention of HIV/AIDS; (c) 
training of DAWASA and MoWI staff, (d) operational equipment and repairs of 
emergency nature to be financed by DAWASA under the Lease Contract; and (e) 
technical assistance to the Wami/Ruvu Basin Office. DAWASA was to implement all 
components; MoWI was to supervise component (e). 
 
 Component 5: Preparation of a medium term WSS development program: This 
component was to support a series of studies aimed at preparing the medium term 
capital works programme. 
 
Extract from World Bank (2003) DWSSP Project Appraisal Document (PAD) 
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Annex 9 Key Performance Indicators of the Dar es Salaam Water and 
Sewerage Corporation - DAWASCO  
 
 Drinking water quality leaving water treatment plant / borehole source 
 Drinking water quality in distribution 
 Effluent quality 
 Customer meter installation 
 New water supply customers 
 Transmission main losses 
 Water distribution losses 
 Collection efficiency 
 Service pipe repairs and mains up to and including 100mm diameter 
 Repair of mains above 100mm diameter and up to and including 300mm diameter 
 Repair of mains above 300mm diameter and up to and including 600mm diameter 
 Repair of mains above 600mm diameter 
 Repair time 
 Data collection 
 Percentage of customers receiving less than 5m pressure at the tap 
 Percentage of customers receiving less than 10m pressure at the tap 
 
Source: Lease Contract between DAWASA and DAWASCO, 2005. 
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Annex 10 - Summary of information relating to the projects studied     
 Ghana: 
Urban Water Project  
2004-2010 
Burkina Faso: 
Ouagadougou Water Supply Project 
(“ZIGA”) 2001-2007 
Burkina Faso: 
Urban Water Sector Project 
 2009-2015 
Tanzania: 
Dar es Salaam Water Supply and 
Sanitation Project 2003-2009 
 
Project 
objectives  
 
To (i) significantly increase access to the 
piped water system in Ghana‟s urban centres, 
with an emphasis on improving access, 
affordability and service reliability to the 
urban poor; (ii) restoring GWCL‟s long term 
financial stability, viability & sustainability” 
 
 
“To increase access to adequate and reliable 
potable water in Ouagadougou through 
expansion of distribution and tertiary water 
networks and improvement of urban water 
sub-sector management” 
 
To increase access to sustainable water and 
sanitation services in selected urban areas”. 
Consolidate achievements of the reform of 
the urban water supply sub-sector and 
strengthening of capacities to deliver and 
manage services”. 
 
To provide a “reliable, affordable and 
sustainable water supply service and 
improve the sewerage and sanitation in 
the “Service Area” of DAWASA” 
Project value 
(US$) & IDA 
contribution  
120million 
(IDA contribution 103m) 
205.88million 
(IDA contribution 70m) 
92.92million 
(IDA contribution 80m) 
164.6million 
 (IDA contribution 61.5m) 
Project 
components 
and value in 
US$ 
- System expansion and rehabilitation (91.8m) 
- Public-private partnership development 
(6.5m) 
- Capacity building and project management 
(7.7m) 
- Severance program (11m) 
- Resettlement & mitigation plan (11.55m) 
- Dam construction (27.64m) 
- Boudtenga storage facility, delivery system & 
transmission main (26.83m) 
- Treatment plant (20.51m) 
- Primary network (20.77m) 
- Reservoir & pumping station (24.55m) 
- Secondary & tertiary networks (47.06m) 
- Domestic connections equipment: 1.62m 
- Power supply line (2.24m) 
- Unallocated & refinancing (3.71m) 
- Urban water supply in four urban centres 
(52.78m) (Ouagadougou 13,33m) 
- Urban sanitation in Ouagadougou and 
Bobo-Dioulasso (35.56m) (Ouagadougou 
18.11m) 
- Institutional support and capacity building 
(3.93m) 
- Environmental and social management 
(0.64m) 
- Rehabilitation and extension of water 
supply facilities (106.05m) 
- Rehabilitation and extension of 
wastewater facilities (22.4m) 
- Community water supply and sanitation 
program (3.85m) 
- Institutional strengthening program 
(25m) 
- Preparation of a medium-term WSS 
development program (6.15m) 
Main 
infrastructure 
elements 
- First Year Investment Programme of US$17m 
for minor works; Subsequent Year 
Investment Progamme of US$70m for 
individual water supply systems, extension of 
water production, transmission and 
distribution works, to be distributed across 10 
Ghana regions. 
- Repair, Replacement and Rehabilitation Fund, 
originally US$5m, increased with additional 
donor funding to US$12m to be managed by 
the operator 
- Construction of new storage and bulk water 
production facilities and transmission main to 
Ouagadougou (50km) 
- Construction of distribution and tertiary 
networks within Ouagadougou with 
installation of connections and standposts 
 
- Expansion of water distribution networks, 
installation of connections and standpipes 
in Ouagadougou and three other urban 
centres 
- Expansion of bulk water production and 
storage capacity in other cities (not 
Ouagadougou) 
- Construction of household and school 
sanitation facilities in Ouagadougou and 
Bobo-Dioulasso (e.g. 18,000 household 
latrines in Ouagadougou) 
- Rehabilitation of water supply 
infrastructure to increase bulk supply 
and reduce losses 
- Network extension and new connections 
Main 
institutional 
elements 
- Public-private partnership development 
- Training and technical assistance 
- Capacity building of ONEA in technical, 
commercial, administrative and financial 
management, to move to  “financial 
equilibrium” (PAD, p7-8) 
- Improve reliability, accountability and 
customer management 
- Improve staff skills 
- Assess performance and visibility of ONEA 
- Separation of functions: asset holder 
and operator (private 2003-5, now 
public following contract termination) 
- Technical assistance and training: 
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 Ghana: 
Urban Water Project  
2004-2010 
Burkina Faso: 
Ouagadougou Water Supply Project 
(“ZIGA”) 2001-2007 
Burkina Faso: 
Urban Water Sector Project 
 2009-2015 
Tanzania: 
Dar es Salaam Water Supply and 
Sanitation Project 2003-2009 
- Introduction of a service contract to “strengthen 
ONEA‟s commercial, accounting and financial 
operations” 
 
to households 
Review suitability of access options 
proposed 
engineering, financial, legal, asset 
management, audit, communications, 
environmental monitoring. 
 
Financing 
arrangements 
- IDA grant to GoG 
- Portion on-lent to GWCL (terms not available 
to researchers)  
 
 
- IDA concessional loan to GoB; maturity 20 
years with grace period of 10 years;    
- GoB on-grant to ONEA of US$ 42m 
(“contribution to equity capital in cash”) 
- GoB on-loan to ONEA of US$ 28m; maturity 
of 20 years with 10 years grace period for the 
principal - PAD p.50) 
 
 
- IDA grant to GoB.   
- GoB on-grant to ONEA of US$ 25.87m 
(half of total IDA funds for water supply 
component)  
- GoB on-loan to ONEA of US$ 26.87m (half 
of total IDA funds for water supply 
component) 
- GoB on-grant of US$ 24.4m for (all) 
sanitation component. 
 
- IDA credit to GoT: 40 year term; 10 
year grace period; annual interest rate  
- GoT on-grant to DAWASA of funds for 
all consulting services and 60% of 
infrastructure construction 
- GoT on-loan to DAWASA of funds for 
40% of infrastructure construction; 15 
year term; 5 years grace period; interest 
rate 11.5% 
 
Outcome/ 
Impact key 
performance 
indicators  
 
 
 
- Urban centres receiving civil works add at 
least 50,000 new connections or standposts 
- GWCL in the five largest cities meet 100% of 
their cash obligations from collected 
revenues 
- 2 well-targeted pro-poor programmes are put 
in place by PURC. 
 
 
- Increased water reliability (24 hours per day) 
- Population connected to the water network 
from 300,000 inhabitants to 800,000 
inhabitants in 2007 
- Recovery rate from private customers from 
86% in 2000 to 92% at the end of 2004 and 
95% thereafter 
- Accounts receivable of private customers from 
160 days to less than 120 days at the end of 
2004 and to 90 days in 2006 
- Productivity of commercial staff from 186 to 
230 in Ouagadougou at the end of 2006 and 
thereafter 
- Financial statements prepared according to 
international standards (on time and certified 
for year 2002). 
 
- Percentage of population having access to 
safe water in Ouagadougou, Bobo-
Dioulasso, Koudougou and Dédougou 
- Percentage of population having access to 
adequate sanitation services in 
Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso 
- Additional individuals in the project having 
access to improved water sources through 
household connections and standpipes 
- Additional individuals in the project area 
having access to improved onsite sanitation 
facilities 
- Additional students in the project area have 
access to adequate sanitation in their 
schools 
- Financial equilibrium of the urban water 
sector maintained with the implementation 
of an agreed tariff policy based on cost 
recovery 
- Ratio of ONEA‟s water employees per 
1,000 connections 
- Bill collection ratio of private water 
customers. 
 
 
- 70% of customers obtain 24 hour water 
supply service under adequate pressure 
- 100% of water samples taken meet the 
water quality standards specified in the 
Lease contract 
- 80% of sewage collected is treated and 
95% of effluent samples meet specified 
standards 
- A life-line tariff for domestic customers 
is fully implemented 
- Revenues from water and sewerage 
services cover all operations and 
maintenance and allow for a 10% 
contribution to the construction costs of 
the project. 
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